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ABSTRACT
To the modern corporate scholar and lawyer, the internal affairs doctrine seems 
in the natural order of things.  Corporate law is state law.  Each corporation is formed 
under the law of its chosen state of incorporation.  To ensure consistency and 
predictability, that law must govern the corporation’s internal affairs.  Yet the origin of 
such a doctrine is puzzling.  Respecting the firm’s choice of corporate law, the doctrine 
forces state legislatures into competition to attract incorporations.  But how did 
legislatures come to concede their traditional territorial regulatory authority, and instead 
agree to compete?  This Article solves this puzzle, offering the first account of the 
doctrine’s surprising origins.  In so doing, it also raises an important challenge to
regulatory competition proposals generally, which are all the rage today, and which rely 
on U.S. corporate law as their prototype.
Widespread acceptance of the internal affairs doctrine among U.S. states assures
that a firm’s choice of corporate law will be respected outside the incorporating state.  
According to the dominant paradigm, this respect for firm choice creates a common 
market for corporate law, enabling regulatory competition.  Both proponents and critics 
of competition agree that state legislatures compete—or at least have competed—to sell 
corporate charters to raise state revenues.  In the debate over state competition, all sides 
take the internal affairs doctrine as a given.  But if legislators compete to maximize 
private benefits in the form of state revenues, why do states recognize foreign 
corporation law at all?  How did state legislatures ever come to surrender their 
traditional territorial jurisdiction, and instead agree to a choice of law convention
forcing them into direct competition?
To date, the puzzle of the internal affairs doctrine has been overlooked.  The 
doctrine’s existence has been taken for granted, requiring little in the way of comment, 
criticism, or explanation.  I explain the unexpected origins of the doctrine and its 
persistence through the early years of modern charter competition in the early part of 
the twentieth century.  This historical analysis shows that the doctrine’s origin had 
nothing to do with regulatory competition.  Instead, it emerged before state charter 
competition, at a time when firms had little choice about where to incorporate.
Competition came later, under circumstances radically different from those under which 
the doctrine was first articulated.  That the earlier-crafted doctrine later facilitated 
regulatory competition was hardly by design.  Instead, its path to facilitating modern 
charter competition depended on a fortuitous sequence of events, driven by ideology, 
interest group influences, and institutional inertia.  This story of historical contingency 
debunks common assumptions about the emergence of the doctrine, which modern
corporate scholars implicitly view to have been inevitable.
ii
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Solving the puzzle of the internal affairs doctrine has important implications for 
regulatory competition generally.  Competition proposals abound in other regulatory 
areas and often rely on charter competition as their prototype. These public choice 
constructions of regulatory behavior depend on regulators’ assumed pursuit of private 
benefits to realize the advantages of competition, yet they ignore critical questions of 
institutional design and evolution.  Competition proponents seem content to assume that 
rational regulators would happily surrender their traditional territorial authority—their 
regulatory monopolies.  The story of the internal affairs doctrine, however, suggests that 
markets for law may not emerge spontaneously.  Instead, regulatory competition may 
require a perfect historical storm.
Keywords:  regulatory competition, corporate law, choice of law, federalism, 
legal history.
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BEFORE COMPETITION:  ORIGINS OF THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS DOCTRINE
Frederick Tung*
Every State in this country has enacted laws regulating corporate 
governance. . . . Large corporations that are listed on national exchanges, 
or even regional exchanges, will have shareholders in many States and 
shares that are traded frequently.  The markets that facilitate this national 
and international participation in ownership of corporations are essential 
for providing capital not only for new enterprises but also for established 
companies that need to expand their businesses.   This beneficial free 
market system depends at its core upon the fact that a corporation—except 
in the rarest situations—is organized under, and governed by, the law of a 
single jurisdiction, traditionally the corporate law of the State of its 
incorporation.1
I. INTRODUCTION
To the modern corporate scholar and lawyer, the internal affairs doctrine seems 
in the natural order of things.  Corporate law is state law.  Each corporation is formed 
under the law of its chosen state of incorporation.  To ensure consistency and 
predictability, that law must govern the corporation’s internal affairs.2  But the origin of 
such a doctrine is puzzling.  Respecting the firm’s choice of corporate law, the doctrine 
forces state legislatures into competition to attract incorporations.  But how did 
legislatures come to concede their traditional territorial regulatory authority, and instead 
agree to compete?  This article solves this puzzle, offering the first account of the 
doctrine’s surprising origins. In so doing, it also raises an important challenge to
* Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law.  A.B. 1983, Cornell; J.D. 1987, Harvard Law 
School.  For helpful comments and conversation, I owe thanks to Bobby Ahdieh, Bill Buzbee, Deborah 
DeMott, Vic Fleischer, Michael Kang, Rob Kar, Brett McDonnell, Katie Pratt, Larry Ribstein, Michael 
Solimine, Lynn Stout, and Adam Winkler, as well as participants at workshops at Emory University 
School of Law, Indiana University School of Law, UCLA School of Law, University of Minnesota Law 
School, William and Mary School of Law, the Canadian Law and Economics Association 2004 Annual 
Meeting, the Association of American Law Schools 2005 Annual Meeting, Section on Business 
Associations, and the Law and Society Association 2005 Annual Meeting.
1
 CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89-90 (1987) (emphasis supplied).
2 To many corporate lawyers, the “internal affairs” doctrine—the notion that only one state, 
almost always the site of incorporation, should be authorized to regulate the relationships among 
a corporation and its officers, directors, and shareholders—is irresistible, if not logically 
inevitable.  Convenience and predictability of application, it is said, dictate that one body of 
corporate law govern internal affairs, while the most plausible state to supply that law is the state 
of incorporation, to whose legislative grace the corporation owes its legal existence.
Deborah A. DeMott, Perspectives on Choice of Law for Corporate Internal Affairs, 48 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 161 (1985) (citations omitted).
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regulatory competition proposals generally, which are all the rage today, and which 
often look to U.S. corporate law as their prototype.  
For disputes over a corporation’s internal affairs—the relations among a firm’s 
shareholders and managers—states generally apply the law of the incorporating state.  
The widespread acceptance of this doctrine enables a firm to incorporate under the law 
of any state, knowing its choice will be respected elsewhere.  According to the 
prevailing wisdom, this respect for firm choice creates a common market for corporate 
law.  It treats corporate law as a product and sparks regulatory competition among the
states.3
Both proponents and critics of corporate regulatory competition have long held
that state legislatures compete to sell corporate charters in order to raise state revenues.4
In this debate, the internal affairs doctrine is taken as a given.  Scholars further agree 
that the features of corporate law result from the pursuit of private benefits by 
legislators and firm managers.  In the juxtaposition of these assumptions, however, a 
question arises:  why do maximizing legislators recognize foreign corporation law at 
all?  How did state legislatures ever come to surrender their traditional territorial 
regulatory jurisdiction in this one area of law, and instead agree to a choice of law 
3 ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 1-13 (1993) (noting firm choice of 
corporate law independent of physical presence and resulting state competition); Frank H. Easterbrook & 
Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 Va. L. Rev. 669, 697 (1984) 
(“Because only one state's law governs the 'internal affairs' of a corporation, competition can be 
effective.”); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation 107 
YALE L.J. 2359, 2408 (1998) (noting relation between internal affairs doctrine and regulatory 
competition); Edward Rock, Securities Regulation as Lobster Trap:  A Credible Commitment Theory of 
Mandatory Disclosure, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 675, 702 (2002) (describing relation between internal affairs 
doctrine and regulatory competition); Erin A. O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in 
Choice of Law, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1151, 1162 (2000) (describing role of internal affairs doctrine in 
enabling jurisdictional competition over corporate law); Michael J. Whincop and Mary Keyes, The 
Market Tort in Private International Law, 19 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 215, 266 (1999) (“[The internal 
affairs doctrine] has formed the basis of jurisdictional competition for incorporations in the United 
States.”); David A. Skeel, Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and Corporation Bankruptcy, 72 
TEX. L. REV. 471, 521 (1994) (noting that internal affairs doctrine is “crucial component” of state charter 
competition).    
4 See sources cited infra note 35.  A recent strand in the literature argues that states no longer compete—
at least not vigorously—but that Delaware now dominates the market.  Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, 
The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679 (2002) (arguing that states do 
not compete with Delaware, and political considerations are the reason why); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & 
Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk:  Reconsidering the Debate on State Competition over 
Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553 (2002) (apply industrial organization theory to explain why states 
do not compete with Delaware).  These scholars recognize, though, that states have in the past competed.  
Scholars have also recently begun to debate the significance of the federal government’s influence on the 
content of state corporate law.  In recent papers, Mark Roe has argued that the federal government has 
significant—and perhaps dominant—influence on the content of U.S. corporate law, and therefore that 
the state competition debate has been misguided.  Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 588 (2003); Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491 (2005).  Roberta Romano 
disputes Roe’s thesis, asserting the continuing significance of competition among states.  Roberta 
Romano, Is Regulatory Competition a Problem or Irrelevant for Corporate Governance? (Yale Law 
School, Center for Law, Economics and Public Policy, Research Paper No. 307, March 2005), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=693484. 
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convention forcing them to compete? In short, why did states allow firms to choose
their corporate law?  
Lawmakers ordinarily legislate with a territorial reach.  Nations, states, and 
other political subdivisions are based on territorial borders—identifiable boundaries—
and lawmakers generally enjoy prescriptive authority within their borders.5  In the 
microeconomic parlance, they enjoy a certain monopoly on law.  The monopoly might 
be contested, of course.  More than one jurisdiction may assert its power to prescribe 
rules to govern a particular activity or transaction.  Within this contest, however, it is 
highly unusual for a sovereign voluntarily to forswear its prescriptive jurisdiction over 
activity that occurs wholly or predominantly within its own territory.  Especially given 
the rich returns enjoyed first by New Jersey,6 and later by Delaware, as the primary 
purveyor of corporate charters to public companies,7 legislatures’ deference to firm 
choice seems puzzling.  Here, monopolists willingly foreswore their respective 
monopolies to allow their markets to be contested.  Why not instead mandate local law 
for firms engaging in local business?8
Much ink has been spilled in the debate over corporate charter competition and 
its social welfare implications.9  Yet to date, the puzzling nature of the internal affairs 
doctrine has been overlooked.  Though it has long been the dominant rule among the
states,10 the doctrine’s existence has been taken for granted, requiring little by way of 
comment, criticism, or explanation.  Its origins have gone unexplored.
In this Article, I address this puzzle.  I explain the origins of the internal affairs 
doctrine and its persistence through the early years of modern charter competition 
through the early part of the twentieth century.11 This historical analysis reveals that the 
doctrine’s origin had nothing to do with regulatory competition.  The doctrine emerged 
before state charter competition did, at a time when firms had little choice about where 
to incorporate.  Firms ordinarily incorporated in their home states—where their 
operations were located and where their organizers lived.  In this context, the deference 
to the incorporating state embodied in the internal affairs doctrine merely recognized 
each state’s territorial sovereignty over local firms.  The doctrine did not vindicate 
private choice, since firms had no choice about where to incorporate.  Instead, at its 
genesis, the internal affairs doctrine simply allocated territorial regulatory authority 
5
 In a federal system, regulatory overlap among different levels of government may be common, but even 
then, law, constitutions, and custom tend to delineate which level of political authority may regulate 
particular issue areas.
6 See infra notes 253-258 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
8
 Granted, too heavy a regulatory hand might discourage firms from doing business in a state.  But in
other areas of regulation, the conventional response to such competitive pressure is to adjust the 
substance of the regulation to mitigate its burden—not to allow firms to opt out in favor of other law.  
Jurisdictions adjust their tax laws, their tort laws, or their workers’ compensation laws in response to 
firms’ grumblings.  But they do not leave it to firms to choose.  Offering opt out seems extreme.
9 See infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
10 See Elvin R. Latty, Pseudo-Foreign Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 137 (1955); DeMott, supra note 2. 
11
 The doctrine’s continuing persistence after the early part of the twentieth century is the subject of a 
subsequent Article.
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among sovereigns—a useful function for regulatory monopolists.  Competition came 
later, under circumstances radically different from those under which the doctrine was 
first articulated.  Only with the rise of large interstate firms, and with New Jersey’s 
pioneering strategy of actively marketing charters to firms with no economic ties to the 
state, did the internal affairs doctrine come to facilitate regulatory competition.  That the 
earlier-crafted doctrine later facilitated state competition was hardly by design.  Rather, 
its path to facilitating modern charter competition depended on a fortuitous sequence of 
events, driven by ideology, interest group influences, and institutional inertia. 12
This story of historical contingency debunks common assumptions about the
emergence of doctrine, which many modern scholars implicitly view to have been
inevitable.  Two conceptions of such inevitability seem particularly popular.  Some 
scholars have argued that the doctrine has Constitutional origins.13 These scholars 
assert that charter competition—and implicitly, the modern internal affairs doctrine—
was a direct result of the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause decisions in the 1860s
precluding states from regulating foreign corporations engaged in interstate 
commerce.14 Other scholars suggest that the doctrine’s modern functional advantages 
explain its emergence:  because it offers consistency and predictability for firm 
managers and investors, and because it promotes efficient private ordering, the doctrine 
was foreordained.  Since it makes sense in the modern context, the logic goes, the 
doctrine’s widespread acceptance was inevitable.15 My historical account undermines
both these explanations.16
12 My historical explanation applies the lessons of what Ron Harris has dubbed the Historical New 
Institutional Economics (HNIE).  Ron Harris, The Encounters of Economic History and Legal History, 21 
LAW & HIST. REV. 297 (2003).  Eschewing functionalist approaches, HNIE focuses instead on the origins 
of institutions and the coalitions on which they are founded.  Kathleen Thelen, Historical Institutionalism 
in Comparative Politics, 2 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 369, 400 (1999).  Timing matters.  The historical view 
implies that rules and institutions embody the results of the temporal processes that led to their creation.  
Unintended consequences are commonly observed, and they often take on a life of their own.  Lee J. 
Alston, Empirical Work in Institutional Economics:  An Overview, in EMPIRICAL STUDIES IN 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (Lee J. Alston et al., eds. 1996).  These themes feature prominently in the 
following analysis.
13 See infra Part IV.D.  Assertions of the doctrine’s Constitutional underpinnings have taken another form 
as well.  Some have argued that recent cases on state antitakeover statutes have Constitutionalized the 
doctrine under the Commerce Clause.  See infra note 31.  Recent takeover cases, of course, cannot 
explain the doctrine’s origin.
14 See infra Part IV.D.
15 See infra Part II.A.
16
 As for the 1860s Commerce Clause cases, I consider and reject arguments that these cases played a 
decisive role in generating charter competition or that they foreordained the modern internal affairs 
doctrine.  I show instead that states retained significant power to regulate foreign corporations, but that 
political and economic conditions toward the end of the nineteenth century disfavored such regulation.  
See infra Part IV.D.  Common functionalist explanations for the internal affairs doctrine likewise fail to 
explain the doctrine’s origins.  Indeed, functionalist approaches overlook the puzzle of the doctrine’s 
origins entirely.  The modern doctrine no doubt serves the ends of consistency and predictability, so 
familiar to contemporary discussion of corporate charter competition and implicitly sanctioned in CTS.  
Similarly, its vindication of parties’ private choice of law may offer efficiency gains.  Identifying the 
doctrine’s consequences, however, does not explain its causes.  My historical account shows that the 
doctrine did not emerge to serve these functional goals, however desirable they may be in the modern 
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Solving the puzzle of the internal affairs doctrine has important implications for 
regulatory competition generally.  Competition proposals abound in other regulatory 
areas,17 demanding fundamental institutional reform and relying on charter competition 
as a prototype.  These public choice constructions of regulatory behavior depend on 
regulators’ assumed pursuit of private benefits to realize the advantages of competition, 
yet they ignore critical questions of institutional design and evolution.  Competition 
proponents seem content to assume that rational regulators would readily surrender the 
territorial prescriptive authority they have traditionally enjoyed—that regulators would
give up their regulatory monopolies and simply let firms choose.  The story of the 
internal affairs doctrine, however, suggests that markets for law may not emerge 
spontaneously.  Instead, regulatory competition may require a perfect historical storm.
The Article is organized as follows.  In Part II, I elaborate on the puzzling nature 
of the internal affairs doctrine.  Parts III and IV together explain the doctrine’s initial 
articulation by the courts.  In Part III, I explain the historical ideological underpinnings 
of the doctrine.  In Part IV, I describe courts’ first enunciation of the internal affairs 
doctrine in the mid-late nineteenth century and the territorial corporate law context in 
which this occurred.  Part V describes the advent of modern charter competition and the
new role for the internal affairs doctrine in enabling that competition.  I first recount the 
great merger movement at the turn of the twentieth century and New Jersey’s role in 
instigating modern “strong-form” law-as-a-product charter competition.  I then explain 
the political economy of the early modern internal affairs doctrine—why state 
legislatures were willing to surrender their territorial prerogatives with respect to 
corporate law.  I conclude in Part VI, pulling together the various historical strands to 
summarize the puzzle’s solution and suggesting broader implications of this analysis for 
the promise of regulatory competition reform generally.  
context.  Instead, the practice of charter competition evolved around the already extant internal affairs 
doctrine.  See infra Part II.A.
17 See infra note 340 and accompanying text.
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II. THE PUZZLE OF THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS DOCTRINE
To corporate lawyers and corporate law scholars, the internal affairs doctrine 
seems unremarkable.  It seems always to have been a part of the corporate law
landscape.  Modern justifications for the doctrine seem rational, and so it must ever 
have been thus.  
But the internal affairs doctrine is remarkable.  “The remarkable feature of the 
development of American law in this area was its openness and the willingness of the 
states to permit local entrepreneurs to incorporate elsewhere and thus to select the legal 
regime that would govern them.”18 In this Part, I first summarize the modern doctrine.  
I then elaborate on its puzzling nature.
A. The Doctrine
In its modern form, the internal affairs doctrine is a choice of law rule, widely 
accepted among states,19 that selects the law of the incorporating state to govern 
disputes over the corporation’s internal affairs.20  Corporate lawyers and corporate 
scholars take the doctrine for granted.21  Its widespread acceptance among the states 
suggests the relative lack of controversy surrounding the rule.22
18
 William J. Carney, The Political Economy of Competition for Corporate Charters, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 
303, 314 (1997).
19
 A handful of states—California and New York most notably—impose their own local requirements on 
certain foreign corporations as to certain issues.  See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (2001); N.Y. BUS. CORP. 
LAW § 1317-1320 (2002).  
20
 McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206 (Del. 1987).  The Restatement (Second) of Conflicts defines 
internal affairs as “the relations inter se of the corporation, its shareholders, directors, officers or agents—
and hence likewise fall within the scope of the rules of §§ 303-310.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 cmt. a (1971) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS].  Internal 
affairs include:
steps taken in the course of the original incorporation, the election or appointment of directors 
and officers, the adoption of by-laws, the issuance of corporate shares, preemptive rights, the 
holding of directors' and shareholders' meetings, methods of voting including any requirement 
for cumulative voting, shareholders' rights to examine corporate records, charter and bylaw 
amendments, mergers, consolidations and reorganizations and the reclassification of shares.  
Matters which may also affect the interests of the corporation's creditors include the issuance of 
bonds, the declaration and payment of dividends, loans by the corporation to directors, officers 
and shareholders, and the purchase and redemption by the corporation of outstanding shares of 
its own stock.   
Id.  Specific internal affairs include determination of shareholders, id. § 303; shareholder participation in 
management and profits, id. § 304; voting trusts, id. § 305; liability of a majority shareholder, id. § 306; 
shareholder liability to the corporation and its creditors, id. § 307; and director and officer liability to the 
corporation, its creditors, and shareholders, id. § 309.
21
 “[T]he lex incorporationis principle is generally treated as axiomatic.”  Kozyris, supra note 42, at 19.
22
 “The doctrine is widely accepted and has become enshrined in the Revised Model Business 
Corporation Act as a statutory choice of law rule.”  Carney, supra note 18, at 314.  The Model Act 
provides that it “does not authorize this state to regulate the organization or internal affairs of a foreign 
corporation authorized to transact business in this state.”  MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 
15.05(c) (1984).  The official comment elaborates that this provision “preserves the judicially developed 
doctrine that internal corporate affairs are governed by the state of incorporation even when the corporate 
business and assets are located primarily in other states.”  Id. § 15.05(c) official cmt.  The Model Act 
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The standard rationales for the doctrine also seem simple and straightforward:  
the doctrine offers predictability for firms and their investors; it offers uniform 
treatment of all shareholders; it vindicates the parties’ choice of law.  Unlike more 
complex conflicts analyses used in other areas of law,23 the internal affairs doctrine 
offers a consistent choice of law for firms and their investors, for whom certainty is said 
to be critical.  Moreover, shares of stock within the same class are meant to enjoy 
identical rights.  Disputes among corporate managers and shareholders would therefore 
seem to be an area where the same substantive rules must apply across the board.  
Different laws to govern identical disputes could place the parties in untenable 
positions.24 In addition, the doctrine vindicates corporate managers’ and shareholders’ 
choice of governing law.25
To the extent commentators have attempted to explain the doctrine’s existence, 
they have done so merely by pointing out these standard rationales. The doctrine makes 
sense.  It functions well in promoting these various laudable goals. Enhancing the 
predictable enforcement of private choices, it is efficient.
Under the prevailing conflicts practice, . . . [courts] have consistently 
applied the law of the state of incorporation to the entire gamut of internal 
corporate affairs.  In many cases, this is a wise, practical, and equitable choice. 
It serves the vital need for a single, constant and equal law to avoid the 
fragmentation of continuing, interdependent internal relationships. . . . It 
validates the autonomy of the parties in a subject where the underlying policy of 
the law is enabling. It facilitates planning and enhances predictability. . . .  
[A]pplying local internal affairs law to a foreign corporation just because it is 
amenable to process in the forum or because it has some local shareholders or 
some other local contact is apt to produce inequalities, intolerable confusion, 
provision has been adopted by a number of states.  Jennifer J. Johnson, Risky Business:  Choice-of-Law 
and the Unincorporated Entity, 1 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 249, 271-72 and n.86 (1997).
Some scholars have noted that the internal affairs doctrine is hardly uniformly followed.  Elvin R 
Latty, Pseudo-Foreign Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 137 (1955) (collecting cases); Jed Rubenfeld, State 
Takeover Legislation and the Commerce Clause:  The “Foreign” Corporations Problem, 36 CLEVELAND 
ST. L. REV. 355 (1988) (collecting cases and arguing that internal affairs doctrine is incoherent).  
However, even the cases that apply local law to a foreign corporation typically attempt to explain away 
the applicability of the doctrine—for example, by suggesting that the particular facts somehow do not 
implicate internal corporate affairs.
23
 Absent effective choice by the parties, the general rule described in the Restatement (Second) of 
Conflicts requires the weighing of various factors in a search for the jurisdiction with the “most 
significant relationship” to the parties and transaction at issue. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS, 
supra note 20, §§ 6, 188.
24
 For example, it is impossible for the corporation to honor inconsistent laws of two different 
jurisdictions regarding cumulative versus straight voting.  DeMott, supra note 2, at 175-76.  
25
 Managers make an explicit choice by having selected the particular state of incorporation, and 
shareholders make an implicit choice by deciding to invest in that corporation.  See sources cite in supra 
note 42.
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and uncertainty, and intrude into the domain of other states that have a superior 
claim to regulate the same subject matter.26
Describing the doctrine’s functional consequences, however, does not explain its 
causes.
B. The Puzzle
Functional accounts of the internal affairs doctrine seem to suggest some 
rational design behind the doctrine.  Roberta Romano, for example, locates the “genius” 
of American corporate law in its system of state charter competition.  “[P]rivate parties 
are persistent in devising institutions that circumvent or minimize the effect of political 
constraints on economic development.  The genius of American corporate law in this 
regard is that the dynamics of state competition reduces the number of extraneous 
regulations that must be bypassed.”27  On this view, the emergence of the internal 
affairs doctrine to facilitate competition would seem inevitable, a product of history’s 
inexorable march to efficiency.  From this efficiency perspective, it is difficult to 
imagine a different approach to corporate choice of law.  The doctrine’s existence must 
necessarily have resulted from its survival as the “fittest” institutional design, to be 
preferred against all others.28
From a political economy perspective, however, the existence of the doctrine 
leaves an awkward gap in the regulatory competition story for those who tell it.  Race-
to-the-top and race-to-the-bottom scholars agree that states and their legislatures
compete to offer attractive corporate law in order to garner revenues from the sale of 
corporate charters.  But as Adam Smith observed long ago,29 and as every business 
person knows, sellers would rather not compete.  Instead, they prefer protected markets.  
Unlike private sellers, states have a ready method of protecting their regulatory markets.  
They can legislate their own protection:  they can mandate local corporate law for firms 
doing business within their borders.30  Instead, however, since the late nineteenth 
26
 Kozyris, supra note 42, at 98.  See also ROBERT LEFLAR ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 700 (4th
ed. 1986) (citing uniformity of shareholder treatment as justifying internal affairs doctrine); Romano, 
supra note 3, at 2403 (noting uniformity of treatment of shareholders as widely cited justification for 
internal affairs doctrine); P. John Kozyris, Some Observations on State Regulation of Multistate 
Takeovers—Controlling Choice of Law through the Commerce Clause, 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 499, 510 
(1989) (“Internal corporate affairs should be subjected to a unitary, cohesive, consistent, predictable, 
equal, and continuous regime of regulation.”); Ribstein, supra note 42 (noting efficiency of internal 
affairs doctrine). 
27 ROMANO, supra note 3, at 147.
28 See generally, JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSEN, REDISCOVERING INSTITUTIONS 54 (1989) 
(describing efficient evolution view of history).
29
 “People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the 
conversation ends in a conspiracy against the publick, or in some contrivance to raise prices.”  ADAM 
SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 145 (R.H. Campbell et 
al. eds., Oxford Press 1976) (1775).
30
 This might of course subject a multistate firm to inconsistent or excessive regulation, but that issue has 
not stopped individual states from regulating in all sorts of areas—employment law, environmental law, 
tort law, for example.  To the extent a corporation might find it impossible to comply with inconsistent 
rules—regarding its internal corporate affairs or in some other area—it might just have to withdraw from 
doing business in some states.  Presumably, in this situation, the corporation would have to choose a 
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century, these supposed maximizing legislatures have allowed their markets to be 
contested.  They have generally permitted firms to opt out of their local corporate law.  
They have condoned competition among states by acquiescing to the internal affairs 
doctrine.  Why?31 Modern functionalist explanations about consistency and 
predictability cannot account for the doctrine’s origin or explain its persistence in 
facilitating charter competition.
As is well known, Delaware is the leading supplier of corporate charters for 
publicly traded companies in the United States.  It finances a large proportion of its state 
budget through the franchise taxes it charges its incorporated firms.32 Its consistent 
ability to generate hundreds of millions of dollars each year through the sale of 
corporate charters has attracted imitators, admirers, and critics.33 Likewise, New Jersey 
compliance strategy than would enable it to remain doing business in its most economically advantageous 
set of states.
31
 Some courts and commentators have suggested over the years that the internal affairs doctrine is 
Constitutionally mandated.  See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S.Ct. 1637, 1650 (1987) 
(hinting that internal affairs doctrine may be required under dormant Commerce Clause); Kozyris, supra 
note 42 (arguing that full faith and credit clause and dormant commerce clause mandate internal affairs 
doctrine); Robert E. Suggs, Business Combination Antitakeover Statutes:  The Unintended Repudiation of 
the Internal Affairs Doctrine and Constitutional Constraints on Choice of Law, 56 OHIO ST. L. J. 1097, 
1131 (1995) (asserting that CTS decision “strongly suggests” internal affairs doctrine is Constitutionally 
required).  Cf. Richard M. Buxbaum, The Threatened Constitutionalization of the Internal Affairs 
Doctrine in Corporation Law, 75 CAL. L. REV. 29 (1987) (discussing and opposing Constitutionalization 
of internal affairs doctrine).  In a bit of perhaps parochially motivated piling on, the Delaware Supreme 
Court has argued that the internal affairs doctrine is Constitutionally required under the Commerce 
Clause, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment.  McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 
A.2d 206, 216 (Del. 1987).  However, because the doctrine is of much earlier vintage than any suggestion 
of Constitutional mandate, that cannot serve as a causal explanation.  Moreover, no historical evidence 
appears to suggest that states viewed the internal affairs doctrine as a Constitutional mandate. See infra 
Part IV.C.
32
 These fees account for more than 20% of Delaware state revenues.  Robert Daines, The Incorporation 
Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1566 (2002).
33 See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 4, at 556 n.13 (noting that Delaware collected approximately 
$600 million on franchise fees in 2001).  
Over the last century, various states have attempted to duplicate Delaware’s success and steal 
some of its market share.  Joel Seligman, A Brief History of Delaware’s General Corporation Law of 
1899, 1 DEL. J. CORP. L. 249, 283 (1976) (describing efforts of various states from 1967 through 1976); 
Kahan & Kamar, supra note 4, at 693 & nn. 41, 42 (noting modern efforts of Nevada, Maryland, and 
Pennsylvania to compete with Delaware).  None have had even modest success.  In fact, just the opposite 
has occurred.  Over time, Delaware has consolidated its position as the leading supplier of corporate 
charters for publicly traded companies.  In 1965, Delaware was the most popular state of incorporation 
for companies traded on the New York Stock Exchange, accounting for 35% of those firms.  Stanley A. 
Kaplan, Foreign Corporations and Local Corporate Policy, 21 VAND. L. REV. 433, 435 n.5 (1968).  New 
York was second with 13%.  Id.  In 1974, fifty-two of the largest 100 industrial companies were 
Delaware corporations; 251 out of the largest 500, and 448 of the largest 1,000 were also Delaware 
corporations.  Seligman, supra, at 283.  These 448 accounted for over 52% of the sales of the largest 
1,000 companies.  Id.  Today, Delaware accounts for 58% of all U.S. public company charters.  Bebchuk 
& Hamdani, supra note 4, at 578 (2002).  The vast majority of firms—97% percent of all U.S. public 
companies—incorporate either in their home state or Delaware.  Daines, supra note 32, at 1562.  
Delaware’s dominance is even more pronounced when the market for out-of-state incorporations is 
separately considered.  Among firms choosing to incorporate outside their home state, 85% choose 
Delaware.  Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 4. 
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enjoyed similar success and similar criticism as the original dominant purveyor of 
corporate charters before Delaware.34
Both admirers and critics of competition generally agree that some competition 
among states does occur—or at least has occurred—over corporate charter sales.  While 
there is no general agreement about whether this competition has been for good or ill,35
all sides recognize that a facilitative choice of law rule—the internal affairs doctrine—
has enabled the competition.36 However, the doctrine is taken as given.  Scholars
debate the myriad issues embedded in the “law as a product” idea and the analogy of 
political markets to product markets.37 They debate whether firm managers are 
sufficiently constrained to pursue investors’ welfare in their choice of corporate law.  
They debate whether and under what circumstances revenue incentives might spur 
legislatures into vigorous competition for corporate charters.  They debate the intensity 
of competition and its effects in shaping states’ corporate laws.  But the choice of law 
rule that enables this competition has always been treated simply as an exogenous 
phenomenon—it just is.
34 See infra 253-258 and accompanying text.  New Jersey lost its dominant position to Delaware when it 
voluntarily bowed out of the “chartermongering” game in 1913.  New Jersey governor Woodrow Wilson 
had won his bid to be President of the United States.  In his last few months as governor, Wilson now had 
a national constituency to be concerned with.  Responding to the widespread national criticism of New 
Jersey as the Traitor State, see infra Part V.A.2, Wilson pushed through the state legislature the famous 
“Seven Sisters” reforms that attempted to tighten up New Jersey’s corporation code.  CHRISTOPHER 
GRANDY, NEW JERSEY AND THE FISCAL ORIGINS OF MODERN AMERICAN CORPORATION LAW 81-82 
(1993).  This succeeded in driving all the New Jersey corporations to Delaware, which had been perhaps 
the most studious imitator of New Jersey’s chartermongering strategy.  Delaware was at the time already 
poised to take over New Jersey’s first mover advantage, having adopted New Jersey’s general 
incorporation statute essentially verbatim in 1899, and having had a state court declare in 1900 that in so 
doing, Delaware’s legislature must have intended that its courts follow New Jersey precedents in 
interpreting the statute.  Wilmington City Railway Co. v. People’s Railway Co., 47 A. 245, 254 (Del. Ch. 
1900).  Only a few years later, New Jersey unwound Wilson’s reforms in an attempt to get back into the 
chartering business.  But the great corporations had gone to Delaware for good.
35
 For thirty-odd years, corporate scholars have debated whether corporate charter competition benefits 
investors or only self-serving firm managers.  This debate over corporate law’s “race-to-the-top” versus 
“race-to-the-bottom” is a familiar one.  Classic race-to-the-top works include Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State 
Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977); Peter 
Dodd & Richard Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters:  “Unhealthy Competition” vs. Federal 
Regulation, 53 J. BUS. 259 (1980); Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on 
Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 913 (1982); Roberta Romano, 
Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985); FRANK H. 
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991).  Race-to-
the-bottom scholarship includes William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon 
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 
COLUM. L. REV. 1461 (1989); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable 
Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435 (1992).  See also Michael 
Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757 (1995) 
(suggesting that network effects may impede race to the top).  Cf. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. 
Miller, Toward an Interest- Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 498-509 
(1987) (describing role of Delaware corporate bar in influencing Delaware corporate law).
36 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
37
 For the seminal account of the differences between political markets and product markets, see George 
J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 10 (1971).
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But state legislatures control state choice of law rules just as they control 
substantive corporate law.  If the terms of competition were not to a state’s liking, why 
did they compete at all?  A state legislature could simply have decided not to honor firm 
choice, but could have applied local corporate law to all corporations doing some 
quantum of business in-state.  Such a move would have discouraged at least the local 
firms from incorporating in Delaware—or New Jersey before it—since firms’ chosen 
corporate law would not have been honored locally in any event.  From the very 
beginning of modern charter competition, a state legislature could have retained market 
share simply by refusing to recognize out-of-state incorporation.38 Imposing local law 
would also have enabled  legislators to strike their preferred balance among the various 
in-state interests affected by corporate law—firm managers, shareholders, creditors, 
employees, local communities, and competitors,39 for example—instead of leaving it to 
firms to choose.  Despite these various potential advantages for legislatures from
imposing local corporate law, the internal affairs doctrine emerged and persisted.  
C. Solving the Puzzle: Historical Context
Viewed as a snapshot—as an equilibrium captured in an instant in time—the
internal affairs doctrine is a puzzle.  Corporate scholars’ standard assumption about 
maximizing legislators does not allow for legislators’ widespread acceptance of a 
choice of law rule so seemingly inimical to their interests.  Solving this puzzle requires 
a turn to history.
From the early days of charter competition to today, the modern internal affairs 
doctrine has operated in a specific context.  Deference to the law of the incorporating 
state has enabled regulatory competition only because a firm may incorporate under the 
law of any state to do business in every state.  More particularly, (a) each state offers 
incorporation to any firm regardless of where the firm is physically located and where 
its organizers reside, and regardless of whether the firm has any other ties to its chosen 
state of incorporation; and (b) each state recognizes foreign corporations’ corporate 
status and allows them to do business in-state—again without regard to whether such
firms have substantive ties to their incorporating states.40
38
 Of course, this might just drive local firms to move out of state.
39
 Contemporary conventional wisdom does not include firm-employee relations within the scope of 
corporate law or corporate internal affairs.  However, recent proposals have called for their inclusion.  See 
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 
(1999).  Alternative constituency statutes also expressly recognize employees as corporate stakeholders 
and permit managers to consider them in corporate decision making.  See Comm. on Corporate Laws, 
Other Constituency Statutes:  Potential for Confusion, 45 BUS. LAW. 2253, 2260-63 (1990) (discussing 
alternative or “other” constituency statutes).  Finally, traditional restrictions in nineteenth century 
corporate law can be understood to protect employees and other stakeholders.  See infra Part IV.B.2.
40 It thus is an accepted part of the business landscape in this country for States to create 
corporations, to prescribe their powers, and to define the rights that are acquired by purchasing 
their shares.  A State has an interest in promoting stable relationships among parties involved in 
the corporations it charters, as well as in ensuring that investors in such corporations have an 
effective voice in corporate affairs.
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 91 (1987).
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In the modern context, these features seem unremarkable.  They seem part and 
parcel of the corporate law environment as we know it. However, it was not always 
thus.  The internal affairs doctrine arose in the context of territorial corporate law.
When courts first began to articulate the doctrine, firms had little choice about where to 
incorporate; they incorporated in their home states.  Shopping for a corporate charter 
across multiple states was not an option, since a state typically expected or required its 
domestic corporations to maintain economic ties with the state.  This expectation 
comported with the local nature of most businesses.  Firms transacted primarily if not 
exclusively in local product, labor, and capital markets.  A firm typically had an 
identifiable “center of gravity” in one state, and it incorporated there.41  Each state 
legislature effectively enjoyed a captive market for its corporate law, which was 
restrictive in nature.  Outside the state of incorporation, courts deferred jurisdiction over 
internal affairs disputes in favor of the courts of the incorporating state.  The doctrine 
served as a jurisdictional bar to courts outside the incorporating state, and not merely a 
choice of law rule.  This deference to the incorporating state recognized each state’s 
territorial sovereignty over its corporate entities.  Initially, this judge-made rule was 
consistent with legislators’ rent seeking interests.  It assured each legislature that sister 
states would not interfere with the legislature’s existing state monopoly on corporate 
law.  Ironically, the doctrine promoted market sharing among states with respect to 
corporate law, and not competition.42
Only later did competition over corporate law develop.  A confluence of events, 
including the great merger movement at the end of the nineteenth century, led to 
modern corporate charter competition and a new role for the internal affairs doctrine in 
facilitating that competition.43  New Jersey and other states began to grant charters to 
firms with which they enjoyed no substantive economic ties, and they began to price 
their charters to generate significant revenues.44  Firms now enjoyed a range of choices 
for their state of incorporation,45 and states had important political and financial 
incentives to offer enabling corporate law and to sell charters to all comers.46  Only in 
this context—when firms could choose their state of incorporation—did deference to 
the incorporating state also mean deference to firms’ choice of corporate law.  Only 
then did the internal affairs doctrine serve to facilitate modern charter competition.  
41 See infra notes 105-109.
42
 This history contrasts with modern corporate contractualism, which closely associates the internal 
affairs doctrine with the vindication of party autonomy and free contracting.  See Larry E. Ribstein, 
Choosing Law by Contract, 18 J. Corp. L. 245, 266 (1993) (“[T]he ‘internal affairs’ rule . . . provides for 
general enforcement of contractual choice of law in corporations.”); P. John Kozyris, Corporate Wars 
and Choice of Law, 1985 DUKE L. J. 1, 50 (“[T]he choice of the state of incorporation comes about by 
agreement among the organizers and its law is selected, explicitly or implicitly, to govern this private 
internal corporate relationship.”); O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 3, at 1202 (noting the internal affairs 
doctrine is consistent with, and lends support to, arguments justifying enforcement of choice-of-law 
clauses in other contexts). 
43 See infra Part V. 
44 See infra Part V.A.2.
45 See infra Part V.C.
46 See id.
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State legislatures could have revisited the internal affairs doctrine at this point.  
After all, corporate law was no longer territorially bound, and the doctrine no longer 
vindicated states’ territorial sovereignty or legislators’ regulatory monopolies.  On the 
contrary, respect for firm choice dissipated legislators’ monopolies.  It forced them to 
compete.  Legislatures could have excluded foreign corporations from doing intrastate 
business or attempted to impose local rules on those foreign corporations, thereby 
discouraging out-of-state incorporation.  However, local interest group pressures and 
barriers to collective action among state legislatures foreclosed such a strategy.47  Along 
with the merger movement came dramatic economic upheaval.  Large interstate firms 
came to dominate national markets, and local interests in each state developed 
economic relationships with these firms.  Legislatures could not afford to maintain 
restrictive corporate rules or impose them on foreign corporations.  That would have 
risked driving business out of state to the detriment of local interests.  Moreover, as it 
became clear that corporate law could no longer maintain any regulatory bite, 
legislatures substituted other territorially-based regulation to protect favored interest 
groups.  Legislatures lost interest in rent seeking through corporate law.48
And courts perpetuated the internal affairs doctrine.  Reminiscent of Cardozo’s 
disdained “tyranny of tags and tickets,”49 courts continued to parrot the earlier 
rationales, relying on notions of states’ sovereignty over their domestic corporations, 
despite the fact that now the state of incorporation might have no substantive ties to 
“its” corporations.  Institutional inertia preserved the basic notion of deference to the 
incorporating state,50 but now with the consequence of promoting competition and not 
monopoly.
47 See infra Part V.C.2.
48 See infra Part V.C.3.
49
 Benjamin N. Cardozo, Mr. Justice Holmes, 44 HARV. L. REV. 682, 688 (1931).
50 See generally Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law:  The Course and Pattern of Legal 
Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601 (2001) (discussing role of precedent in creating 
path dependent common law process).
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III. IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS:  TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY OVER LOCAL FIRMS
Modern corporate charter competition began at the end of the nineteenth century 
with the great merger movement.  It was then that the internal affairs doctrine first came 
to play its modern role in facilitating competition.  However, the doctrine was originally
articulated by courts in a very different context, earlier in the century before the advent 
of charter competition.  During most of the nineteenth century, states did not compete to 
sell corporate charters but instead enjoyed territorial monopolies on corporate law.  To 
understand how the modern internal affairs doctrine came ultimately to facilitate charter 
competition, we must study its initial articulation in this unfamiliar context.  Its pre-
merger movement evolution is the focus of this Part and the next.  In this Part, I recount 
the pre-industrial ideological origins of the doctrine, which courts later echoed in their 
enunciation of the doctrine.  The next Part describes the period of U.S. industrialization 
during which courts first articulated the doctrine.
The animating ideas behind the internal affairs doctrine were formed during the
pre-industrial period—from the American Revolution to the middle of the nineteenth 
century.  Before industrialization, businesses were small, predominantly family-run, 
local businesses.  Most were run as partnerships, and those that incorporated did so in 
their home states.51 Businesses transacted primarily in local product, labor, and capital
markets, and rarely had operations out-of-state.52 Foreign corporation questions rarely 
arose, as firms’ activities were typically confined to their home states.  States were 
generally assumed to enjoy territorial sovereignty over their domestic corporations.53
The conception of the corporation was also very different from its current 
conception.  Incorporation was not generally available to all who applied; instead, 
corporate charters were granted only sparingly, one-by- one, through special acts of state 
legislatures.  Each act was specifically tailored to the particular project proposed, with 
powers and privileges specifically defined.54 Not only were business corporations 
“creatures” of the state—in the sense that they came into existence through specific acts 
of state legislatures—but through the early part of the 19th century, they were viewed as 
agencies of the state.  Like the other more popular types of corporations of the day—
municipal, charitable, ecclesiastical, educational—business corporations were formed to 
pursue public purposes and were thought of as auxiliary organs of state government.55
This view of the corporation occasioned practices and associations between the 
corporation and state government that would be unthinkable today, when the business 
corporation is viewed primarily as a private profit-maximizing organization.  Business 
corporations were typically granted special privileges or delegated government powers 
thought necessary to the accomplishment of the particular projects undertaken.  For 
example, canal companies typically enjoyed eminent domain powers.  States were also 
51 See infra notes 105-107 and accompanying text.
52 See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
53 See infra Part III.C.
54 See infra Part III.B.1.
55
 As late as 1892, one treatise writer on statutory law categorized the law of business and private 
corporations as public law. E. MERRICK DODD, AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860 15 
(1954) (citing 2 FREDERICK J. STIMSON, AMERICAN STATUTE LAW 1 (1892)).
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often actively involved in financing or overseeing the management of their 
corporations, investing state funds and taking board seats.    
Given the close relations between state governments and the corporations they 
created, sovereignty considerations necessitated that each state should enjoy exclusive 
authority over the internal affairs of its corporations.  In the aftermath of the Revolution, 
each new state jealously guarded its sovereign prerogatives, and the later deference to 
the incorporating state embodied in the internal affairs doctrine—assuring each state 
singular control over the internal governance of its business corporations—followed 
naturally from these sovereignty concerns.  Writing in 1933, one commentator noted:
The early corporations trailed the clouds of glory of their sovereign origin.  Thus 
the East India Company wore the ermine:  late in the eighteenth century English 
courts dismissed a dispute over its breach of contract as a “political 
question.” . . .  It is not surprising to find indications, where “internal affairs” 
were involved, that a matter of some diplomatic nicety was at stake and even 
today, when general incorporation laws and nation-wide corporations are of 
course, courts hasten to add, in taking jurisdiction, that they are not exercising 
“visitorial powers.”56
Indeed, well into the twentieth century, the internal affairs doctrine was viewed as a 
jurisdictional bar—precluding courts from even adjudicating disputes involving foreign 
corporations’ internal affairs—and not merely a choice of law rule.57 Resting 
jurisdiction exclusively with the courts of the incorporating state invariably resulted in 
application0020of that state’s laws to the internal affairs dispute, so the choice of law 
outcome would be consistent with the modern doctrine.  
As a creature of the sovereign, each business corporation was thought to exist 
only within the territorial borders of the sovereign.  Since most businesses were local in 
character, this territorial notion was unremarkable and caused little controversy before 
56
 Note, Forum Non Conveniens and the “Internal Affairs” of a Foreign Corporation, 33 COLUM. L. 
REV. 492, 494-95 (1933) (citations omitted).  “Visitorial powers” were those powers “exercised by the 
founder of a corporation to make and enforce by-laws and to command faithful performance of duties by 
officers.”  Id. at 495 n.14.
57 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, 17 CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 8425 (perm. 
ed. 1933); RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 196, 197, 199 (1934); Kaplan, supra note 33, at 443.  
See also Erickson v. Nesmith, 86 Mass. 233 (1862); Williston v. Michigan So. & No. Indiana R.R. Co., 
95 Mass. 400 (1866); Smith v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 96 Mass. 336 (1867); Howell v. Chicago & Nw. 
Rwy. Co., 51 Barb. 378 (Sup. Ct. NY 1868); Redmond v. Enfield Mfg. Co., 13 Abb. Pr. (N.S.) 332 (Sup. 
Ct. NY 1872); North State Copper and Gold Min. Co. v. Field, 20 A. 1039, 1040 (Ct. App. Md. 1885); 
Wilkins v. Thorne, 60 Md. 253 (Ct. App. Md. 1883).  This jurisdictional bar also had certain practical 
underpinnings.  Especially with the early cases, courts recognized the difficulty of enforcing a judgment 
against a foreign corporation, at a time when corporate assets and corporate officers were not typically 
found outside the incorporating state.  As one court noted, “it is a little difficult to imagine how a court in 
[the District of Columbia] could restrain and direct the action of the corporation at its home office in the 
city of New York.”  Clark v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass’n, 14 App. D.C. 154 (1899).  See also 
Kansas & Eastern Constr. Co. v. Topeka, S. & W. R. R., 135 Mass. 34 (1883).  
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the mid-1800s.58 This ideology of territorial sovereignty helps explains how the 
internal affairs doctrine could later emerge as a consensus among states.59  Only the 
incorporating state was deemed to possess jurisdiction to decide disputes over its
corporation’s internal affairs because these disputes implicated the sovereignty of the 
incorporating state.  Courts of other states were unwilling to interfere.60
This ideology of sovereignty was also conveniently consistent with legislators’ 
rent seeking interests.  Because each grant of corporate privileges was effected by 
special act, legislators were able to exact tribute from the corporate promoters seeking 
these special privileges.61 The ideology of state sovereignty assured that legislative 
bargains would not be revisited by courts outside the incorporating state.62
A. Agencies of the State
Before 1800, the corporation was not uniquely or even predominantly a tool for 
commerce.  Municipal corporations—towns, districts, and other local government 
entities—and ecclesiastical, educational, and charitable corporations were far more 
common than business corporations.63  The benefits of incorporation were as important 
to these other types of organizations as they were to businesses:  “incorporation allowed 
a group to make binding rules for its self-government, to function in law as a single 
person with the right to hold property and to sue and be sued—and so to protect its 
58
 When businesses eventually began to expand to engage in transactions across state lines, states 
commonly imposed territorial restrictions on their domestic corporations and forbade foreign corporations 
from certain businesses and from owning real property in-state.  See infra Part IV.B.1.
59
 It is not too surprising that jurisdictional disputes would not have arisen before the 1860s.  Given the 
quasi-public conception of corporations, their close ties with state legislatures, and the fact that no 
distinctions were made among municipal, business, and other corporations, it would have been 
unthinkable during the pre-industrial period for a state’s legislature or court to attempt to interfere in the 
inner workings of the corporate creation of a sister state.
60
 Judicial opinions articulating the doctrine regularly noted the sovereign interests of the incorporating 
state that were at stake.  See infra notes 169, 336 and accompanying text.
61
 The graft and logrolling involved with special charters eventually caused popular resentment of the 
practice.  This was one factor that ultimately led to its demise.  See infra note 132 and accompanying text. 
62
 In the early years of the Republic, most states’ judges were appointed by the state legislature, and so 
could be assumed to be sensitive to legislators’ interests.  Symposium, The Case for Judicial 
Appointments, 33 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 353, 356-57 (2002).  Popular election of state judges became more 
common only by the mid-1800s.  James Andrew Wynn, Jr., Judging the Judges, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 753 
(2002).  With popular elections, of course, judges would feel the same local interest group pressures as 
legislators did.
Moreover, at least until the turn of the twentieth century, courts faced with internal affairs 
decisions consistently noted that jurisdiction could not exist absent statutory authority.  See, e.g. Erickson 
v. Nesmith, 86 Mass. 233 (1862); Halsey v. McLean, 94 Mass. 438 (Mass. 1866); Smith v. Mutual Life 
Insur. Co., 96 Mass. 336 (1867); Howell v. Chicago & Nw. Rwy. Co., 51 Barb. 378 (Sup. Ct. NY 1868); 
Stafford & Co. v. American Mills Co., 12 R.I. 310 (1881); North State Copper and Gold Min. Co. v. 
Field, 20 A. 1039, 1040 (Ct. App. Md. 1885).
63
 Pauline Maier, The Revolutionary Origins of the American Corporation, 50 WM. & MARY Q. 51, 53 
(1993) (describing pattern of incorporation acts in Massachusetts and other states before 1800).  
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assets—and to persist after the lifetimes of its founding members.”64  These various 
corporate entities were distinguishable from voluntary organizations insofar as they 
enjoyed a delegation of authority from the state that created them.  This authority 
included the power to coerce their membership—i.e., to enforce collective decisions—
for the public benefit.
Only the state had the authority to make laws sanctioned by force.  For reasons 
of its own it could, however, delegate some of its political powers.  Associations 
like the town and its offshoots, granted that privilege were political entities, little 
republics in Blackstone’s language, or bodies politic.  Contemporaries knew 
such societies as “corporations” and assumed that the general intent, the 
purpose, of all corporations was for better government, either general or 
special.65
For government entities, the power to govern and to tax were important coercive 
powers.  Business corporations enjoyed the power to retain members’ capital and 
property contributed to the corporation, despite a member’s disagreement with the 
corporation’s collective judgment.66  Before the advent of limited liability, the business 
corporation also enjoyed the power to enforce unlimited assessments against its 
members for the firm’s capital needs.67
While these various types of corporations seem quite different today, no legal 
distinctions were drawn among them.  In general, the same rules applied to them all.68
The common law of corporations developed in the context of religious or governmental 
entities was freely applied to business organizations, and legislative committees for 
corporate chartering handled petitions from municipal and ecclesiastical organizations 
as well as banks and manufacturing companies, without distinguishing among them.69
In particular, no distinctions were made between public and private corporations.  All
corporations, including business corporations, were conceived as public corporations 
and were expected to serve a public purpose.  “[N]o grant was forthcoming without 
justification in terms of the interests of the state as a whole.”70 Manufacturing 
companies were meant to promote public goals no less than municipal or charitable 
corporations, and private benefit to the corporation’s promoters was not a 
64 Id. at 54.  Limited liability for business corporations was an innovation of later vintage.  Oscar Handlin 
& Mary F. Handlin, Origins of the American Business Corporation, 5 J. ECON. HIST. 1, 17 (1945); Maier, 
supra note 63, at 55.
65 OSCAR HANDLIN & MARY FLUG HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH:  A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF 
GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY:  MASSACHUSETTS, 1774-1861 98 (1947) (citations omitted).  
66 Id.
67 Id. at 105; Seligman, supra note 33, at 255.
68
 “The most striking peculiarity found on first examination of the history of the law of business 
corporations is the fact that different kinds of corporations are treated without distinction, and, with few 
exceptions, as if the same rules were applicable to all alike.”  Samuel Williston, History of the Law of 
Business Corporations before 1800, 2 HARV. L. REV. 105 (1888).
69 JOSEPH STANCLIFFE DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS v. 2 4 
(1917).  This legislative practice continued in New Jersey until almost 1840.  Id.
70 HANDLIN & HANDLIN, supra note 65, at 78.
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consideration.71  Corporations were generally viewed as “agencies of government . . . 
for the furtherance of community purposes.”72  Even the business corporation “was 
conceived as an agency of government, endowed with public attributes, exclusive 
privileges, and political power, and designed to serve a social function for the state.”73
Moreover, the vast majority of business corporations chartered before 1800 were 
engaged in the provision of services traditionally associated with government.  Banks, 
water companies, and transportation companies—for the construction or operation of 
canals, turnpikes, and bridges—comprised the overwhelming majority of business 
corporations.74 While the number of purely private enterprises increased over time, the 
overall predominance of public service companies probably continued through mid-
century.75
Consistent with their public service purposes and indicative of their quasi-
governmental status, business corporations often enjoyed what today might appear to be 
drastic delegations of governmental authority.  Turnpike and canal companies, for 
example, typically enjoyed eminent domain powers, authority to plan routes, and 
authority to set toll rates.76 To encourage private investment in these sometimes risky 
71
 “That a particular venture would benefit the private estates of individuals seems to have been of no 
concern—or to have been a positive consideration—as long as the public’s welfare was also served.”  
Maier, supra note 63 at 56.  For example, the Beverly Cotton Manufactory, incorporated in 
Massachusetts in 1789, was expected to “promot[e] . . . useful manufactures, and particularly such as are 
carried on with materials of American produce within this Commonwealth,” which would advance “the 
happiness and welfare thereof, by increasing the agriculture and extending the commerce of the country.”  
PRIVATE AND SPECIAL STATUTES OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, FROM THE YEAR 1780, 
TO . . . 1805, I 24-26, 224-226 (1805). 
72 JAMES NEAL PRIMM, ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A WESTERN STATE:  MISSOURI, 
1820-1860 33 (1954).  As late as 1866, Angell and Ames noted in their famous treatise:
The object in creating a corporation is, in fact, to gain the union, contribution, and assistance of 
several persons for the successful promotion of some design of general utility . . . .  The principle 
is . . . that the design of a corporation is to provide for some good that is useful to the public.  
“[A]cts of incorporation . . . ought never to be passed, but in consideration of services to be 
rendered to the public.”
JOSEPH K. ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS AGGREGATE § 13 (8th ed. 1866) 
(quoting Roane, J. in Currie v. Mutual Ins. Soc. 4 Hen. & M. 347) (other citations omitted).
73
 Handlin & Handlin, supra note 64, at 22.
74
 By 1800, 317 business corporations had been chartered in the U.S., of which 13 were for 
manufacturing and other miscellaneous business.  Banks and insurance companies numbered 62.  The rest 
were transportation companies (207) and providers of local public services (36).  DAVIS, supra note 69, at 
27.
75
 There was some regional variation in the proportions.  In Pennsylvania, 2,333 special charters for 
business corporations were granted between 1790 and 1860.  About 1500 of these were for transportation 
companies; less than 200 were for manufacturing.  LOUIS HARTZ, ECONOMIC POLICY AND DEMOCRATIC 
THOUGHT, PENNSYLVANIA 1776-1860 38 (1948).  In New England, the combined number of charters for 
public utilities and finance consistently outnumbered mining and manufacturing charters before 1831.  
However, from 1831-1875, charters for mining and manufacturing were the majority.  William C. 
Kessler, Incorporation in New England:  A Statistical Study, 1800-1875, 8 J. ECON. HIST. 43, 47 (1948).
76
 “[I]n every state, . . . the very large powers of eminent domain . . . were transferred wholesale to the 
private sector.”  Harry N. Scheiber, Federalism and the American Economic Order, 1789-1910, 10 LAW 
& SOC. REV. 57, 95 (1975).  See also DODD, supra note 55, at 44 (citing State v. Town of Hampton, 2 
N.H. 22 (1819) (upholding eminent domain powers granted to turnpike corporation); Chesapeake & Ohio 
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public service projects, governments often included lucrative monopoly privileges or 
tax exemptions in the charters.77 In addition, governments were very generous in 
bailing out their failing corporate ventures with state lotteries, land grants, and increased 
tolls.78
B. State Involvement with Business Corporations
Given the public service orientation of early business corporations and the fact 
of their regard as public agencies, state legislatures not surprisingly took an active 
interest in the formation and subsequent operations of these firms.  This relationship 
between state legislatures and their corporations also helps to explain states’ claims to 
sovereignty over their corporations.  In the special chartering process, legislators paid 
close attention to the particular privileges and powers accorded to each corporation.  In 
addition, states frequently financed the projects of their corporate creations and 
exercised operational oversight.
1. Special Chartering
  A grant of corporate privileges was hardly a routine or mechanical 
administrative process, but was instead a power guarded quite jealously as a matter for 
the sovereign’s discretion.  In the English tradition,79 a grant of corporate privileges was 
viewed as a sovereign concession, and after the overthrow of English rule, state 
legislatures succeeded to this sovereign power.80  “As in the Eighteenth Century 
negotiations for these contracts were carried on with the crown, so in America they 
Canal Co. v. Key, 3 Cranch C.C. 599 (C.C.D.C 1829) (upholding eminent domain power granted to canal 
corporation)); Seligman, supra note 33, at 255.  Railroads also often enjoyed eminent domain powers.  
See Bonaparte v. Camden & A. R.R. Co., 3 Fed. Ca. 821, No. 1, 617 (C.C.D.N.J. 1830) (upholding 
eminent domain powers of railroad corporation).
77 When neither the [state] government nor any extant body politic was willing or able to 
execute a desirable but costly function, the state held out to a new corporation inducements in 
the shape of a promise of profits.  Such a promise became credible and attractive if fortified by 
the grant of a valuable franchise.  Tolls, lotteries, or monopolies, and the prestige that came from 
state sponsorship underwrote the expectation of gain and acted as an enticement for which the 
members would tax themselves and manage the coveted enterprise efficiently.
HANDLIN & HANDLIN, supra note 65, at 105.  As one early example, New Jersey had to offer significant 
monopoly rights and an extremely generous tax exemption to induce the building of the Camden and 
Amboy railroad line.  Harold W. Stoke, Economic Influences upon the Corporation Laws of New Jersey, 
38 J. POL. ECON. 551, 555 (1930). “[S]pecial monopolies were granted to the railroads which reserved to 
them all traffic rights between the points they were authorized to connect.  Privilege and exclusion, with a 
minimum of state regulation and control, were the rule in order to induce capital to invest heavily.” Id. at 
557.
78
 Handlin & Handlin, supra note 64, at 16 and n.82 (citing canal and bridge company examples); 
HANDLIN & HANDLIN, supra note 65, at 112 (describing Massachusetts state bail out of the Beverly 
Company with a land grant and lottery in 1790).
79
 Blackstone noted that “[t]he king’s consent is absolutely necessary to the erection of any corporation.”  
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 472.
80 DAVIS, supra note 69, at 8 (1917).  Early on, in 1778 the governor of New Jersey attempted 
unilaterally to grant a charter, but the legislature later voided that charter, declaring itself the sole 
authority for the exercise of the power of incorporation.  The governor agreed, and “the question was 
settled for good.”  Id. at 9.
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were carried on with the sovereign power of the various states as successors to the 
crown.  In practice this meant the state legislature.”81
Corporate charters were granted one by one through special acts.  By modern 
standards, corporate charters were quite restrictive and narrowly drawn.  Each charter 
was tailored to the specific business activity contemplated by the corporation’s 
promoters, and the particular privileges and powers of each corporation were required 
to be explicitly enumerated in its charter.82 Capitalization of the corporation was 
typically limited.  Corporate activities and the exercise of powers outside of those 
expressly authorized in the charter were ultra vires, subject to challenge by both the 
state and private interests.  The dynamics of the process were those typical of legislation
benefiting particular interests.  Logrolling was common:  individual legislators 
championed their constituents’ charter applications, securing the support of colleagues 
with the promise of reciprocal support for future acts of incorporation.  On occasion, 
governors vetoed acts of incorporation that offered too much in the way of privileges—
which would risk inciting the popular ire—or that triggered opposition from groups 
threatened by the prospective corporate competitor. 83
Privileges and powers might vary from one charter to the next, even for 
corporations engaged in the same type of business, depending on the “vagaries of 
individual bill drafters. . . for the lawmakers were casual and haphazard about including 
even clauses the principles of which were universally accepted.”84 In a very real sense, 
each corporation was uniquely a creation of the legislature that legislated its specific 
existence and granted its privileges and powers.85
2. State Financing  and Oversight
States were often actively involved with the financing or operations of their 
domestic corporations in ways that might seem unimaginable today but that are 
consistent with the public purposes for which corporations were formed.  As part of the 
81 ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 121 
(1968).
82 DODD, supra note 55.
83
 Maier, supra note 63, at 67 & n.54.  In later years, the governor of New Jersey vetoed several special 
acts of incorporation in order to deter the use of special charters and to encourage incorporation under 
New Jersey’s general corporation act.  JOHN W. CADMAN, JR., THE CORPORATION IN NEW JERSEY:  
BUSINESS AND POLITICS, 1791-1875 159-60 (1949).
84
 Handlin & Handlin, supra note 64, at 14.  
85
 Standardization eventually emerged, as states began to adopt standard forms of charters for the 
principal types of businesses.  For example, in 1805, Massachusetts enacted a law specifying the general 
powers and duties of turnpike corporations.  It did the same in 1809 for manufacturing companies.
Kessler, supra note 75, at 44.  Even then, however, charters were still considered individually and granted 
individually by legislative acts which relied on the standard forms.  Over the course of the nineteenth 
century, special charters became more and more standardized.  DODD, supra note 55, at 198 (“It was not 
long before there developed a tendency toward the adoption of standard forms for most of the principal 
business types.”); JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE 
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780-1970 136, 146 (1970); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF 
AMERICAN LAW 190 (1973).  Massachusetts had even passed a general incorporation act for aqueducts in 
1799 which codified principles embodied in sixteen earlier special acts.  Handlin & Handlin, supra note 
64, at 15.  
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price for the corporate privilege and state support, states often asserted themselves as 
active business partners with their domestic corporations, exercising control through 
board representation and requiring profit sharing.  While in the early years of the 
Republic, states burdened with Revolutionary War debts were not financially able to 
offer direct aid,86 the 1800s saw active state financing for corporations. 
Pennsylvania offers a good example.  From the early 1800s, the state was an 
active investor in its banks, turnpike companies, bridge companies, canals, and railroad 
companies.87 Having chartered and invested in the Bank of Pennsylvania in 1793, the 
Bank of Philadelphia in 1803, and the Farmers’ and Mechanics’ Bank in 1810, the state 
held bank shares with a par value of $1,990,793 after this last investment.88 These bank 
investments turned out to be quite profitable.  In 1816, dividends from bank stocks 
made up two-fifths of Pennsylvania’s state revenues.89 Bank stock dividends 
constituted the state’s “first and principal source of revenue,” according to a legislative 
committee in 1822.90 By 1835, the state held three-fifths of the stock of the Bank of 
Pennsylvania.91
State-appointed directors were also a typical feature of these corporations.  
Conflicts between state directors and private directors were also not uncommon, 
especially during times of economic downturn, when state interests and private interests 
might diverge.92  In one instance, dissatisfied with the returns on the state’s investments 
in transportation companies, the Pennsylvania legislature ultimately caused the 
appointment of state managers in all turnpike companies in which the state was the 
majority stockholder.93
States’ delegation of governmental authority to corporations also required 
particular oversight.  For example, exercise by canal companies of eminent domain 
86 HANDLIN & HANDLIN, supra note 65, at 64-67.
87 FRIEDMAN, supra note 85, at 169.  Hartz offers a useful graph showing the value of Pennsylvania’s 
stock holdings in various types of corporations from 1800-1860.  HARTZ, supra note 75, at 87.
88 Id. at 82-83.
89 Id. at 90 n.26.
90 Id. at 90 n.28.
91 Id. at 97.  Pennsylvania made investments of similar magnitude in its turnpike companies.  These 
investments grew from $61,937 in 1810 to over $1 million by 1820, and to over $2.3 million by 1843.  Id. 
at 83.  The amount of state investment in a given company sometimes exceeded the amount of private 
investment.  Id.
92 See id. at 96-104.
93 Id. at 102.  Other states were similarly involved with their corporations.  Between 1827 and 1878, the 
state of New York lent or donated over $10 million for the construction of sixteen railroads.  HARRY H. 
PIERCE, RAILROADS OF NEW YORK, A STUDY OF GOVERNMENT AID 15 (1953).  Local government 
investment in railroads was also common.  Maryland controlled ten of the thirty director seats on the 
board of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, while the city of Baltimore controlled eight.  FRIEDMAN, supra 
note 85, at 170.  New Jersey took preferred stock in exchange for exclusive transport franchises.  Id.  
From 1832 through the Civil War years, the lion’s share of New Jersey’s general fund revenues came 
from dividends on its railroad stocks.  See GRANDY, supra note 34, at 24 (charting percentage of state 
fund receipts from railroad revenues).  These dividends rarely made up less than half the general fund in 
any given year, and for a fifteen-year period, railroad dividends accounted for over ninety percent of 
general revenues, allowing abolition of the state property tax during that period.  See id. at 23.
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powers required accompanying review procedures.  The charter for Rhode Island’s 
Blackstone Canal Corp. included elaborate provisions for external supervision.  As the 
corporation identified the route of the canal, it was required to file reports with the court 
of common pleas describing the route and the names of affected landowners, who were 
required to be given notice of the taking of their land.94 Commissioners were to be 
appointed by the court to estimate the damages sustained by these affected landowners.  
The charter also described dispute resolution mechanisms.95
Finally, as earlier described, states often stepped in to offer assistance when their 
business corporations hit upon hard times.96
The notion that corporations were creatures of the state, then, was more than 
theoretical fancy.  States were often intimately involved with their corporations’ 
finances and operations, as well as their formation.  The public service nature of 
business corporations’ activities, together with states’ active involvement in overseeing 
and investing in their domestic corporations, help explain the ideology of states’ 
dominion over their corporations.  
C. Territorial Monopoly in Corporation Law
Consistent with the notion of corporations as agencies of their incorporating 
states, and with the delegation of public powers and functions that corporations enjoyed, 
it was generally understood that a corporation’s legal standing reached only to the 
borders of the incorporating state.97 Corporate law had only a territorial effect,98 and a 
corporation existed only within the borders of the sovereign that created it.99 Assuming 
the corporation was so empowered by its charter, transactions and activity outside the 
home state were permitted only at the sufferance of the host state, and states had the 
power to bar foreign corporations from operating locally.100
94
 Farnum v. Blackstone Canal Corp., 8 Fed. Cas. 1059, 1062 (C.C.D.R.I. 1830).
95 Id. at 1062-63.
96 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
97
 Moreover, corporate charters often granted special privileges that could only be enjoyed within the 
incorporating state.  The famous Society for Establishing Useful Manufactures (S.U.M.), for example, 
was incorporated in New Jersey.  Its charter exempted it from taxes for ten years and exempted its 
employees from poll and occupation taxes.  DAVIS, supra note 69, v. 1 at 384.  S.U.M. was also granted 
the power of eminent domain to cut canals and collect tolls, as well as authority to form a municipal 
corporation and to raise capital by conducting a lottery.  Id. at 385-86.  S.U.M. was unusual as to the 
breadth of activities that were authorized in its charter.  Id. at 379.  However, the various powers granted 
were not in themselves unusual.  The Camden and Amboy railroad company enjoyed monopoly rights 
and tax exemptions.  See supra note 77.
98 See Blackstone Mfg. Co. v. Blackstone, 13 Gray 488, 489 (1859).
99 It is very true that a corporation can have no legal existence out of the boundaries of the 
sovereignty by which it is created. It exists only in contemplation of law, and by force of the 
law; and where that law ceases to operate, and is no longer obligatory, the corporation can have 
no existence. It must dwell in the place of its creation, and cannot migrate to another 
sovereignty.
Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 588 (1839).
100
 The Bank of Augusta court specifically noted:
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In its famous decision in Bank of Augusta v. Earle,101 the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that corporations were not entitled to the Constitutional protections of the 
privileges and immunities clause.102  To find otherwise would lead to the then 
unthinkable result that corporations chartered in one state could freely carry on 
operations in another, regardless of the laws of the host state.  
[I]t would deprive every state of all control over the extent of corporate 
franchises proper to be granted in the state; and corporations would be chartered 
in one, to carry on their operations in another. It is impossible upon any sound 
principle to give such a construction to the article in question.103
In this pre-industrial period, the territorial nature of states’ dominion over 
domestic corporations was consistent with corporations’ own limited geographical 
reach.  Technological limitations—in transportation, communication, and energy—
meant that firms had primarily local operations and transacted primarily in local 
markets.  In 1830, for example, the United States had only twenty-three miles of 
railroad track.104 With only humans, animals, wind, and water as energy sources, only
low volumes of production and exchange were possible, such that “[b]usiness 
enterprises remained small and personally managed.”105 At mid-century, it was quite 
uncommon for corporations of one state to own fixed or real property in another.106 The 
partnership was the most common business form, and the actors within a business were 
ordinarily close family members.107 Each firm had an identifiable “center of gravity” in 
one state.    If a firm wished to incorporate, it did so in its home state.108  Corporations 
with explicit interstate ambitions—for the construction and operation of canals or 
Every power . . . of the description of which we are speaking, which a corporation exercises in 
another state, depends for its validity upon the laws of the sovereignty in which it is exercised; 
and a corporation can make no valid contract without their sanction, express or implied.
Id. at 589.  While the court ultimately upheld the enforceability of the interstate contracts at issue, the 
holding was based on the presumption—given the lack of any state law to the contrary—that the host 
state Alabama permitted foreign corporations to contract locally.  Principles of comity among states 
justified such a presumption.  Id. at 589.
101
 38 U.S. 519 (1839).
102 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
103
 Bank of Augusta, 38 U.S. at 586-87.  Thirty years later, the Supreme Court affirmed the same basic 
idea.  See infra note 190 and accompanying text.  See also Henry N. Butler, Nineteenth-Century 
Jurisdictional Competition in the Granting of Corporate Privileges, 14 J. LEGAL. STUD. 129, 155 (1985) 
(“As late as the 1860s, the status of operating a corporation in a foreign jurisdiction was uncertain.”).  
104 HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1945 200 (1949).  By 1860, that number had 
leapt to 30,626 miles, and by 1880, there were 93,262 miles of track.  Id.
105 ALFRED CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND:  THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 48 
(1977).
106
 In 1859, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts noted “the very few exceptional instances of 
real and personal property held and used in this state by a foreign corporation.”  Blackstone 
Manufacturing Co. v. Blackstone, 13 Gray 488, 491 (Mass. 1859).  See also FRIEDMAN, supra note 85, at 
173 and n.13.
107 CHANDLER, supra note 105, at 50.
108 DODD, supra note 55, at 151 (noting that in era before 1860, “most corporations were organized under 
the law of the organizers’ home state”).
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bridges, for example—obtained multiple charters from the legislatures of the states in 
which they sought to do business.109
In this context, each state enjoyed something of a territorial regulatory 
monopoly over its local firms—not only for corporate law, but for economic regulation 
generally.  Only with great difficulty could firms physically exit their home 
jurisdictions, since their product and labor markets, and to a great extent their capital 
markets, were at home.  Until the approach of industrialization, conflicts among states 
over corporate law would have been rare.  Given the coincidence of a firm’s state of 
incorporation and the location of its operations, the idea that each state would enjoy 
plenary authority over the internal affairs of its domestic corporations would not have 
been controversial, consistent as it was with each state’s general territorial powers.
With this plenary authority, legislatures could extract rents from geographically 
captive businesses in terms of fees and other exactions. Later, as technological 
innovation enabled firms’ activities to cross state lines, legislatures would initially 
attempt to reinforce firms’ territorial limits through legal mandate.  They would enact
rules both to keep domestic corporations in-state and some foreign corporations out.  
Disputes concerning foreign corporations arose in due course, and the deference to the 
state of incorporation embodied in the internal affairs doctrine was consistent with the 
notions of territorial sovereignty that developed in the earlier pre-industrial period.  A 
state’s assertion of its own local law—or its legislative or judicial authority—to govern 
the internal affairs of a foreign corporation would have seemed quite intrusive.  It would 
effectively have exercised authority over another state’s legislature.  Courts’ express 
renunciation of visitorial powers over foreign corporations was simply a recognition 
that exercise of such powers would be an affront to a sister state.  Even with 
industrialization, discussed in the next Part, the territorial notion of corporate law 
remained resilient until the great merger movement in the 1890s.  
109 See, e.g., Farnum v. Blackstone Canal Corp., 8 Fed. Cas. 1059 (C.C.D.R.I. 1830) (Story, J.) 
(involving companion Massachusetts and Rhode Island corporations formed to build canal from 
Worcester to Providence).  See also DAVIS, supra note 69, at 30 (enumerating dual-chartered corporations 
before 1800); GERARD CARL HENDERSON, THE POSITION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 30-31 (1918) (discussing formation of Potomac Company, incorporated in both 
Maryland and Virginia, to render Potomac River navigable).
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IV. INDUSTRIALIZATION, INTERSTATE FIRMS, AND 
ARTICULATION OF THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS DOCTRINE
With industrialization, firms’ activities began to cross state lines beginning in 
the mid-nineteenth century.  Interstate firms emerged, but they incorporated under 
territorial corporate laws.  With the emergence of interstate product markets and 
interstate firms, and with a changing industrial organization, legislatures saw their once-
plenary regulatory authority over local economic activity being contested.  Legislatures 
faced conflicting political pressures for more liberal corporate law and for economic 
protection.  During this period, courts first enunciated the internal affairs doctrine, 
reflecting pre-industrial notions of states’ territorial sovereignty over their domestic 
corporations. In this Part, I describe the economic, political, and legal contexts in which 
the doctrine emerged.  I focus on the roughly forty-year period from the mid-nineteenth 
century up until about 1890, a transitional period during which the legal past 
commingled with the economic future.  I also detail the judicial development of the 
internal affairs doctrine and note its consonance with legislators’ private interests in this 
period before modern charter competition.
Especially before the Civil War, states enjoyed considerable regulatory power to 
control economic activity within their borders.  States had always competed for 
economic development in a sort of “rivalistic state mercantilism.”110 They shaped their 
regulation to attract capital and labor from neighboring states.  With industrialization, 
changes in technology and industrial organization put some competitive pressures on 
states’ regulatory monopolies.  Interstate markets emerged, following dramatic 
advances in transportation, communication, and energy production.  The Supreme 
Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence also facilitated market integration.  Interstate 
markets led to the rise of interstate firms and the legal issues concerning states’ 
treatment of foreign corporations.111  The emergence of interstate firms led to disputes 
over corporate internal affairs that were brought in courts outside the incorporating 
state.  These suits typically involved shareholders suing in their home states to enforce 
rights against foreign corporations in which they had invested.  
Corporate law was still largely territorial at mid-century:  firms ordinarily 
incorporated in the state where their organizers resided and where their major 
operations were located.  Corporations and legislatures expected—and legislatures 
sometimes mandated—that corporations would have significant operations in the 
incorporating state, that officers and directors would be residents of that state, and that
shareholders’ and directors’ meetings would be held in the state.  In complementary 
fashion, corporations with no economic ties to the state of incorporation—“tramp” 
corporations—often found that host states would refuse to recognize the ir corporate 
status.112 Firms therefore ordinarily maintained significant tangible identification with 
their incorporating state. While this territorial nature of corporate law would weaken as 
industrialization progressed through the second half of the century, maintenance of 
110
 Scheiber, supra note 76, at 71-72.
111
 The first general foreign corporation statutes appeared in 1852.  William Laurens Walker, Foreign 
Corporation Laws:  The Loss of Reason, 47 N.C.L. REV. 1, 12 (1968).
112 See infra notes 343-344 and accompanying text.
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some territorial ties between the corporation and its incorporating state would remain 
the norm until the 1890s when charter competition began in earnest.  
The multistate markets that emerged with industrialization meant that firms 
became geographically more mobile at the margin.  They enjoyed some latitude to shop 
for favorable business conditions, including attractive corporate law, simply by moving 
operations to a neighboring state.113 States therefore felt some pressure to liberalize 
their corporate laws, including the relaxation of territorial restrictions, in order to 
maintain local employment and the industrial tax base. This sort of charter competition 
I call “weak-form” competition—states’ adjustments to territorial corporate law as part 
of a general effort to attract capital and labor by offering an hospitable business 
environment.114 This was the primary form of jurisdictional competition over corporate 
law until the 1890s, when “strong-form” law-as-a-product competition ensued. 115
The discussion of this period concludes by correcting a misconception about the 
significance of Supreme Court Commerce Clause decisions of the period for modern 
corporate charter competition and the internal affairs doctrine. Counter to what some 
scholars have suggested, I show that these decisions did not compel state charter 
competition or universal respect for firms’ choice of corporate law.
A. National Product Markets and Interstate Firms
By mid-century, the United States was well on the way to industrialization.  
Enormous advances occurred in industrial technology, energy, transportation and 
communication.  In 1830, it took three weeks to go from New York to Chicago by rail.  
By 1857, the same trip could be made in three days.116 Railroad integration also 
improved the efficiency of rail transport.  In 1849, freight from Philadelphia to Chicago 
required at least nine transshipments over as many weeks.  Ten years later, the same 
shipment took three days and only one shipment.117 In 1869, the first transcontinental 
railroad was completed by the joining of the rails of the Union Pacific and Central 
Pacific railroads at Promontory Summit in Utah.  The advent of the telegraph and its 
113 See infra Part IV.B.1.
114
 This fear of competitive disadvantage in attracting firms competing in newly expanded interstate 
markets was not a problem unique to corporate law.  States felt similar pressures with regard to social 
legislation.  See William Graebner, Federalism in the Progressive Era:  A Structural Interpretation of 
Reform, 64 J. AM. HIST. 331 (1977).
115
 With “strong-form” competition, firms could choose their corporate law independent of their location, 
the residence of their organizers, or other territorial considerations.  See infra Part V. 
 Raising revenues directly through the sale of corporate charters was an innovation that occurred 
only in the 1890s with New Jersey’s implementation of its “chartermongering” strategy.  See Christopher 
Grandy, New Jersey Corporate Chartermongering, 1875-1929, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 677, 680-81 (1989).  
Before 1888-1890, even New Jersey’s corporate law liberalization was done primarily with local firms in 
mind—firms with operations located primarily in-state.  See infra note 165 and accompanying text.  A 
special Massachusetts legislative committee report in 1903 noted that “[u]ntil within the past ten years the 
practice of foreign incorporation was not general.”  MASSACHUSETTS REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON 
CORPORATION LAWS 18 (1903) [hereinafter MASSACHUSETTS REPORT].
116 CHANDLER, supra note 105, at 83-87 (describing railroad boom of 1840s and technological advances 
resulting in increased passenger and cargo carrying capacity).
117 Id. at 122.
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widespread availability also played a crucial role in creating interstate product and 
capital markets.118 From 1825 to the mid-1840s, coal output soared from almost 
nothing to 2 million tons per year.119  Abundant coal and the increasing sophistication 
of coal-using technologies enabled increased output in metalworking industries.  This 
led to large-scale fabrication of interchangeable metal parts, which, along with this new 
industrial energy source, paved the way for mass production.
The Supreme Court decided important Commerce Clause cases in the mid-late 
1800s that facilitated the rise of interstate markets by curbing states’ protectionist 
impulses in the face of industrialization.  One important set of cases ended the 
commonplace of discriminatory taxation on out-of-state products, which was apparently 
conventional practice before 1876.120  Beginning in that year with the decision in 
Welton v. Missouri,121 the Court used the Commerce Clause to strike down these 
discriminatory tax burdens.122  The Court went even further in Robbins v. Shelby 
County Taxing District,123 striking down a Tennessee license tax on drummers for out-
of-state manufacturers, and holding explicitly that “[i]nterstate commerce cannot be 
taxed at all.”124
The combination of technological innovation and this rule of nondiscrimination 
against out-of-state products facilitated the emergence of interstate product markets for 
manufacturers and distributors.  Firms’ customers and suppliers were now scattered 
across numerous states, and with these new and larger markets, firms grew to meet this 
greater demand.125  Improved transportation and communication enabled parties to 
transact and manage from afar.  “The almost simultaneous availability of an abundant 
new form of energy and revolutionary new means of transportation and communication 
led to the rise of the modern business enterprise in American commerce and 
industry.”126
118 See Richard B. Du Boff, Business Demand and the Development of the Telegraph in the United 
States, 1844-1860, 54 BUS. HIST. REV. 459, 461 (1980) (noting significance of “distance-shrinking” 
potential of early telegraph and its critical role in “forging extralocal and interregional links among 
merchants, bankers, brokers, and shippers.”).
119 CHANDLER, supra note 105, at 76.
120
 Charles W. McCurdy, American Law and the Marketing Structure of the Large Corporation, 1875-
1890, 38 J. ECON. HIST. 631 (1978).
121
 91 U.S. 275 (1876).
122 Welton involved a Missouri law requiring merchandising agents of foreign corporations to pay a 
licensing fee for the privilege of selling out-of-state goods in Missouri.  The plaintiff, an agent for the 
Singer Sewing Machine Company, challenged the law as a restraint on interstate commerce.  Recognizing 
that the licensing fee was essentially a tax on the goods themselves, the court invalidated the law in order 
to avoid a trade war among the states.  Id. at 281-82.
123
 120 U.S. 489 (1887).
124 Id. at 498.  The contours of this basic idea were left to be worked out over the ensuing twenty years.  
See HENDERSON, supra note 109, at 119-31.
125
 Integrated markets also created scale economies that provided some of the impetus to the Great 
Merger Movement that began in the last decade of the nineteenth century.  It was then that charter 
competition began in earnest.  See infra Part V. 
126 CHANDLER, supra note 105, at 78.
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B. Interjurisdictional Pressures on Territorial Corporate Law: Weak-Form 
Charter Competition
This section describes the evolving corporate law context in which courts first 
articulated the internal affairs doctrine.  With industrialization and interstate firms, the 
legal demands of those firms grew.  What were initially conventional corporate law 
restrictions—on capitalization, on permissible business activities and their geographical 
scope—became a hindrance on the growth and expansion necessary for firms to 
survive.  States had always competed with one another for economic development.  
Now with the changing needs of business, state legislatures responded by loosening 
some of these corporate law constraints.  However, they did not abolish all of them.  
Instead, they retained the basic idea of limiting corporate size and scope through
corporate law. And they continued to demand that their corporations maintain 
economic ties to their incorporating states.
1. States’ Struggle to Maintain Territorial Monopoly
In the early years of industrialization, as corporations’ activities had initially 
begun to cross state lines, states responded by mandating in-state ties for their domestic 
corporations and discriminating against foreign corporations attempting to do business 
locally.  For domestic corporations, it was assumed or required that operations would be 
confined within the chartering state.127  For a manufacturing company, the charter 
typically even specified the particular town where the company would operate.128
Corporations were required to hold their director’s meetings and shareholder meetings 
in-state.129  Certain corporate officers and/or a minimum number of the corporation’s 
directors were typically required to be state residents, and the corporate books and 
records were required to be located in-state.130  With these restrictions, state legislatures 
attempted to cement their domestic corporations’ dependence on their legislative grace.
As for foreign corporations, discrimination against foreign banking and 
insurance companies was common, as were prohibitions against foreign corporations’ 
ownership of real property.131
127 Stoke, supra note 77, at 562; Edward Q. Keasbey, New Jersey and the Great Corporations, 13 HARV. 
L. REV. 198, 204 (1899); Butler, supra note 103, at 142.  In his statistical study of New England 
incorporations, Kessler notes that only in the period 1863-1875 were a number of charters granted for out 
of state mining and petroleum activity. Kessler, supra note 75, at 60.  
128 DODD, supra note 55, at 400 n.29.  Even absent formal legal prohibition, “the operation of a factory or 
mine by a foreign corporation would probably have been generally regarded as so contrary to the mores
of the times as to be an unwise business practice.”  Id. at 325.
129
 “All votes and proceedings of persons professing to act in the capacity of the corporations, when 
assembled beyond the bounds of the State granting the charter of the corporation, are wholly void.”  
JOSEPH K. ANGELL AND SAMUEL AMES, LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS AGGREGATE § 498 (8th ed. 
1866).  See also Keasbey, supra note 127, at 204 (describing New Jersey corporation act of 1849).  
130 See Stoke, supra note 77, at 561 (describing New Jersey’s general corporation law of 1849).  Even 
toward the end of the nineteenth century, states revoked the charters of their noncompliant corporations.  
See also infra note 162 and accompanying text.
131 SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS § 7913 (1st ed. 1896).  Cf. Richardson v. Swift, 30 A. 781 
(Del. Super. 1885) (describing special act of Delaware legislature authorizing Connecticut corporation to 
own real property in Delaware). 
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With interstate firms becoming increasingly more common, however, states felt 
pressure to ease some restrictions. Interstate firms with multistate markets enjoyed 
some freedom to migrate.  With dispersed customers and suppliers, all reachable 
through the new technologies, manufacturers and distributors could move their 
operations without necessarily reducing access to their markets.  This increased 
mobility meant that even with strictly territorial corporate law, firms could move to 
more favorable jurisdictions.
With this exit option for firms, state legislatures’ territorial monopolies 
weakened.  Corporate law remained territorial, in the sense that a firm was expected to 
maintain substantive ties to its incorporating state.  Most corporations operated solely or 
predominantly within their incorporating states.  However, firms’ geographical mobility 
enabled their flight from a jurisdiction with unattractive corporate law—or tax law or 
labor law, for that matter.  A firm’s physical exit meant not only a lost corporate 
charter, but more importantly also lost jobs and tax revenues.  State legislatures began 
to feel some pressure to be responsive to the demands of both local capital and capital 
that might be enticed into their states.  
2. General Incorporation and the Regulation of Local Industrial 
Organization
At the same time that the demand for corporate law was changing, Jacksonian 
populism led states to adopt general incorporation statutes, a trend that continued 
through most of the nineteenth century.132 These general incorporation statutes co-
existed with the earlier practice of special incorporation for several decades.133 Initially, 
general incorporation privileges were quite limited by modern standards.  Statutes were
restrictive, rather than enabling.  Besides territorial restrictions of the sort earlier 
132 See RALPH NADER ET AL., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 37 (1976).  The practice of special 
incorporation was condemned for the graft and favoritism it spawned, as promoters were forced to lobby 
for special legislation granting them the powers and privileges of the corporate form.  Id. at 490; 
WILLIAM W. COOK, THE CORPORATION PROBLEM 110 (1893); CADMAN, supra note 83, at 163.  In some 
states, the sheer volume of special chartering activities also crowded out other work of the legislature, 
leaving little time or attention for public legislation.  Id. at 161-62; FRIEDMAN, supra note 85.  As one 
example, in 1870, the New Jersey Senate formed two standing committees on corporations, in addition to 
its regular committee on corporations, to handle the volume of special charter applications.  One standing 
committee handled railroad, canal, and turnpike charters, while the other handled banks and insurance 
companies.  CADMAN, supra note 83, at 162 n.37.  General incorporation statutes were meant to eliminate 
these problems and to make corporate privileges generally accessible.
By 1850, general incorporation statutes permitting incorporation for a limited business purpose 
were common.  Statutes allowing incorporation for every lawful business became common after 1875.  
Liggett v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 555 & n.28 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
133
 Moreover, the process of special incorporation also became more standardized over time, as 
legislatures either adopted standard forms or passed laws standardizing the general terms of special 
charters.  MASSACHUSETTS REPORT, supra note 115, at 16-17 (describing progression of legislation 
standardizing certain aspects of special charters prior to enactment of general incorporation statute in 
1851).  See also HURST, supra note 85, at 146 (noting standard patterns in terms of special charters); 
DODD, supra note 55, at 198 (“[I]t was not long before there developed a tendency toward the adoption of 
standard forms for most of the principal types of business corporations.”); Kessler, supra note 75, at 44 
(describing cross-reference in special charters to laws specifying general powers and duties of 
corporations).
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described,134 limits on capitalization and debt, corporate longevity, and permissible 
business activities were also typical.  Statutes distinguished different types of business 
activities, setting different restrictions for different businesses.  
The detailed distinctions and restrictions suggest that states relied on their 
general incorporation statutes to regulate their local industrial organization.  For 
example, in 1811 New York offered general incorporation for certain specified business 
purposes:  manufacturing woolen, cotton, or linen goods; making glass; making, from 
ore, bar iron, anchors, mill irons, steel, nail rods, hoop iron, ironmongery, sheet lead, 
shot, white lead, and red lead.135  Capital was limited to $100,000, the life of the 
corporation was limited to 20 years, and shareholders were liable if corporate assets 
were insufficient to pay creditors upon dissolution.136 Later in 1817, general 
incorporation was made available for the manufacture of certain leather, but 
capitalization was limited to $60,000.137  In 1821, incorporation for the manufacture of 
salt was made generally available, with capital limited to $50,000.138 An 1852
enactment offered general incorporation for firms engaged in ocean navigation, with 
capital not to exceed $2,000,000.  This limit was progressively raised and then lowered 
over the years.139  Similar patterns of distinctions and limitations were followed in other 
states.140
These careful delineations and restrictions in the general laws were
understandable given the general fear, prevalent during this period, of large 
aggregations of capital and corporate power, as well as political demands for economic 
protection.  Judge Brandeis captured this sense in his classic dissent in Liggett v. Lee.  
Fear was widespread:
Fear of encroachment upon the liberties and opportunities of the individual.  
Fear of the subjection of labor to capital.  Fear of monopoly.  Fear that the 
absorption of capital by corporations, and their perpetual life, might bring evils 
similar to those which attended mortmain. There was a sense of some insidious 
134 See supra notes 127-131 and accompanying text.
135 N.Y. LAWS 1811, c. 67.
136 Id.  Legislatures began to offer corporate limited liability for particular enterprises and types of 
enterprises early in the nineteenth century.  However, as for general corporate limited liability, 
legislatures in many states struggled with the question through the first half of the nineteenth century.  
The issue remained controversial in some states until well into the second half of the nineteenth century.  
See DODD, supra note 55, chs. V, VI.
137
 Liggett v. Lee, 288 U.S. at 551 n.6 (citing Act of April 14, 1817, c. 223). 
138 Id. (citing LAWS OF N.Y. 1821, c. 231, § 19).
139 See id.
140 See id. at 550-56.  As another example, a Massachusetts act in 1870 permitted capitalization of 
$500,000 for mining and manufacturing corporations, but only $5,000 for the propagation of herring and 
alewives.  See id. at 551 n.8 (citing MASS. ACTS & RES. 1870, p. 154).  Even after the great merger 
movement, some states retained numerous specific incorporation provisions with different restrictions 
and limitations for different types of businesses.  As late as 1903, Texas and Tennessee each made special 
provisions for about sixty different types of corporations, and Indiana had over fifty classes.  
MASSACHUSETTS REPORT, supra note 115, at 160.
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menace inherent in large aggregations of capital, particularly when held by 
corporations.141
The enactment of general incorporation laws, according to Brandeis, “[did] not 
signify that the apprehension of corporate domination had been overcome.”142  Instead, 
the need for business expansion created an “irresistible demand for more charters.”143
While attempting to respond to this demand, the general laws also “embodied severe 
restrictions upon size and upon the scope of corporate activity, [which] were, in part, an 
expression of the desire for equality of opportunity.”144
Because of the numerous limitations on corporate finance and operations
contained in early general incorporation laws, for a time special incorporation remained 
attractive as a path to securing privileges unavailable under general laws,145 including 
the privilege to do some business outside the incorporating state.146 In New Jersey, 
before their abolition in 1875, special charters with liberal provisions not available 
under the general law were regularly used as a device to induce the investment of out-
of-state capital.147 In New England, special chartering was the “predominant mode of 
securing corporate privileges” for the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century.148
141
 Liggett v. Lee, 288 U.S. at 548-49.
142 Id. at 549.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145
 For example, corporations were generally forbidden from holding stock in other corporations.  
However, as early as the 1850s, state legislatures gave specific permission to particular corporations to do 
so by way of special chartering.  FRIEDMAN, supra note 85, at 454-55.  In Wisconsin between 1848 and 
1871, almost ten times as many special charters were issued as general charters.  GEORGE J. KUEHNL, 
THE WISCONSIN BUSINESS CORPORATION, 1800-1875 143 (1959).  Similarly, in New England between 
1844 and 1862, the number of special charters granted outnumbered those issued under general statutes 
by more than 2.5 times.  See Kessler, supra note 75, at 57.  Butler has suggested a price discrimination 
explanation for the dual incorporation system.  States offered a standardized product with low production 
costs— the general charter—but also made special privileges available to those willing to pay more for the 
customized product—the special charter.  Butler, supra note 103, at 148.
Under this dual system of incorporation, courts did not distinguish general charters from special 
charters in their reluctance to exercise jurisdiction over foreign corporations.  See, e.g., Halsey v. 
McLean, 94 Mass. 438 (Mass. 1866) (holding that, in case involving corporation formed under New 
York’s general incorporation law, personal liability of stockholder depended on statutory system of 
another state, and therefore execution could not be obtained in a Massachusetts court).
146 See Butler, supra note 103, at 151 & n.87; CADMAN, supra note 83, at 168.
147 In individual incorporation acts passed for the benefit of out-of-state petitioners, New Jersey was 
willing to give terms more attractive to businessmen than any that would have been approved in 
general laws in the middle years of the nineteenth century.  Since the New York constitution of 
1846 made it difficult for promoters to obtain special acts of incorporation in that state, New 
Jersey maintained a competitive advantage in the field of chartering by retaining its system of 
special acts of incorporation.  As early as 1847, the opportunity thus offered to outbid New York 
in the matter of business charters had been recognized.
CADMAN, supra note 83, at 175-76.  For example, a number of special charters gave permission for 
stockholders’ and directors’ meetings to be held in New York or Philadelphia, where the promoters and 
investors resided.  Id. at 177.  Similarly, New York and Philadelphia investors procured a large number of 
special charters for mining and oil companies that permitted the ownership of real estate in any state or 
territory.
148
 Kessler, supra note 75, at 43.
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Beginning in 1845, states adopted constitutional amendments prohibiting special 
incorporation.149
With the demise of special chartering, state legislatures were forced to rely on 
their general laws to offer corporate privileges broad enough to meet the demands that 
could no longer be addressed through special enactments.  So legislatures dismantled 
some restrictions in their general laws.150 For example, in 1866, New York expanded 
the permissible purposes for general incorporation to “any lawful purpose.”151 In 1875, 
the limit on corporate capital was raised to $2 million.152  It was raised to $5 million in 
1881.153 Massachusetts progressively liberalized the scope of activity for which general 
incorporation was available.  Its first general law in 1851 permitted incorporation for 
“any kind of manufacturing, mechanical, mining or quarrying business,” with capital 
limited to $200,000.154  The scope of permissible activities and capital limits were
gradually increased through successive revisions,155 and general incorporation for any 
lawfully purpose was offered in 1874.156 Beginning in 1862, Maine offered general 
incorporation with limited liability to manufacturing companies, but with capitalization 
limited to $50,000.157  In 1876, the number was raised to $500,000;158 in 1883, it was 
raised to $2,000,000.159
3. Continuing Territoriality and Weak-Form Charter Competition
Despite liberalization, however, domestic corporations still were expected to 
maintain significant economic ties with their incorporating states.  Even after general 
incorporation became widespread, many states’ general incorporation statutes required a 
majority of incorporators, directors, or both to be residents of the incorporating state.160
149 See CADMAN, supra note 83, at 183-86; Butler, supra note 103, at 152-53.  By 1875, nineteen of the 
thirty-seven states had adopted absolute constitutional prohibitions on special incorporation, while three 
more had adopted qualified prohibitions, and one mandated general incorporation laws without abolishing 
special charters.  See id.
150 See GRANDY, supra note 34, at 41 (noting relative liberality of New Jersey’s first General 
Incorporation Act of 1875, enacted in response to state constitutional amendment abolishing special 
charters).
151 HARRY G. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 17 
& n.12 (1961).
152 N.Y. GEN’L BUS. CORP. ACT OF 1875, c. 611, § 11.
153 N.Y. GEN’L BUS. CORP. ACT OF 1875, c. 295.
154 MASS. ACT. OF MAY 15, 1851, c. 133, quoted in Liggett v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 551 n.8. 
155 See Liggett v. Lee, 288 U.S. at 551-52 & nn.8-10.
156 MASS. ACT OF APRIL 14, 1874, c. 165, § 1, quoted in Liggett v. Lee, 288 U.S. at 555 & n.28.
157 MAINE ACTS AND RESOLVES 1862, c. 152, p. 118.
158 MAINE ACTS AND RESOLVES 1876, c. 65, § 2, p. 51 (increasing capitalization to $500,000).
159 MAINE ACTS AND RESOLVES 1883, c. 116, § 1, p. 95 (increasing capitalization to $2,000,000).  In the 
face of the great merger movement, in 1891 the number was raised dramatically to $10,000,000.  MAINE 
ACTS AND RESOLVES 1891, c. 99, § 1, p. 88.  Finally in 1901, the limitation was removed entirely.  
MAINE ACTS AND RESOLVES 1901, c. 229, § 8, p. 242.
160
 E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 285 (1885); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1944 (1888); ILL. REV. STAT. c. 114, § 11 
(1891); ME. REV. STAT. cc. 47, 51, pp. 412, 467 (1883); MD. GEN. LAWS p. 299 (1888); OHIO REV. STAT. 
§ 3236 (1886); PA. DIG. tit. Corporations, § 63 (Purdon's (13th Ed.) 1905) (P.L. 1868, p. 80, § 1).  See 
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Some explicitly restricted the corporation to doing in-state business161 or required the 
corporation to maintain its headquarters and books and record in-state.162 An 1865 
enactment gave express permission to New Jersey corporations to carry on part of their 
business outside the state and to own property outside the state, but only to the extent 
“necessary for and consistent with the purposes of the company,” and further provided 
that a majority of “the persons associated together in the organization of such company” 
were citizens and residents of New Jersey.163
In the face of private demand for more liberal corporate law, weak- form charter 
competition emerged.  Territorial restrictions meant that firms could not generally shop 
for corporate law across all states.  Depending on the details of each state’s territorial 
requirements, organizers could pursue charters only from states where they might wish 
to locate the firm’s principal place of business or significant operations, or where they 
could recruit additional local organizers.  For most businesses, especially established 
ones, this typically meant a state neighboring the organizers’ home state.  
Corporate law was not yet viewed by states as a product in itself, but as a 
marketing device to attract capital and labor.  Corporate charters were not intended to 
raise state revenues directly, and they were not priced to do so.164  Instead, liberal tax 
and corporation laws were part of a more general program to create an attractive 
environment for doing business in-state.  Even with New Jersey, the original 
chartermongering state, before 1888 its corporate law reforms assumed that its 
corporations would have some operations in the state.165 As early as 1845, New 
also WIS. STAT. c. 85, § 1750 (1908) (chief managing officer or superintendent must reside in state, 
except in case of interstate railroad).  
161 See Kessler, supra note 75, at 48-49 (noting such a limitation in Vermont’s general incorporation law 
of 1851); Keasbey, supra note 127, at 204 (noting that before 1865, New Jersey’s general corporation law 
required that business be carried on in-state, and that stockholders’ and directors’ meeting be conducted 
in-state). 
162
 States sometimes revoked the charters of their noncompliant corporations.  See, e.g., State v. 
Milwaukee, Lake Shore & W. Rwy Co., 45 Wis. 579 (1878) (finding that failure of common law duty to 
keep principal office, corporate records, and residence of principal officers in-state may justify forfeiture 
of corporate charter); State v. Topeka Water Co., 52 P. 422 (Kan. 1898) (affirming forfeiture of Kansas 
charter for corporation’s failure to keep a principal place of business, books and records, and treasurer in-
state as required by Kansas law); State v Park & Nelson Lumber Co., 58 Minn. 330 (1894) (vacating 
Minnesota charter because of noncompliance with state laws requiring in-state residence for secretary and 
treasurer, as well as that corporation’s principal place of business and books and records remain in-state).
163
 Stoke, supra note 77, at 562 (quoting LAWS OF NEW JERSEY, pp. 344, 356 (1866)).  
164
 In New Jersey at the time, “[t]he state government did not benefit directly by way of increased 
revenues on account of . . . out-of-state enterprises.”  CADMAN, supra note 83, at 180.  Christopher 
Grandy describes the almost serendipitous route by which New Jersey in 1884 arrived at the notion of 
taxing corporations generally according to their authorized capital.  Only four years later did New Jersey 
begin to implement an active program to sell charters.  See infra note 237 and accompanying text.
165 GRANDY, supra note 34, at 40-41.  “Limitations of corporate life, capital stock requirements, property 
taxation, etc., make sense only if the firm engages in economic activity within state borders.”  Id. at 41.  
A similar assumption likely underlay the provision in New Jersey’s 1875 General Corporation Act 
requiring firms incorporated under the Act to pay real and personal property taxes at the same rate as 
individuals.  Id. at 42 (citing General Corporation Act, Section 105).
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Jersey’s success in offering liberal charters to attract out-of-state capital was noted.  A 
pamphlet published that year in South Carolina, presumably to goad the South Carolina 
legislature into offering competitive charters, recounted:
A very large manufacturing establishment has been recently put in operation at 
Gloucester-point in New-Jersey, three miles below Philadelphia.  The owners 
are Philadelphians, who made choice of that location, because a more liberal 
charter could be obtained from that State than from Pennsylvania.  What will be 
the result of this move?  It will be the building up of a town in New-Jersey, and 
the investment of some millions of Pennsylvania capital, to give employment to 
the poor, and pay taxes to the former State.166
And in 1873, the governor of New York remarked on New Jersey’s success in 
attracting labor and capital through favorable tax and other laws:
The natural advantages of New York, especially for commerce, far 
exceed those of other States; but they are not great enough to enable us to 
contend successfully with the rivalry of neighbors, quite as enterprising as 
ourselves, unless labor and capital are encouraged by laws as liberal as theirs.167
As early as the 1860s, New Jersey did apparently offer some special charters for projects that 
would operate wholly outside the state, but the practice was controversial. CADMAN, supra note 83, at 
178-80.  One editorial criticized the legislature:
It is certainly derogatory to the character of our legislators to have an impression exist 
abroad that it requires but little management, in connection with a judicious hospitality, to secure 
the passage of bills through our Legislature.  That such an impression does exist is apparent from 
the attempt made by citizens and residents of other States, from time to time, to secure the 
passage of acts of incorporation, and other measures for private emolument, which their own 
States either utterly refuse to grant, or do so only after proper examination and criticism. . . .  
[I]ncorporations . . . with no relations whatever to New Jersey, transacting no business within 
her limits, having no stockholders, no officers, not even an office in the State, and consequently 
having no right to be identified with it in any way, have at different times been created by our 
pliant legislators. . . .
Is it to be supposed that such men as constitute the majority of our legislators, were 
considered better qualified . . . than the legislators of New York, Pennsylvania, or 
Massachusetts?  Or, was it not rather owing to a belief that they could be more easily cajoled in 
giving a legal existence to the incorporation than personages in like positions elsewhere?    
Id. at 178-79 (quoting the NEWARK DAILY ADVERTISER, Feb. 25, 1862).  And in any event, the revenues 
generated from these out-of-state projects were trivial, since corporate charters were not yet priced with 
the intention of raising revenues directly from chartering fees.  
166 CADMAN, supra note 83, at 37 & n.30 (quoting An Enquiry into the Propriety of Granting Charters of 
Incorporation for Manufacturing and Other Purposes, in South Carolina:  By One of the People 9).  
Cadman recounts New Jersey special charters granted as early as 1815 and 1823 for businesses 
previously incorporated in New York.  The latter explicitly recited that the managers contemplated 
moving the firm to New Jersey and that the legislature recognized the benefit to the state from the 
employment of capital there.  See id. at 37. 
167 CADMAN, supra note 83, at 177 (quoting VI MESSAGES FROM THE GOVERNORS 530).  
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C. Emergence of the Internal Affairs Doctrine
It was in this context of weak-form territorial charter competition that courts 
first articulated the internal affairs doctrine.168  Courts relied on traditional pre-industrial 
notions of territorial sovereignty to refuse jurisdiction over disputes involving foreign 
corporations’ internal affairs.  This jurisdictional bar was consonant with the private 
interests of state legislatures endeavoring to preserve their now-contested regulatory 
authority over local economic activity.
1. Articulation by the Courts
Early decisions enunciating the internal affairs doctrine echoed pre-industrial 
notions of states’ sovereignty over their domestic corporations. Sovereignty 
considerations required deference to the incorporating state, and courts of other states 
did not have jurisdiction to address questions of corporate internal affairs.  This 
jurisdictional bar “does not merely regard the powers of the court, but rather the extent 
of the state authority which underlies those powers.  It is in the nature of a question of 
sovereignty.”169
Internal affairs decisions before the merger movement were not many, and 
judging from that relative handful of decisions, courts seemed to find their jurisdictional 
limitations in this area fairly self-evident.  They consistently noted the special role of 
the incorporating state, the state under whose laws the corporation was created and on 
which its existence depended.170  Courts of one state possessed no visitorial powers over 
corporations of another state.171  Only the incorporating state enjoyed such visitorial 
powers:
It is the duty of the state to provide for the collection of debts from foreign 
corporations, due to its citizens . . . and it is the duty of the state to protect its 
citizens from fraud, by all the means in its power, whether against domestic or 
foreign wrongdoers. This, however, does not authorize the courts to regulate the 
internal affairs of foreign corporations. The courts possess no visitorial power 
over them. We can enforce no forfeiture of charter for violation of law; nor can 
168
 Richard Buxbaum summarizes this context:
The American states could afford state of incorporation rather than siège reference 
points for their choice of law rule because at the time of that rule’s first appearance their 
substantive regulatory laws did not permit, and federal constitutional law did not require them to 
permit, the type of foreign corporate emplacement in host states that the internal affairs concept 
describes and that it is the function of the siège notion to render harmless—local shareholders, 
local workforce and local sales.  Recourse to the state of incorporation to identify the governing 
law was perfectly safe, given this limited right of mobility.
Richard M. Buxbaum, The Origins of the American “Internal Affairs” Rule in the Corporate Conflict of 
Laws, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR GERHARD KEGEL (1987).
169
 Smith v. Mutual Life Insur. Co., 96 Mass. 336 (1867) (emphasis supplied).  
170 E.g., id. at 341; Howell v. Chicago & Nw. Rwy. Co., 51 Barb. 378 (Sup. Ct. NY 1868).  
171 Id.; N. State Copper and Gold Min. Co. v. Field, 20 A. 1039, 1040 (Ct. App. Md. 1885).
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we remove directors for misconduct. These powers all properly belong to the 
courts of the state from which they derive their existence.172
In addition to state sovereignty considerations, courts also noted the practical 
wisdom of the doctrine.  Courts recognized the territorial limits of their own authority.  
They wished to avoid adopting decisions that would require enforcement in other states.  
Taking jurisdiction “would be assuming a power which the court ought not to exercise, 
and rendering a judgment which could not be enforced against the company in the place 
of its existence.”173  In addition, consistent with modern functionalist explanations for 
the doctrine, some courts recognized that the jurisdictional bar avoided subjecting 
corporations to conflicting decisions and inconsistent obligations.174
One might have thought that the rise of general incorporation, national product 
markets, and private profit making firms of national scope would put some pressure on 
the earlier ideology of the corporation as a public agency created by its sovereign.  As 
early as 1819, the famous Dartmouth College decision, best known for its explication 
that “[a] corporation is an artificial being,”175 also recognized that not all corporations 
were auxiliaries of the state.  Instead, some were private vehicles to accomplish the 
private goals of their founders.  The mere fact of incorporation did not render them 
public institutions.176 In addition, state investment in domestic corporations was also 
becoming less common and less popular by mid-century.  For many states, these 
172
 Howell, 51 Barb. at 378.  In Wisconsin, a corporation was seen to have a duty to keep its principal 
place of business, its records, and the residence of its principal officers all within the incorporating state 
in order to assure the corporation’s amenability to the state’s visitorial powers.  Breach of such a duty 
might result in a forfeiture of the corporation’s charter.  State v. Milwaukee, Lake Shore & W. Rwy Co., 
45 Wis. 579 (1878).
Echoing a similar view, Angell & Ames wrote in 1866:
To render the charters or constitutions, ordinance, and by-laws of corporations of perfect 
obligation, and generally to maintain their peace and good government, these bodies are subject 
to visitation; or, in other words, to the inspection and control of tribunals recognized by the laws 
of the land.  Civil corporations are visited by the government itself, through the medium of the 
courts of justice. . . .  Civil corporations, . . . being created for public use and advantage, properly 
fall under the superintendency of that sovereign power whose duty it is to take care of the public 
interest.
ANGELL & AMES, supra note 129, at § 684.
173
 Redmond v. Enfield Mfg. Co., 13 Abb.Pr. (N.S.) 332 (S.C.N.Y. 1872).  See also Howell v. Chicago & 
Nw. Rwy. Co., 51 Barb. 378 (Sup. Ct. NY 1868); N. State Copper and Gold Min. Co. v. Field, 20 A. 
1039, 1041 (Ct. App. Md. 1885).
174 See N. State Copper and Gold Min. Co. v. Field, 20 A. 1039, 1041 (Ct. App. Md. 1885) (noting 
prospect of “conflicting decisions,” “interminable confusion,” and “judgments and decrees that the courts 
of Maryland would be unable to enforce”).  This turned out to be especially problematic for mutual 
insurance companies, whose policyholders were also its shareholders.  “[N]o corporation could ever 
venture to conduct business beyond the limits of the State of its creation. . . .  It might have a half dozen 
courts, in as many different States, requiring discovery, and demanding the production of books, and 
directing the statement of accounts, all at the same time.”  Clark v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass’n, 14 
App. D.C. 154 (D.C. App. 1899).  See also Taylor v. Mutual Reserve Life Ass’n of New York, 33 S.E. 
385, 389 (Va. 1899). 
175
 17 U.S. 581, 636 (1819).
176 Id. at 636.
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investments turned sour after the Panic of 1837.177  In state after state, constitutional 
prohibitions against such investment were enacted beginning in 1845.178
However, even as to private corporations with limited ongoing state 
involvement, a strong sense continued to exist that they were territorially and 
conceptually bound to their incorporating state—that they depended for their existence 
on the state of incorporation and had no legal existence outside that state except as the 
comity of other states might allow.  Consistent with this view, the 1850s and 1860s saw 
a broadening of the idea of “public purpose” to justify exercise of eminent domain 
powers by private companies.  Manufacturing and mining companies, as well as 
transport companies and other traditional beneficiaries of eminent domain powers, now 
enjoyed the exercise of public power in pursuit of private wealth.179 With Paul v. 
Virginia,180 discussed in more detail below, the Supreme Court in 1868 reaffirmed this
territorial view of corporate existence.181
2. Legislators’ Private Interests
In this context of territorial corporate law, the internal affairs doctrine was 
consistent with legislators’ private interests.  Legislatures would therefore have had no 
private cause to expand the jurisdiction of their state courts in order to entertain suits by 
local investors over the internal affairs of foreign corporations.  
The deference to the incorporating state embodied in the doctrine, far from 
enabling competition, served instead to reinforce each state’s market power over its 
local firms with respect to corporate law.  Courts’ consistent approach to internal affairs 
decisions effected an implicit reciprocity among states,182 assuring each state that sister 
states would not interfere in the internal affairs of its domestic corporations.  The 
doctrine helped to effect market sharing over corporate law, consistent with state
legislatures’ general attempts to perpetuate their regulatory control over economic 
activity within their state borders.
The internal affairs doctrine was also consistent with each state’s pursuit of its 
own economic development.  In their mercantilistic rivalries, states would generally 
177
 The Panic of 1837 was precipitated by President Andrew Jackson’s specie circular in 1836 that the 
U.S. Treasury would no longer accept bank notes as payment for public lands.  Instead, only payment in 
specie—gold and silver coins—would be accepted.  The deflationary pressure from this official lack of 
confidence in paper money caused widespread bank failures and economic depression.  See RONALD E. 
SEAVOY, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATION, 1784-1855 138, 151 (1982).
178 See CADMAN, supra note 83, at 195-96.
179 See Scheiber, supra note 76, at 95-96; JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF 
FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 63-64 (1956).  Eminent domain powers, of 
course, could only be exercised within the granting state.
180
 8 Wall. 168 (1868).    
181 See infra notes 186-190 and accompanying text.  Even after the merger movement and the formation 
of the great trusts as holding companies with national reach, courts relied on these same state sovereignty 
ideas in articulating the internal affairs doctrine.  See infra note 336.
182 See Michael E. Solimine, Forum-Selection Clauses and the Privatization of Procedure, 25 CORNELL 
INT’L L. J. 51, 76 & n.157 (1992) (applying game theory approach to explain implicit judicial cooperation 
through precedent). 
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have attempted to discourage the export of local capital.  The doctrine furthered this 
goal, closing the local courthouse doors to the complaints of local investors in foreign 
corporations, whose capital was likely being utilized in the incorporating state and not 
in the forum state.  States effectively refused to come to the aid of local capital 
exporters—local promoters and other investors setting up and financing businesses in 
neighboring states.  While no evidence suggests that this rationale helped motivate the 
internal affairs doctrine, it may help to explain why legislatures would have been
perfectly happy with the doctrine and would have seen no reason to tinker with it.
Disgruntled local investors in foreign corporations were likely to have been few and 
diffuse during this period.  They would have been difficult to organize ex ante to 
petition for change in the jurisdictional rule.183
It is important also to note what the early internal affairs decisions did not do.  
Because the early internal affairs decisions occurred in an environment of territorial 
corporate law, firms did not enjoy an unbridled choice of corporate law.  Unlike the 
modern context, therefore, the internal affairs doctrine did not vindicate private choice.  
Instead, each corporation had a home state, in which it was physically located and under 
whose laws—including corporate law—it was regulated.  In this context, the internal 
affairs doctrine merely left to the home state the regulation of its own corporations.
D. State Regulation of Foreign Corporations
I conclude the discussion of this industrialization period by addressing a 
misconception about the timing of strong-form charter competition and the role of 
Constitutional doctrine in bringing this competition about.  As earlier noted, certain of 
the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause decisions of the period facilitated an integrated
national market in goods.184  At the same time, other Commerce Clause decisions
wrestled with the question of states’ latitude to regulate foreign corporations.  The 
seminal case was Paul v. Virginia in 1868.185 Some commentators have suggested that 
Paul effectively precluded states from regulating foreign corporations.  On this view, 
the decision single-handedly mandated universal respect for firms’ choice of corporate 
law, creating a national market for corporate charters and causing strong-form charter 
competition.  One implication of this view is that the internal affairs doctrine—
deferring to the law of the incorporating state—was Constitutionally required.
In this section, I discuss Paul and its implications.  I show that Paul could not 
and did not lead directly to strong-form charter competition or mandate universal 
deference to the incorporating state in matters of internal corporate affairs.  Instead, 
charter competition came several decades after Paul, and the story of the internal affairs 
doctrine is not nearly so simple.
183 See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF 
GROUPS (Schocken 1965) (describing difficulty of organizing diffuse groups for political action).
184 See supra notes 120-124 and accompanying text.
185
 8 Wall. 168 (U.S. 1868).
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1. The Commerce Clause and State Control of Foreign 
Corporations
Paul v. Virginia settled two important Constitutional questions for foreign 
corporations.  First, it reaffirmed the holding of Bank of Augusta v. Earle186 that a 
corporation is not a “citizen” entitled to the protections of the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause.187 Second, while also finding it “undoubtedly true” that corporations enjoyed 
the protections of the Commerce Clause,188 the Court made clear that for economic 
activity that did not qualify as interstate commerce, states were free to regulate and 
discriminate against foreign corporations.  The court denied a Commerce Clause 
challenge to a Virginia statute imposing licensing requirements on foreign corporations 
doing an insurance business, finding that the insurance business did not constitute 
interstate “commerce.”189  The decision explicitly reserved to the states broad latitude to 
regulate foreign corporations or even exclude them entirely, provided they were not 
engaged in interstate commerce.
The corporation being the mere creation of local law, can have no legal 
existence beyond the limits of the sovereignty where created. . . . The 
recognition of its existence even by other States, and the enforcement of its 
contracts made therein, depend purely upon the comity of those States—a 
comity which is never extended where the existence of the corporation or the 
exercise of its powers are prejudicial to their interests or repugnant to their 
policy.  Having no absolute right of recognition in other States, . . . it follows, as 
a matter of course, that such assent may be granted upon such terms and 
conditions as those States may think proper to impose. They may exclude the 
foreign corporation entirely; they may restrict its business to particular localities, 
or they may exact such security for the performance of its contracts with their 
citizens as in their judgment will best promote the public interest.  The whole 
matter rests in their discretion.190
This power to exclude foreign corporations we can think of as the ultimate rejection of 
the internal affairs doctrine.  Exclusion of foreign corporations meant that only a firm 
willing to take a domestic charter could qualify to do intrastate business as a 
186
 38 U.S. 519 (1839).  Bank of Augusta is discussed supra at nn. 99-103 and accompanying text.
187 U.S. CONST. art. IV. § 2; Paul, 8 Wall. at 182.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 183.
190 Id. at 181.  Recognizing corporate privileges and immunities would lead to unthinkable results:
States would be unable to limit the number of corporations doing business therein. . . . They 
could not repel an intruding corporation, except on the condition of refusing incorporation for a 
similar purpose to their own citizens; and yet it might be of the highest public interest that the 
number of corporations in the State should be limited; that they should be required to give 
publicity to their transactions; to submit their affairs to proper examination; to be subject to 
forfeiture of their corporate rights in case of mismanagement, and that their officers should be 
held to a strict accountability for the manner in which the business of the corporations is 
managed, and be liable to summary removal.
Id. at 182.
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corporation.191 Paul, then, effectively left to states the discretion to regulate the internal 
affairs of foreign corporations doing intrastate business.
In rejecting the Commerce Clause challenge, the Paul court left an important 
negative implication as well:  that the Commerce Clause forbade states from excluding 
or regulating foreign corporations engaged in interstate commerce.192 Commentators 
have claimed that this Commerce Clause prohibition explains the emergence of state 
charter competition, implying as well that the internal affairs doctrine was 
Constitutionally mandated.  On this view, Paul created a national corporate charter 
market and triggered fervent charter competition. One scholar notes that after Paul, 
interstate enterprises could shop for the most favorable state of incorporation, 
and some of the smaller states began to ‘liberalize’ or ‘modernize’ their 
corporation laws in ‘charter-mongering’ competition or, stated more 
euphemistically, to meet the needs of modern business.  New Jersey became the 
first ‘mother of corporations’ in 1875.193
Another scholar argues:
The impact of Paul v. Virginia on the legislative market for corporate 
privileges was enormous. . . .  Once the spatial monopolies for corporate 
privileges had fallen away after Paul,. . . [o]ne opportunity open to states was to 
pass liberal general laws to attract incorporators from across the nation and to 
increase the revenues of the legislators’ home states with taxes and franchise 
fees on the firms chartered under their laws but operating in other states.  In 
essence, state legislators were presented with the opportunity to export some of 
the costs of their state government.194
This analysis implies that after Paul, states saw little latitude to regulate the 
internal affairs of foreign corporations. For foreign corporations engaged in interstate 
commerce, imposition of local corporate rules might have run afoul of the Commerce 
Clause.195 In addition, under this analysis Paul’s clear reservation of regulatory 
authority over intrastate commerce was apparently not a significant reservation.  
Interstate commerce was apparently so ubiquitous, and foreign corporations engaged in 
interstate commerce so numerous, that Paul led directly to states’ universal deference to 
firms’ choice of corporate law.  On this view, states’ territorial monopolies on corporate 
191 See Rwy. Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 282 U.S. 440 (1931).
192
 This negative implication of Paul was made explicit in later cases.  See Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. 
Western Union Telegraph Co., 96 U.S. 1 (1877); Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47 (1891).  See also 
HENN, supra note 151, at 17; HENDERSON, supra note 109, at 114.
193 HENN, supra note 151, at 17.  Others have claimed, incorrectly, that corporate charter competition was 
Constitutionally mandated by Santa Clara v. So. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).  See NADER ET AL., 
supra note 132, at 47; Seligman, supra note 33.  Contrary to the claims, Santa Clara did not discuss the 
question whether a corporation qualified as a “citizen” under the Privileges and Immunities Clause.  It did 
hold that corporations were “persons” for purposes of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.  
See Santa Clara, 118 U.S. at 394.
194
 Butler, supra note 103, at 155-56.  
195
 “For if the right to exclude is denied, the right to admit on condition necessarily falls with it.”  
HENDERSON, supra note 109, at 116.
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law ended because the dominant presence of foreign corporations in interstate 
commerce swamped any theoretical powers states retained over intrastate commerce.  
The competitive pressure to liberalize corporate law and to honor firms’ chosen 
corporation law became irresistible.  
If this analysis were correct, then the origin and persistence of the internal 
affairs doctrine would be a mere footnote in the interstate commerce story.  If after
Paul, the Commerce Clause removed significant swaths of economic activity—and the 
foreign corporations engaged in that activity—from the sphere of state regulation, then
states’ patterns of deference to firm’s choice of corporation laws would then not be 
puzzling, since there would appear to be some Constitutional command for such an 
approach with respect to large—even dominant—sectors of the economy. If only trivial 
economic activity remained for state regulation, states might not have bothered.
2. The Significance of Intrastate Business
The above rendering overstates the significance of Paul and its negative 
implication regarding interstate commerce.  The implied prohibition on regulating 
interstate commerce was not a major limitation on states’ ability to regulate foreign 
corporations.  Important industries remained within the sphere of state control, and 
states were generally confident of their legal authority to use corporate law to regulate 
foreign corporations.  True, important industries—railroads and telegraph companies, 
for example—came within the definition of interstate commerce,196 and states might 
plausibly have competed for corporate chartering revenues from these firms.  However, 
significant economic activity remained within the bounds of intrastate commerce, such 
that states’ ability to exclude foreign corporations or admit them on conditions was no 
small reservation of legal powers.  Moreover, it took twenty years after Paul for New 
Jersey to begin actively marketing corporate charters to firms without economic ties to 
the state.  Its pursuit of chartering revenues through modifications to and active 
marketing of its corporate law did not begin until 1888.197
Important industries such as agriculture, forestry, manufacturing, and mining 
operations, as well as insurance, were clearly not considered interstate commerce at the 
end of the nineteenth century and were therefore not shielded from state regulation 
under the Commerce Clause.198 Likewise, a foreign corporation could own property or 
196 See JOSEPH HENRY BEALE, JR., THE LAW OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS § 129 (1904); W. DRAPER 
LEWIS, THE FEDERAL POWER OVER COMMERCE AND ITS EFFECT ON STATE ACTION 15-16 (1892).
197 See infra note 237 and accompanying text.
198 Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 67 U. CHI. L. REV.
1089, 1120 (2000).  Beginning in 1910, however, Supreme Court decisions began to characterize foreign 
corporations’ Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights—first enunciated in Santa Clara v. 
Southern Pacific Railroad Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886)—as rights of nondiscrimination.  See Southern R.R. 
Co. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400 (1910); Herndon v. Chicago Rwy., 239 U.S. 560 (1916); Phoenix Ins. Co. v. 
McMaster, 237 U.S. 63 (1915).  These cases clearly curtailed states’ power to exclude foreign 
corporations.  See HENDERSON, supra note 109, at 148-62.  This would not generally affect states’ 
latitude to regulate foreign corporations’ internal affairs, however, since states doing so would typically 
only be applying the rules applicable to domestic corporations. 
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maintain offices or warehouses only at the sufferance of the host state.199  Therefore, 
while foreign corporations might deliver goods into a state free from local regulation or 
taxation, Commerce Clause protection might not extend much further in protecting 
other of their economic activities outside their incorporating states.
After Paul, the Court repeatedly affirmed states’ power to discriminate against 
foreign corporations by declaring that certain business activities—like manufacturing 
and mining—did not constitute interstate commerce.200  And strong evidence exists that 
these intrastate businesses subject to state control predominated; they were not 
exceptional.  For example, in New England between 1863 and 1875, charters for mining 
and manufacturing companies constituted almost 70% of all corporate charters.201 The 
Court’s decision in Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York202 in 1892 suggests that 
interstate commerce was the exceptional situation, and that states’ power to exclude 
foreign corporations or admit them on conditions was the rule.
As to a foreign corporation, . . . it can claim a right to do business in another 
State, to any extent, only subject to the conditions imposed by its laws. . . .  This 
doctrine has been so frequently declared by this court that it must be deemed no 
longer a matter of discussion, if any question can ever be considered at rest.  
Only two exceptions or qualifications have been attached to it in all the 
numerous adjudications in which the subject has been considered . . . .  One of 
these qualifications is that the state cannot exclude from its limits a corporation 
engaged in interstate or foreign commerce.203
Even during the heyday of the great merger movement, while New Jersey was 
instigating strong-form charter competition and reaping stupendous rewards from 
charter sales,204 other states’ officers expressed confidence in their legal authority to 
regulate foreign corporations generally.  The annual report of the attorney general of 
Ohio for 1898 echoes the Horn Silver Mining understanding of states’ broad powers 
over foreign corporations and the narrowness of the interstate commerce exception.  For 
controlling trusts, 
the State is more powerful than the Federal Government. . . . [T]he Federal 
Government’s power in this behalf is limited to corporations doing an inter-state 
199 See Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517, 527 (1886) (holding that for corporation owning property, plants, 
mines, or maintaining offices and warehouses in foreign states, its property necessarily became “part of 
the general mass of property in the State, subject as such to its [taxing and regulatory] jurisdiction.”).
200 Pembina Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181 (1888); Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York, 
143 U.S. 305 (1892); New York v. Roberts; 171 U.S. 658 (1898); American Sugar Refining Co. v. 
Louisiana, 179 U.S. 89 (1900); Diamond Glue Co. v. U.S. Glue Co., 187 U.S. 611 (1903); Hemphill v. 
Orloff, 277 U.S. 537 (1928); Railway Express Agency v. Virginia, 282 U.S. 440 (1931).
201
 For mining and manufacturing, 3,136 charters were granted, out of a total of 4,575.  Kessler, supra 
note 75, at 47.  A charter grant did not always indicate the inception of a business; some charter grants 
went unused.  But these numbers give some indication of the economic significance of intrastate business 
in New England.
202
 143 U.S. 305 (1892).
203 Id. at 314.  The other qualification was for corporations in the employ of the federal government.  Id.
204 See infra Part V.A.2.
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business, while the State is sovereign over its own corporate creatures as well as 
over the franchises of foreign corporations exercised in the State’s domain.205
Similarly, in 1903 a Massachusetts special legislative committee on corporation laws 
reported that:
[A] corporation cannot exercise its franchise in another state as a matter of legal 
right, but only on the principle of inter-state comity.  Foreign corporations may
be excluded entirely, or they may so taxed or otherwise burdened as to compel 
them to leave the state.  They can be admitted to the state, and can exercise their 
corporate privileges therein, only upon conforming to such terms and conditions 
as a state may prescribe. . . .  [F]oreign corporations . . . require the official 
sanction of the state in which they wish to do business.206
It appears, then, that states could have regulated significant economic activities 
in which foreign corporations were engaged.  Contemporary corporate scholars agreed.  
In 1894, William Cook noted in his famous treatise, “[I]n nearly all particulars foreign 
corporations must bend to the will of the state.”207 Even after the merger movement, as 
late as 1929, corporate scholars complained about states’ unwillingness to exercise their 
powers to regulate corporations:
So far as powers go, each state is . . . amply able to regulate and control 
not only the corporations which it itself creates, but also foreign 
corporations. . . .  The causes that give rise to the corporation problem are not to 
be found in any limitation in the powers of the states over corporations, but in 
their failure to exercise those powers with sole reference to the promotion of the 
public interest. . . .  [P]rivate interests and selfish interests of individual states in 
the revenue they can derive through incorporating companies to carry on 
business in other jurisdictions have served to give an unfortunate direction to 
American corporation legislation.”208
For political and economic reasons discussed below, most state legislatures 
ultimately chose not to exclude foreign corporations or deter their entry with significant 
regulation.  Instead, legislatures—with a few notable lapses—forswore regulation of
foreign corporations’ internal affairs and liberalized their own corporate laws.  But this 
did not occur until the 1890s with the great merger movement and New Jersey’s active 
205 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO THE GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF OHIO FOR THE 
YEAR ENDING DEC. 31, 1898 19 (1899) (emphasis supplied).  The attorney general further noted that 
“quo warranto is the true remedy to punish either domestic or foreign corporations when they violate the 
public policy of the State by monopolistic contracts, or when they openly defy the anti-trust laws or any 
other laws of the State.”  Id.
206 MASSACHUSETTS REPORT, supra note 115, at 290-91 (citations omitted).
207 WILLIAM W. COOK, A TREATISE ON STOCK AND STOCKHOLDERS, BONDS, MORTGAGES AND GENERAL 
CORPORATION LAW, v. 2 § 697 (3d ed. 1894).
208 HENRY R. SEAGER & CHARLES A. GULICK, JR., TRUST AND CORPORATION PROBLEMS 33-34 (1929).  
As late as 1931, the Supreme Court upheld a provision of the Virginia constitution that effectively 
required a foreign corporation to take out a Virginia charter in order to do an intrastate express business.  
Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 282 U.S. 440 (1931).  Apparently, Virginia’s law was 
designed to stop the flow of express companies reincorporating in West Virginia and New Jersey.  Liggett 
v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 560.
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marketing of its non-territorial corporate law.209  This reluctance to regulate foreign 
corporations’ internal affairs was more or less a calculated response to economic 
conditions—especially the changing industrial organization brought about by 
technological innovation—and not a result of Constitutional mandate.210
209 See infra note 236-237 and accompanying text.
210
 The division of regulatory power among the states and the federal government along the lines of 
intrastate versus interstate commerce no doubt created coordination problems in the face of interstate 
markets and firms.  See infra notes 273-274 and accompanying text.  However, Commerce Clause 
dictates by themselves cannot explain widespread legislative acquiescence to the internal affairs doctrine 
in the context of modern charter competition.
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V. THE GREAT MERGER MOVEMENT,
CORPORATE CHARTER COMPETITION, AND POLITICAL ECONOMY
The story of corporate charter competition among the states—and the 
explanation for the persistence of the internal affairs doctrine in facilitating that 
competition—is inextricably bound with the story of the great merger movement at the 
end of the nineteenth century and New Jersey’s pioneering strategy of marketing its 
corporation law to firms with no economic ties to the state.  Strong-form charter 
competition began in earnest in the last decade of the nineteenth century, as New Jersey 
modified its corporation law specifically to attract incorporation by out-of-state firms.211
New Jersey broke with the traditional territoriality of corporate law.  It offered a 
corporation law unfettered with geographical or structural limitations.  It supplied a 
corporate form suitable for housing the great trusts, earning for itself the moniker of 
“Traitor State.”212
Other state legislatures could have resisted.  They could have nullified firms’ 
attempts to evade local corporate rules—in the process, rejecting or reworking the 
existing internal affairs doctrine—by excluding tramp foreign corporations from doing 
intrastate business, or by imposing local corporate rules on these foreign corporations.
However, state legislatures generally offered little resistance to New Jersey and the 
great trusts that incorporated there.  
This Part explains the political economy of the internal affairs doctrine during 
and after the great merger movement.  The stakes in the doctrine changed as a result of 
strong-form charter competition and the political and economic pressures that enabled 
that competition.  Respect for the law of the incorporating state now effectively honored 
firms’ choice of corporate law because firms now had a choice about where to 
incorporate.  My project represents a bit of unconventional positive political economy 
insofar as it attempts to explain legislative inaction.213  In the face of changed 
circumstances that rendered the extant internal affairs doctrine a pro-competition, rent-
dissipating jurisdictional rule, legislators failed to act to change the judge-made rule.
Definitive explanations for legislative inaction are no doubt difficult to construct.214
However, I identify circumstances tending to explain why rational legislators would 
acquiescence to the extant internal affairs doctrine in the new pro-competitive context.
211 See GRANDY, supra note 34, at 43.
212 See infra notes 236-259 and accompanying text.
213
 For a cautionary tale on the use of legislative inaction for statutory interpretation, see William N. 
Eskridge, Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67 (1988).
214
 Even explaining positive state corporate legislation during this period is hampered by the relative 
dearth of sources.  
Despite the importance of the subject, there is no abundance of direct evidence to identify the 
prime movers.  The historian confronts here a problem of scarce sources familiar to the student 
of legal history. . . .  [S]tate legislative records are typically a bare-bones collection.  The press 
usually finds little that is newsworthy in what goes on at state capitols. . . .  There is little 
likelihood that the moving forces will be reflected in unofficial published papers.  To a 
considerable extent we must identify interests and pressures and their legal resolution by 
inference from the formal decisions taken by legislatures and courts.
HURST, supra note 85, at 71. 
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I first discuss state legislatures’ reluctance to fight New Jersey or attempt to 
revisit the internal affairs doctrine.  They did not attempt to salvage the rent-seeking 
potential for local corporate law, but were instead content to allow firms to choose their 
corporate law. With severe economic upheaval in the 1890s, each state needed the 
participation of the great trusts and other large interstate firms in its local economy.  
Collective action among state legislatures was not possible, and legislators feared
driving business to a neighboring state.  Therefore, they did not challenge foreign 
corporations’ corporate status or attempt to impose local corporate rules.  Local 
constituencies in each state benefited from their economic interaction with these foreign 
corporations, and state legislatures welcomed these firms’ local activities.  At the same 
time, legislatures relaxed the restrictions in their own corporation laws to head off 
moves by their remaining local firms to reincorporate elsewhere.  Corporate law 
therefore lost any utility it might have had to favor local interests—primarily local 
producers and investors.
I then describe the New York legislature’s exceptional but short-lived attempt to 
fight New Jersey by regulating the internal affairs of foreign corporations.   While most 
legislatures accepted the new realities of charter competition and the extant internal 
affairs doctrine in this new context, the New York legislature was atypical.  It briefly
imposed local corporate rules on foreign corporations in an attempt to discourage New 
Jersey reincorporation by its local businesses.  With its own robust state economy, it 
feared negative economic consequences less than did other state legislatures.  But it 
ultimately did not press the strategy.215
While local industrial organization and political economy were changing, the 
internal affairs doctrine did not.  I conclude this Part with a note on the doctrinal 
consistency—the inertia—of the doctrine through the merger movement.  Despite the 
demise of territorial corporate law, the rhetoric of courts’ internal affairs decisions 
during and after the merger movement remained consistent with the earlier 
justifications:  the sovereignty of the incorporating state remained an important concern.  
Courts acknowledged their disability to interfere in a foreign corporation’s internal 
affairs, citing states’ general lack of authority in the area.216
A. The Great Merger Movement and New Jersey
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, industrialization, urbanization, and 
the emergence of interstate markets and firms had led to industrial concentration across 
215
 California as well has never been shy about imposing local corporate rules to affect the internal affairs 
of foreign corporations.  As early as 1876, it was willing to extend its rule of personal stockholder 
liability to foreign corporations doing business in the state.  See Pinney v. Nelson, 183 U.S. 144 (1901) 
(upholding application of Section 322 of California Civil Code).  California also adopted a broad 
constitutional provision in 1879 that “[n]o corporation organized outside the limits of this state shall be 
allowed to transact business within this state on more favorable conditions than are prescribed by law to 
similar corporations organized under the laws of this state.”  CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION art. 12, § 15 
(1879).  
216 See infra notes 336-339 and accompanying text.
BEFORE COMPETITION:  ORIGINS OF THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS DOCTRINE
47
DRAFT March 5, 2006
all industries.  Driven in part by new scale economies217 and in large measure by 
anticompetitive impulses, entire industries consolidated into one or a handful of national
producers. Numerous industries became monopolized.218 The great conglomerates 
required a legal form to house them.  New Jersey ultimately obliged.  This section 
recounts the familiar story of New Jersey’s role in instigating modern corporate charter 
competition.
1. The Trusts and Corporate Law
John D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil Trust was the first great industrial 
monopoly.  By 1880, he controlled ninety-five percent of all refined oil shipments in the 
United States.219  To control this enormous set of businesses, Rockefeller needed a new 
and special form of business entity.  At the time, the corporate form was unavailable for 
such a colossal enterprise, given the myriad restrictions in the corporation laws of every 
state.220 So Rockefeller’s lawyer created the corporate trust.  Under this 1882 
arrangement221—involving forty corporations and limited partnerships and forty-six 
individuals—the various businesses were combined and trust certificates issued in 
exchange for the property, assets, or shares of the constituent businesses.  The trust was 
managed by nine trustees elected by vote of the trust certificates, and certificates were 
transferable like shares of corporate stock.222  Through this device, the Standard Oil 
Trust achieved a unified control over the enormous pool of assets necessary to its 
monopoly, while at the same time circumventing the structural restrictions of state 
corporate law and avoiding the public disclosure that incorporation would have 
required.
217
 From 1850 to 1920, the average manufacturing plant for agricultural implements increased its capital 
by over 260 times, its number of wage earners by almost twenty-one times, and the gross value of its 
output by 114 times.  For iron and steel manufacturing plants, the average capital increased almost 107 
times, the average number of wage earners increased by more than eleven times, and the value of output 
increased 119 times.  Across all manufacturing plants, average capital increaed by thirty-seven times, 
labor by almost five times, and the value of output by almost twenty-six times.  JEREMIAH JENKS & 
WALTER E. CLARK, JR., THE TRUST PROBLEM 17 (5th ed. 1929).
218
 Eastern railroad corporations formed the first significant national monopolies.  Eight railroad 
corporations together used their control over transportation to acquire ninety-five percent of the anthracite 
coal industry by 1893.  Railroads monopolized other industries as well:  bituminous coal, kerosene, 
matches, stoves, furnaces, steam and hot water heaters, boilers, gas pipelines, and candles.  NADER ET AL., 
supra note 132, at 39.
219 Id. at 42.
220
 Limits on capitalization, out-of-state operations and property holdings, and prohibitions of holding 
company structures were common.  See supra Part IV.B.
221
 An earlier agreement was struck in 1879, but its existence was not publicly known until 1906.  The 
details of the 1882 agreement emerged first, during New York Senate hearings in 1888, and became the 
model for other trusts of the time.  SEAGER & GULICK, supra note 208, at 49, 50 n.1.  See also REPORT OF 
THE COMMITTEE ON GENERAL LAWS ON THE INVESTIGATION RELATIVE TO TRUSTS, N.Y. SEN. DOC. NO. 
50 8-9 (1888) [hereinafter NEW YORK 1888 REPORT] (describing Standard Oil Trust under 1882 
agreement).
222 SEAGER & GULICK, supra note 208, at 50.
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Other industrial trusts followed in short order.223  By 1890, twenty-four trusts 
had been formed, with total capital of $376 million.224
The trusts provoked public outrage.  The vast majority of corporations were still 
“relatively small affairs, financed for the most part through local subscriptions rather 
than by resort . . . to nationwide systems of security distribution or to stock 
exchanges.”225  State officials in six states attacked the trusts in court.  New York and 
California went after the Sugar Trust.226  Nebraska and Illinois sued constituents of the 
Whiskey Trust.227  Louisiana filed suit against the Cotton-seed Oil Trust.228  Illinois 
sued the Chicago Gas Trust, an unauthorized public utility holding company.229  And 
Ohio sued Standard Oil.230
The legal theory relied upon did not directly address questions of monopoly or 
restraint of trade.  Instead, these actions were brought under established corporate law 
rules.  Though Congress enacted the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890231 and state 
antitrust laws were also proliferating,232 concerns about industrial concentration had 
traditionally been regulated through state corporate law.  State-level regulation made 
sense when product markets were primarily local markets.  Legislatures traditionally 
regulated industrial concentration, not by attacking private arrangements among 
producers, as is common under the Sherman Act.  Instead, legislatures and other state 
officials relied on the structural limitations contained in their corporation laws—
limitations on mergers, limitations on corporate capital, prohibitions on holding 
company structures.233  The trust-busting suits continued with this traditional approach.  
223
 The Cotton-seed Oil Trust was organized in 1884; the Linseed Trust in 1885.  Three great trusts were 
created in 1887:  the National Lead Trust, the Sugar Trust, and the Whiskey Trust.  Id. at 51; Harold 
Underwood Faulkner, Consolidation of Business, in ROOSEVELT, WILSON, AND THE TRUSTS 7 (1950) 
(Edwin C. Rozwenc ed.).  For specific discussion of the formation and operation of the Sugar Trust, see 
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON GENERAL LAWS RESPECTING ALL MATTERS RELATING TO “TRUSTS,” 
AND ESPECIALLY “SUGAR TRUSTS,” N.Y. SEN. DOC. NO. 79 4-9 (1891) (hereinafter NEW YORK 1891 
REPORT).
224 NADER ET AL., supra note 132, at 42. 
225
 E. Merrick Dodd, Statutory Developments in Business Corporation Law, 50 HARV. L. REV. 27, 30 
(1936) (describing state of affairs in 1886).  See also Thomas R. Navin & Marian V. Sears, The Rise of a 
Market for Industrial Securities,1887-1902, 29 BUS. HIST. REV. 105, 107 (1955) (noting that industrial 
firms of the late 1880s were “typified by small single-plant companies serving limited markets”).
226 See People v. North River Sugar Refining Co., 121 N.Y. 582 (1890); People v. American Sugar 
Refining Co., 7 Ry. & Corp. L.J. 83 (Cal. 1895).
227 See State v. Nebraska Distilling Co., 29 Neb. 700 (1890); Distilling & Cattle Feeding Co. v. People, 
156 Ill. 448 (1895).
228 See State v. American Cotton Oil Trust, 1 Ry. & Corp. L.J. 509 (La. 1888).
229 See People v. Chicago Gas Trust Co., 130 Ill. 268 (1889).
230 See State v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Ohio St. 137 (1892).
231
 Charles W. McCurdy, The Knight Sugar Decision of 1895 and the Modernization of American 
Corporation Law, 1869-1903, 53 BUS. HIST. REV. 304, 328 (1979).
232 See JENKS & CLARK, supra note 217, at 213; 2 REPORT OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 252A 
(facing page 264) (1901) [hereinafter INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION REPORT]. 
233 See Liggett v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 550-56.  In fact, the original version of the bill that became the 
Sherman Act proposed to attack interstate combinations in restraint of trade by authorizing federal 
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The suits were brought as quo warranto actions to revoke the charters of the 
corporations that had abdicated control to the trusts.  Such transfers of control were
beyond the powers of the constituent corporations—clearly ultra vires.  The suits 
succeeded.  “Established principles of corporation law . . . provided adequate and 
effective weapons for the destruction of corporate combinations.”234
2. New Jersey:  The Traitor State
At the same time the trusts came under attack by officials of various states, New 
Jersey officials adopted a new tack in developing New Jersey’s corporation law.  As 
earlier noted, before the merger movement, state legislatures generally liberalized their 
corporation laws, not to sell corporate charters for their own sake, but typically as part 
of a program to attract and retain capital and labor in the state.235  Offering attractive 
territorial corporate law was merely part of a general effort to create a favorable climate 
for business.  
Beginning in 1888, New Jersey officials targeted firms without any necessary
economic connection to the state.  They hoped to raise revenue merely from the sale of 
corporate charters to firms with all or most of their operations elsewhere.236 A new 
pricing strategy—taxing New Jersey corporations annually based on their authorized 
capital—created the potential for enormous revenues.237 Corporate law became a 
product, and not just a marketing device.
James Brooks Dill, a New York lawyer who lived in New Jersey during the late 
1880s, is generally credited with the idea of selling corporate charters to raise state 
revenues.  After failing to convince New York politicians to adopt his scheme,238 Dill 
went across the river to New Jersey.239 He was able to convince the governor that his 
plan would succeed despite West Virginia’s lack of success with a similar scheme.  
officials to dissolve them, just as state officials could apply for the forfeiture of the charters of their 
domestic corporations.  McCurdy, supra note 231, at 324.  
234 Id. at 322.
235 See supra notes 164-167 and accompanying text.
[Corporate law] standards seem to have remained fairly high until about the last decade of the 
[nineteenth] century, when the combined needs of business for the corporation and of the state 
for revenue after long years of depression soon produced a sweeping change in the hitherto 
rigorous attitude of the state governments.  As is well known, the first state to weaken was New 
Jersey.
William C. Kessler, Business Organization and Management, in THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN 
ECONOMY:  AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 730, 738 (Harold F. 
Williamson ed. 1944).
236 GRANDY, supra note 34, at 43.
237
 Somewhat fortuitously, New Jersey had modified its method of taxing corporations a few years 
earlier.  In 1884, “[a]lmost as an afterthought” following passage of a new tax on railroads, the legislature
enacted a corporate tax based on authorized capital.  Grandy, supra note 115, at 680-81.  Several years 
passed before anyone saw the revenue potential in this new method of taxation.
238
 Stoke, supra note 77, at 571.
239
 Lincoln Steffens recounts the story of how Dill got his inspiration.  He had apparently heard that the 
secretary of state of West Virginia was set up in Manhattan with the state seal by his side, pitching the 
liberality of West Virginia’s corporation law and selling charters for a fee.  Lincoln Steffens, New Jersey:  
A Traitor State, 25 MCCLURE’S 41, 42 (1905).
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Dill’s plan included an additional feature—a private corporation to actively advertise 
the benefits of New Jersey corporation law to out-of-state businesses.240  Dill founded 
The Corporation Trust Company of New Jersey to perform this marketing function.
Besides marketing, the trust company also facilitated New Jersey incorporation by 
providing the ministerial services necessary for out-of-state charter applicants to comply 
with the law’s formal requirements.  The trust company handled the filing of the 
certificate of incorporation with the secretary of state.  It provided an address for the 
newly chartered corporation’s principal office within the state.  An employee of the 
trust company served as the new corporation’s local agent for service of process.241 Dill
also saw to it that both he and important politicians personally profited from the 
chartermongering strategy.  The clerk of chancery served as an incorporator for the 
Corporation Trust Company, and the governor and secretary of state both served as 
directors.  The latter eventually became president of the company.242
New Jersey’s timing was excellent.  Critical amendments were enacted 
beginning in 1888 that facilitated holding company structures and consolidations, 
exactly the legal tools the great trusts needed that corporate law had not theretofore 
240
 Stoke, supra note 77, at 571; Steffens, supra note 239, at 43.
Mr. Dill explained to Governor Abbett that, while his state had liberal laws, other states like 
Delaware and West Virginia were liberalizing their laws, and that while the advantages of Jersey 
were known to the great captains of industry, the little captains did not know about them. . . .  
What was wanted was a state that would not only open up its laws, but would advertise itself; 
that state would get the business, which would go forth with business push, advertising and 
drumming up trade among the businesses that never had heard of West Virginia, Delaware, and 
New Jersey as dealers in lawful license.  Now a state, as a state, could not afford . . . to go out on 
the road showing its goods and advertising itself as the easiest, safest and best shop for limited-
liability charters.  The thing to do, therefore, was to make it worth while for a private company, 
incorporated under Jersey laws, to undertake this part of the business.  So Mr. Dill proposed to 
form a company which, for small but numerous fees, should advertise Jersey as a charter-
granting state, explain her laws, vouch for her courts, attend to the incorporation of commercial 
companies, and look out for them at home while they were off doing business in the other states.
Id.
241 GRANDY, supra note 34, at 40.  The Corporation Trust Company advertised:
We will attend to every detail, including, if you desire, the organization of your 
company, notify you of all meetings you are required to hold, and see that they are legally 
conducted . . . .
We have employees of this office who act as incorporators, who would sign the charter 
and complete the organization, returning to you all the papers ready to do business in three days . 
. . .
The State requires that one director be a resident of this State whom we will furnish if 
desired without extra charge.
Stoke, supra note 77, at 573.  The webpage for CT Corporation, a premier corporation services company, 
describes the range of services that a modern corporation services company provides.  See 
http://www.ctadvantage.com/public/lawFirmCustomers.html# (last visited Mar. 2, 2005).
242 GRANDY, supra note 34, at 40.  His involvement “must have proven particularly useful as the 
secretary of state’s office regularly received inquiries about the law and referred them to one of the 
corporation service companies.”  Id.
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offered.243 These corporate law revisions allowed the great trusts simply to 
reincorporate in New Jersey after having been dismembered by quo warranto actions in 
other states.244 In a particularly galling example, following the New York state attorney 
general’s successful suit to revoke the charter of a New York corporation for its illegal 
participation in the Sugar Trust,245 the firm immediately reincorporated in New Jersey 
and continued doing business in New York.246
Corporations, especially the largest ones, flocked to New Jersey.247  Following 
an 1896 revision, the largest corporations came in droves. 248 By 1899 all the trusts that 
243
 An 1888 act allowed New Jersey corporations to hold stock in other corporations, thereby enabling 
holding companies.  Stoke, supra note 77, at 571, Keasbey, supra note 127, at 207 (citing Laws of New 
Jersey (1888), p. 385).  
An 1891 law permitted corporations to purchase stock or other property using their own stock in 
payment, with great deference given to the directors’ judgment.  Stoke, supra note 77, at 571 (citing Laws 
of New Jersey (1891), p. 329).  This deference was important in allowing acquiring corporations to pay 
handsomely for their acquisitions by issuing their own stock as consideration.  A generous helping of 
stock assured the acquiescence of the target’s owners, and the statutory deference to directors’ judgment 
insulated the acquirer’s directors from the complaints of their pre-existing shareholders concerning the 
massive dilution of their shares caused by issuance of the additional stock in the acquisition.  A general 
revision of the corporation statute in 1896 rendered conclusive the directors’ judgment as to the value of 
property purchased.  LAWS OF NEW JERSEY (1896), pp. 313 ff.  “This meant putative monopolists could 
buy up competing corporations without paying a penny in cash while offering the owners of the acquired 
corporations quantities of stock too irresistible to refuse.  Everyone profited but the public investor.”  
Seligman, supra note 33, at 266.
In 1892, New Jersey repealed its antitrust statute.  Keasbey, supra note 127, at 209 (citing LAWS 
OF NEW JERSEY (1892), p. 200).  It also made explicit that corporations could be formed to do all their 
business outside the state.  Liggett v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 563 & n.44 (citing N.J. LAWS 1892, p. 90).  
General authority for mergers was enacted in 1893.  GRANDY, supra note 34, at 43 (citing Act of Mar. 8, 
1893, ch. 67, 1893 N.J. Laws 121).  This general merger statute offered enormous flexibility to 
corporations.  It contained a general enabling provision, authorizing a merger agreement to contain “all 
such other provisions and details as . . . [the] directors shall deem necessary to perfect the merger or 
consolidation.”  Id. at 44 (citing Act of Mar. 8, 1983, ch. 67, 1983 N.J. Laws 121, § 2).  It also gave 
tremendous flexibility as to the financing of mergers, authorizing issuance of common and preferred 
stock and debt to pay for acquisitions.  See id. at 44 (citing Act of Mar. 8, 1983, ch. 67, 1983 N.J. Laws 
121, § 6).  The same year also saw a broadening of authority for holding companies. Id. at 43 (citing Act 
of Mar. 14, 1893, ch. 171, 1893 N.J. Laws 301).
244
 A general revision of the corporation act in 1896 removed the then-existing fifty-year limit on 
corporate life.  A corporation could be formed for any lawful purpose and could carry on business in any 
state or any foreign country.  A corporation was free to lease its holdings or franchise to another 
corporation.  Taxes were set at a rate of one-tenth of one percent of the par value of stock issued up to 
three million, and five dollars for each one hundred thousand or part thereof above five million.  Stoke, 
supra note 77, at 572 (citing LAWS OF NEW JERSEY (1896), pp. 313 ff.).  This latter provision was 
important for eliminating the tax collectors’ discretion from the calculation of the corporation’s tax bill.  
245
 People v. North River Sugar Refining Co., 121 N.Y. 582 (1890).
246 NEW YORK 1891 REPORT, supra note 223, at 10-14.
247
 According to one account, as of early 1891, 1,626 corporations had been chartered in New Jersey in 
two years.  Stoke, supra note 77, at 573.
248
 In the seven years from 1897 to 1904, 104 corporations were chartered in New Jersey with capital of 
$20 million or more.  Only fifteen of such large enterprises had been incorporated in New Jersey in the 
preceding sixteen years.  GEORGE HEBERTON EVANS, JR., BUSINESS INCORPORATIONS IN THE UNITED 
STATES, 1800-1943 49 (1948).
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had been successfully attacked by state attorneys general in the preceding decade had 
re-emerged as New Jersey corporations.249
In addition to housing the great trusts, New Jersey also dominated more 
generally as the incorporation jurisdiction of choice in the great merger movement.
Dramatic consolidation occurred in major industries between 1895 and 1904.  During 
that period over 1800 manufacturing firms were merged out of existence.  Half of the 
surviving firms enjoyed national market shares in excess of forty percent; one third of 
the surviving firms enjoyed national market shares exceeding seventy percent.250 In 
those years, for mergers exceeding $1 million in capitalization, nearly 80% of the 
capitalization came under a New Jersey charter.251 The next leading incorporating state, 
New York, accounted for a mere 3.7% of capitalization.252
As a fiscal matter as well, the chartering business was wildly successful for New 
Jersey.253  In 1896, it garnering over $857,000 in franchise fees.  By 1900, its franchise 
fee revenues had more than doubled, approaching $1.8 million that year.  By 1904, that 
figure had almost doubled again, reaching $3.4 million.254  From 1896 to 1904, New 
Jersey chartered over 15,000 corporations.255 It had extinguished its state debt by 
1902—including Civil War debt that had amounted to $2.5 million as of 1875—and 
eliminated its property tax.256  By 1905, New Jersey had a surplus approaching $3 
million.257 The governor boasted:
Of the entire income of the government, not a penny was contributed directly by 
the people. . . .  The state is caring for the blind, the feeble-minded, and the 
insane, supporting our prisoners and reformatories, educating the younger 
generations, developing a magnificent road system, maintaining the state 
249
 McCurdy, supra note 231, at 322-23 (citing 19 INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 232, at 
598-99).  United States Steel Corporation, then the largest company in America, incorporated in New 
Jersey in 1901 with a total capitalization of $1.37 billion.  Id.  Besides Standard Oil and U.S. Steel, the 
other five of John Moody’s seven “Greater Industrial Trusts” also incorporated in New Jersey, as well as 
more than half of his “Lesser Industrial Trusts.”  Moody’s great industrial trusts were Amalgamated 
Copper, American Smelting and Refining, American Sugar Refining, Consolidated Tobacco, 
International Mercantile Marine, Standard Oil, and U.S. Steel.  JOHN MOODY, THE TRUTH ABOUT TRUSTS
453-69 (1904).
250 NAOMI R. LAMOREAUX, THE GREAT MERGER MOVEMENT IN AMERICAN BUSINESS, 1895-1904 2 
(1985). 
251 See RALPH L. NELSON, MERGER MOVEMENTS IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY 1895-1956 67 (1959).  
252 Id.
253
 Besides the fortuitous taxing structure put into place in 1884, see supra note 237, New Jersey 
implemented an effective enforcement device to keep their corporations paying their annual franchise 
taxes.  In 1891, the governor was given the authority to revoke the charters of delinquent corporations, 
and each year’s gubernatorial proclamation included an extensive list of such delinquent corporations.  
Later, the legislature also provided for a ninety-day grace period, during which delinquent firms could 
buy their amnesty and reinstatement by paying the back taxes, interest, and fees.  GRANDY, supra note 34, 
at 44.
254 See Seligman, supra note 33, at 267 (citing various sources).  
255 Id.  
256 GRANDY, supra note 34, at 46.
257
 Seligman, supra note 33, at 268.
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government and courts of justice, all of which would be a burden upon the tax-
payer except for our present fiscal policy.  To have raised last year, by direct 
taxation, the income of the state, would have imposed upon property a tax rate 
of nearly one-half of one per cent.258
Its singular success in the sale of corporate charters earned New Jersey the now 
infamous moniker of “Traitor State.”259
B. Potential Resistance by Other States
Officials in other states faced a crucial choice during this period of industry 
consolidation and New Jersey’s stunning modifications of its corporation law.  They 
could either fight New Jersey and its tramp corporations, or they could succumb.  While 
officials in many states condemned New Jersey’s charter selling strategy, and a few 
studiously mimicked it,260 most just reluctantly succumbed.  State legislatures did not 
attempt to exclude New Jersey corporations or impose local corporate rules on them or 
prevent domestic corporations from being acquired by New Jersey holding companies. 
Instead, state legislatures generally recognized foreign corporations’ corporate status 
and their choice of foreign corporate law—leaving the existing internal affairs doctrine 
intact despite its very different consequences from the days of territorial corporate law.  
State legislatures also followed New Jersey’s lead on many aspects of corporation law, 
content to modify their laws sufficiently to defend against the tide of their domestic 
corporations seeking new charters from New Jersey.  Only a few isolated instances of 
resistance occurred.261
The legal tools for resisting New Jersey were readily available.  State officials 
clearly possessed the legal authority to exclude foreign corporations, impose local 
corporate rules on them, or otherwise condition their entry to do a local business.262
State officials would understandably have wished to regulate foreign corporations 
whose acquisition of local plants and other productive assets might impede local 
competition.  As Alton Adams noted in 1903:
With ample power to refuse admission to foreign corporations . . . , a 
state may maintain production on a competitive basis within its limits.  A 
foreign corporation owning plants of a particular character in other states may be 
denied the right to purchase such factories in any given state, or to continue in 
their ownership or operation there even after purchase.  Or, if absolute exclusion 
seems too radical, a heavy special tax may be laid by any state on each foreign 
corporation owning mines, forests or factories in other states.  The result of such 
258
 Steffens, supra note 239, at 51.
259 Id.
260 See James B. Dill, National Incorporation Laws for Trusts, 11 YALE L.J. 273, 282 (1902) (describing 
New York legislative committee desire to compete with New Jersey in 1902); Keasbey, supra note 127, 
at 201-02 (describing competitive efforts of West Virginia, Kentucky, Delaware, and New York); Stoke, 
supra note 77, at 575-76 (additionally listing Maryland and Maine as competitors).
261 See infra Part V.D.
262 See supra notes 204-210 and accompanying text.
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taxes would be to bring the mines, forests or factories rapidly back into the 
hands of independent operators.263
State officials could also readily have revoked the charters of domestic 
corporations attempting to merge or consolidate into New Jersey holding company 
structures.  The same quo warranto actions that state attorneys general took against the
trusts would have been viable after those same trusts found homes as holding 
companies under New Jersey’s corporation law.  Operating companies chartered in the 
various states had no more power to transfer control to New Jersey holding companies 
than they had to transfer control to the trusts that preceded them.264 For the non-New 
Jersey corporations, such consolidations were ultra vires and subject therefore to the 
same vulnerabilities as the transactions by which they had attempted to join the trusts
earlier.265
C. Lack of Resistance
Officials in most states did not resist.  Instead, most copied the provisions of 
New Jersey law most attractive to the trusts and corporate promoters.266  If state 
officials had the legal power to fight the new trusts—by regulating foreign corporations 
and revoking the charters of domestic corporations attempting to consolidate with 
263
 Alton D. Adams, State Control of Trusts, 18 POL. SCI. Q. 462, 478 (1903).
264
 Such a transfer of control might take various transactional forms, all of which were generally 
restricted by state corporation laws before New Jersey’s dramatic amendments.  A simple merger into a 
New Jersey corporation was not generally authorized.  Likewise, a sale of all the corporation’s assets to a 
New Jersey corporation in exchange for the stock of the New Jersey corporation was held to be ultra 
vires under Michigan law.  The selling corporation was not authorized to invest in the stock of another 
corporation, and its sale of its franchise was “contrary to a sound public policy.”  McCutcheon v. Merz 
Capsule Co., 71 F. 787, 792-94 (C.C.A. 6th 1896).  See also De La Vergne Refrigerating Machine Co. v. 
German Savings Instit. 175 U.S. 40, 54-58 (1899) (holding that New York corporation was not authorized 
to purchase stock of rival corporation). 
265 See supra notes 231-234 and accompanying text.  Besides precluding their domestic corporations 
from combining with New Jersey corporations, state officials would have wished to preclude their 
domestic corporations’ alternative strategy of dissolving and reincorporating in New Jersey, while 
continuing to do a local business.  See McCurdy, supra note 231, at 336.  Excluding foreign corporations 
or imposing appropriate conditions on them would have foiled this end run around domestic corporation 
laws and precluded unwanted industrial concentration.
266
 By 1913, almost all the states had done away with limits on capitalization and the requirement that 
stock must be paid for in money.  See J. Newton Baker, The Evil of Special Privilege, 22 YALE L.J. 220, 
222 (1913).  Nine states even explicitly declared that absent fraud, the directors’ judgment was conclusive 
as to the value of property for which stock was issued.  See id.  Perpetual charters for any lawful purpose 
became the general practice.  Eighteen states explicitly permitted mergers and consolidations, and only 
two expressly prohibited it.  Nineteen states permitted corporations to hold stock of other corporations; 
only two prohibited this, while it was qualified in seven states.  Most states permitted corporate meetings 
to be held outside the state of incorporation and did not require that even one director be a resident of the 
incorporating state.  See id.
Several states even offered extraterritorial charters—charters for the incorporation of firms to do 
business anywhere except in the state of incorporation.  See Dill, supra note 260, at 283-86 (describing 
extraterritorial charter programs of Pennsylvania, New York, and Connecticut).
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foreign corporations—then why did they not?267  Addressing this question also explains 
the survival of the internal affairs doctrine despite the changed circumstances.  
Legislatures did not resist because collective action among states was difficult, and 
unilateral action by one state’s officials was very risky both for the state economy and 
for the political fortunes of those officials.  In-state interest groups emerged with 
concentrated stakes in continuing economic interaction with foreign corporations.  
Imposition of restrictive local rules on foreign corporations would have deterred this 
economic interaction.  Federal and state officials also developed antitrust laws and other 
policy margins besides corporate law along which they could respond more selectively 
to the demands of particular groups for insulation from the economic dislocations of the 
merger movement.  For state officials, these regulatory substitutes made local corporate 
law less important as a device for favoring local constituents or attempting to control 
local industrial organization.  Regulatory substitution reduced local constituents’ 
demands for restrictive corporate law and for imposition of local corporate rules on 
foreign corporations.
1. Difficulties of Collective Action and Risks of Unilateral Action
State officials considered coordinated action against the trusts.268  For example, 
in September 1899, governors and attorneys general of nine states participated in the St. 
Louis Antitrust Conference,269 which recommended a host of corporate law rules to 
prevent excessive industrial concentration, including the prohibition of holding 
companies and watered stock.270  The conference resolved that each state should enact 
laws “for the adequate and proper control and regulation of corporations chartered in 
that state.”  As for foreign corporations, one conference recommendation directly 
challenged the internal affairs doctrine, calling for exclusion of foreign corporations 
except on equal terms with the domestic corporations of each state “and subject to the 
same laws, rules, and regulations of the state . . . which are applicable to domestic 
corporations of that state.”271
However, it soon became apparent that coordinated state action was impossible.  
Too many legislatures pursued their own parochial interests in imitating New Jersey.  
By 1902—three short years after the St. Louis Antitrust Conference—the President of 
the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws admitted the futility of attempting adoption 
267
 For example, a state could have selectively admitted foreign corporations to do business locally based 
on their structural features.  Local competition might have been preserved if the only foreign corporations 
admitted to do business were those whose capitalization did not exceed local limits and whose shares 
were not owned by another corporation.
One later commentator argued that states’ power to exclude foreign corporations or admit them 
on conditions does not “extend so far as to give the legislatures of a state power to regulate or control the 
internal affairs of a foreign corporation.”  WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, 8 CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF 
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5807 (perm. ed. 1933).  However, absent Constitutional constraint, it is hard to 
see what prevented a state from doing so.  And as noted in the text, some have.  
268 See McCurdy, supra note 231, at 338-41.
269
 Michigan, Missouri, Texas, Arkansas, Colorado, Tennessee, Iowa, Indiana, and Montana were 
represented.  The St. Louis Anti-trust Conference, 27 PUBLIC OPINION 387 (1899).
270 See id.  On watered stock, see infra note 303 and accompanying text.
271 Id.  The resolution specifically excepted corporations engaged in interstate commerce. Id.
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of a uniform incorporation act among the states.  “The trend of legislation in too many 
of the States is to enact laws favoring incorporation with a view to the pecuniary returns 
to the State rather than with a view to adherrence [sic] to sound principles.”272
Commerce Clause limitations on state regulatory authority likely exacerbated 
this collective action problem among state legislatures.273 For interstate commerce, the 
states would have to rely on the federal government to regulate, and regulation of 
intrastate activity was up to each individual state.  Not only would solidarity among 
forty-six jurisdictions—forty-five states plus the federal government—have been 
required.  But an effective division of regulatory responsibilities between the federal 
government and the states along Commerce Clause lines would have been quite tricky
to implement.
Congress . . . could not suppress a monopoly for the manufacture of sugar, while 
the States could not suppress a monopoly for the interstate sale of sugar.  The 
States could exclude the manufacturing corporations . . . [b]ut the States could 
not exclude the trading corporations, for the States can not regulate interstate 
commerce.  If, then, the corporations are both manufacturing and trading 
corporations, how are they to be dealt with? . . . Forty-four States may pass 
uniform laws to control such combinations; the forty-fifth may render this 
combined action in large part nugatory by chartering and protecting the very 
combination which it is the object of the forty-four to suppress.  In such case it 
would require a harmony of action among the States to prevent a monopolistic 
manufacturing combination and cooperative action on the part of the United 
States to prevent a monopolistic trading combination.  In other words, forty-six 
distinct jurisdictions must work in concert in order to protect all the people of 
the United States from combinations formed to control the prices of raw material 
and the output and price of the finished products.274
272 STATE BOARDS OF COMMISSIONERS FOR PROMOTING UNIFORMITY OF LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES, REPORT OF TWELFTH NATIONAL CONFERENCE 7 (1902).  Today this organization is known as 
NCCUSL, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.  See 
<http://www.nccusl.org/Update/DesktopDefault.aspx? tabindex=0&tabid=11> (last visited July 21, 
2004).
Besides the franchise taxes from domestic corporations, some states charged similar fees for 
foreign corporations based on their authorized capital.  See MASSACHUSETTS REPORT, supra note 115, at 
295-97.  Excluding or deterring foreign corporations would have cost these states in fees, just as the 
dissolution of domestic corporations would have.
273
 States found themselves with a classic collective action problem.  See generally OLSON, supra note 
183.  Even if every other state took the “virtuous” path against New Jersey, each individual state stood to 
gain by defecting—that is, imitating New Jersey.
274
 Ernest W. Huffcut, Constitutional Aspects of the Federal Control of Corporations, in 1 INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 232, at 1213.  Moreover, states tended to give a wide berth regarding 
regulatory issues that might run up against Commerce Clause problems.  
In yielding control of interstate commerce to the Federal Government there has been naturally 
some serious loss to the States in general governmental power, quite distinct from the mere 
inability to regulate commerce.  In the desire to avoid the evils of separate and antagonistic 
control of trade and commerce the States have deprived themselves of the power to control their 
own internal affairs whenever those affairs are connected in any direct way with commerce 
between the States or with foreign nations.
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Exacerbating the difficulty of collective action, officials in any individual state 
took great risks in attempting to curb the trusts unilaterally.  While they could certainly 
drive the trusts from the state through quo warranto actions and a foreign corporation 
statute, this might cause enormous damage to the local economy.  Once a domestic 
corporation was dissolved or a foreign corporation’s license revoked because of trust 
affiliations, it was often unclear what would happen to the firm’s local assets.  Could 
other manager-investors keep the local plant open?  Driving out trusts might have 
generated some short-term populist satisfaction, but this could not guaranty that local 
producers could survive as independent entities.275
Industry concentration was driven only in part by the private pursuit of 
monopoly; basic economic considerations also played an important part.  The rise of 
integrated national markets created larger opportunities for firms, but also put more 
firms in competition with one another.  As these firms expanded production in pursuit 
of these larger markets, excess capacity was the result.  Especially for commodities and 
standardized products, overproduction caused falling prices, imperiling some firms.  
Horizontal combination was a natural corrective.276 According to the Report of the U.S. 
Industrial Commission in 1900, “[a]mong the causes which have led to the formation of 
industrial combinations, . . . competition, so vigorous that profits of nearly all 
competing establishments were destroyed, is to be given first place.”277
To the extent that achievement of scale economies was necessary for survival, a 
legislature that unilaterally impeded these combinations effectively condemned its local 
factories to ruin.  The accompanying job losses and reduced tax base made such 
outcomes singularly undesirable. The mid-1890s was a period of severe depression.  
During the Panic of 1893, nearly 15,000 companies failed, 500 banks went into 
receivership, and nearly thirty percent of the nation’s rail system was insolvent.
Unemployment hovered around eighteen percent, and for those with jobs, wages 
dropped by an average of almost ten percent. This was not a good time for state 
officials to be discouraging local enterprise.  McCurdy notes that “after 1895, the quo 
warranto mechanism, which had seemed so promising only five years earlier, fell into 
disuse.”278 In 1902, the Indiana attorney general reported the futility of unilateral action 
against the trusts, concluding that only federal regulation would suffice.
Id. at 1211-12.  Apparently, even if this monumental solidarity could have been maintained, Quebec 
stood ready to offer a safe haven for trust corporations!  Id. at 1215.
275
 McCurdy recounts several examples of state attorneys general’s practical inability to reduce the local 
influence of Standard Oil.  Driving Standard Oil affiliates out of state could not guarantee that local 
refining and distribution operations could be sustained as independent entities.  Growing local demand for 
oil severely constrained state officials in their attempts either to fight collusion or place control of local 
assets in local hands.  Charles W. McCurdy, 54 BUS. HIST. REV. 401 (1980) (reviewing BRUCE 
BRINGHURST, ANTITRUST AND THE OIL MONOPOLY:  THE STANDARD OIL CASES, 1890-1911 (1979)). 
276 See Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Beginnings of “Big Business” in American Industry, 33 HARV. BUS. 
REV. 1, 10 (1959).
277
 1 INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 232, at 9. 
278
 McCurdy, supra note 231, at 339.  Private challenges to ultra vires consolidations by minority 
shareholders, however, were consistently recognized, and mergers enjoined.  Small v. Minneapolis 
Electro Matrix Co., 45 Minn. 264 (1891); Easun v. Buckeye Brewing Co., 51 F. 156 (C.C. N.D. Ohio, 
W.D. 1892); Marble Co. v. Harvey, 92 Tenn. 115 (1892); Byrne v. Schuyler Electric Mfg. Co., 65 Conn. 
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No trust has been incorporated in Indiana under our law during the last 
four years.  Foreign corporations have purchased individual plants in this state 
and are operating them in connection with their other plants, purchased 
elsewhere.  The federal authorities are now engaged in a prosecution which will 
test to the limits the necessity of further legislation by congress [sic], or the 
necessity for a constitutional amendment which will enable congress [sic] to 
adequately regulate, or totally destroy, every form of trust or combination.
It is apparent that control of combinations should be general in character, 
for, while one state might drive manufacturing concerns from its borders, it 
would only result in closing down all domestic factories and the furnishing of 
the products thereof to the people of such state by the factories of a foreign state, 
where legislation was friendly to such combinations, as it now is in more than a 
half-dozen states of the Union.
General laws and regulations for concerns that do a general business 
throughout the United States has [sic] come to be, by common consent, the only 
effective remedy available.279
2. Local Interest Group Influences
Even before the merger movement, once firms’ operations began to spill over 
state lines, these firms naturally developed constituencies in various states that stood to 
benefit from the firms’ doing business locally.280  With the merger movement, dramatic 
horizontal consolidation and vertical integration made interstate firms ubiquitous across 
important industries.  Local employees now worked for foreign corporations.  Local 
customers and suppliers had important relations with foreign corporations.  Foreign 
corporations used local transportation and communication facilities.  They might offer 
capital, managerial expertise, or scale economies that could keep the local plant in 
operation, when it would otherwise be shuttered.  They might offer an interstate 
distribution system for locally produced goods.  For economic and political purposes, 
whether the foreign corporation had significant economic ties to its state of 
incorporation now mattered little.  
Local interest groups with high per capita stakes in continuing economic 
interaction with these foreign corporations could readily organize to assert their 
interests.  Local managers and other employees of foreign-incorporated firms or 
affiliates of foreign holding companies, for example, would not have been shy about 
voicing their druthers to legislators.  The same with local customers—especially 
industrial consumers—and suppliers.  All would have had large stakes in the continued 
336 (1895); Forrester v. Boston & Montana Consol. Copper and Silver Mining Co., 21 Montana 544 
(1898).
279 BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE STATE OF INDIANA, NOVEMBER 1, 1900, TO 
OCTOBER 31, 1902 24 -25 (1902).
280 See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Contract and Jurisdictional Freedom, in THE FALL AND 
RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 325, 333 (F.H. Buckley, ed., 1999); Carney, supra note 18, at 313.  The 
firms themselves were influential in local politics, contributing to both political parties.  JEREMIAH W. 
JENKS, THE TRUST PROBLEM 192 (rev. ed. 1903).  The large conglomerates were rumored to exercise 
inordinate sway over local legislatures.  Id. at 190.
BEFORE COMPETITION:  ORIGINS OF THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS DOCTRINE
59
DRAFT March 5, 2006
in-state activities of foreign corporations.  Legislators protective of these stakes would 
enjoy the political support of these groups, as well as the political benefits from an 
increased tax base from these economic activities.  With these pressures and 
inducements to support local interaction with foreign corporations, legislatures would 
have been hard pressed to maintain laws generally excluding foreign corporations or 
significantly deterring their entry.  States’ territorial monopolies on corporate law 
appeared unsalvageable.  
Reluctance to demand conditions for entry likely precluded any thought of 
regulating foreign corporations’ internal affairs.  The corporate law rules at issue during 
that period had been fundamental regulatory tools, meant to regulate local industrial 
organization for the benefit primarily of local producers and investors, as well as for 
rent-seeking legislators.281  Corporate longevity and capitalization limits, the scope of 
corporate purposes, authorization for mergers and corporate stock holdings, and the 
prospect of unlimited liability in some circumstances were all up for debate.  
Legislatures were ready to concede these most critical issues concerning corporations’ 
internal organization in order to retain the incorporation of their own local firms and to 
avoid deterring foreign corporations whose entry might boost their ailing economies.  
Any contemplated application of local corporate rules to a foreign corporation would 
likely have been triggered based on certain local contacts or activities of the foreign 
corporation.  But regulating the internal affairs of foreign corporations on this basis 
would have caused some foreign corporations simply to avoid those sorts of local 
contacts282—contacts that were presumably desirable to well-organized local interests.
Especially in the immediate aftermath of the merger movement, potential 
incursions on the internal affairs doctrine would have enjoyed only weak political 
support.  Local producers could not be helped by state officials’ attempts to curb foreign 
competition.  Returns to scale and the rise of multistate firms and powerful monopolies 
in numerous industries made control of local industrial organization impossible for state 
officials.  Even driving out foreign corporations with traditional structural regulation 
would therefore not have helped local producers survive.283 Local investors in foreign 
corporations might have wished for application of protective local corporate law by 
local courts for disputes over internal affairs, but these benefits would have been 
difficult to anticipate ex ante.  The intricacies of jurisdictional rules for corporate law 
would likely not have been salient to local investors, who might come to learn of these 
rules only in the event of a dispute.  At least in the early part of the twentieth century, 
these investors likely comprised only a fairly small group in any state, so that a critical 
mass of disgruntled investors would have been unlikely to form.284
281 See supra Part IV.B.2.
282
 The Connecticut legislature had earlier apparently learned a hard lesson in this regard.  An 1881 
amendment to its corporation statute to require that a majority of directors be residents and that twenty 
percent of a corporation’s capital stock be paid in cash succeeded in “[driving] from her borders not only 
foreign enterprises but also her own industries.”  COOK, supra note 207, at § 935.
283 See supra note 275 and accompanying text. 
284 The exceptional case might have been New York.  Significant public ownership of stock—separating 
ownership from control—likely occurred there before it spread to other states.  This may explain New 
York’s singular early attempt to protect local investors in disregard of the internal affairs doctrine just on 
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Especially given the general trend of liberalized corporate law, there were likely 
fewer and fewer important protections in local corporate law that local producers or 
investors would have found useful.  Provisions facilitating industrial consolidation and 
less constraining to management were copied; provisions with the opposite bent were 
rebuffed.  For example, New Jersey’s amendments to facilitate corporate acquisitions 
included a provision shielding directors’ business judgment concerning the value of 
property acquired for stock.285  This was a dramatic liberalization in the rules of internal 
corporate management.  In contrast, as discussed below, New York attempted to impose 
certain personal liabilities on directors, officers, and stockholders of foreign 
corporations—a fairly aggressive incursion on internal affairs.286  But while New 
York’s regulatory amendment was rebuffed,287 New Jersey’s liberalizing provision was 
quickly copied, even by New York.  By 1903, six other states including New York had 
adopted provisions giving conclusive effect to directors’ judgment on the valuation of 
property taken as payment for stock.288
In addition, managers’ increasing power within firms probably also enabled 
them to be more effective lobbyists than shareholders.  From the early part of the 
twentieth century, power within the corporation began to shift from shareholders to 
directors.289  As late as 1896, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that absent some 
indication otherwise, managerial authority rested ultimately with stockholders.290
However, after the merger movement, as ownership separated from control and 
investors diversified their investments over a growing array of publicly traded 
companies, a class of passive investors arose.  It became more and more difficult to 
ascribe ultimate managerial authority to so large and amorphous a group.291  As power 
within firms shifted from shareholders to directors, and as securities markets emerged to 
offer diversification and liquidity to shareholders, shareholder exit became a more 
attractive option than voice.292  Widely dispersed and increasingly anonymous 
shareholders could sell, rather than fight with management.  
Having given up the fight to regulate with corporate law during the heyday of 
the merger movement, state legislatures would generally have seen increasing and 
increasingly important commercial contacts with foreign corporations.  With that trend 
the heels of the merger movement.  See supra Part V.C.2.  Ironically, New York later lagged behind other 
states in enacting blue sky laws.  As of 1920, it was apparently a center for stock promotion.  William W. 
Cook, “Watered Stock”—Commissions—“Blue Sky Laws”—Stock Without Par Value, 19 MICH. L. REV.
583, 591 (1921).
285 See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
286 See infra notes 320-327 and accompanying text.
287 See infra notes 330-335 and accompanying text.
288
 The six states were Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, New York, North Carolina, and West Virginia.  
MASSACHUSETTS REPORT, supra note 115, at 181.
289 See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960, THE CRISIS OF 
LEGAL ORTHODOXY 98 (1992).
290
 Union Pac. Rwy. v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Rwy., 163 U.S. 564, 596 (1896).
291 See HOWARD HILTON SPELLMAN, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF LAW GOVERNING CORPORATE 
DIRECTORS 4-5 (1931).
292 See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY:  RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, 
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1972). 
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firmly in place, legislators and interest groups in each state would generally have seen 
no point to opposing recognition of foreign corporations and respect for foreign 
corporation law.293  Therefore, the extant internal affairs doctrine never came up for 
revision.  By their inaction, state legislatures acquiesced in letting firms choose.  
3. Regulatory Substitution
Responding to the flaccidity of corporate law as a rent-seeking and regulatory 
tool, both Congress and state legislatures made adjustments along other policy margins 
in order to answer the demands of interest groups previously protected by the traditional 
structural restrictions in corporate law.  For example, Congress passed the Sherman Act 
to fight the trusts at the national level, in large measure at the behest of small businesses 
and farmers fearing “the ravages of excessive competition.”294  State legislatures 
devised state antitrust laws and other types of territorial regulation to protect particular
local producers and trade groups.  While territorial monopolies on corporate law could 
no longer be maintained, and general imposition of local corporate law on foreign 
corporations became unworkable, state legislatures could still target territorial 
regulation or impositions more specifically.  And of course, Congress could act on a 
national scale.  This regulatory substitution would have helped to minimize any political 
pressure for revision of the internal affairs doctrine.  Here, I focus on state legislatures’ 
policy adjustments.
i. Influencing Local Industrial and Labor Organization 
State legislatures devised new territorial regulation to affect local industrial and 
labor organization after corporate law became unusable in this regard.
State antitrust laws offer the most immediate example of this sort of regulatory 
substitution.  These laws came almost simultaneously with the corporate law 
liberalization that eliminated structural limitations states had relied upon to regulate 
local market structure.  Without the ability to prohibit holding company structures or 
limit the capitalization of corporations doing local business, state legislatures could at 
least retain some influence over the structure of specific local markets through antitrust 
laws.  These statutes enabled them to respond to the protectionist demands of local 
producers,295 as well as the popular fear of monopoly power.296  By 1914, all but seven 
293
 Ironically, New Jersey was the only state to backtrack for a crucial few years.  See supra note 34. 
294
 Herbert Hovenkamp, The Robinson-Patman Act and Competition:  Unfinished Business, 68 
ANTITRUST L.J. 125, 130 (2000).  See also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY:  THE 
LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 47-51 (2d ed. 1999).
295 Whatever one thinks about the relative weight of the various goals stated as justifications for 
antitrust laws, small producers organizing to protect themselves against new big businesses at 
the turn of the century were critical to those laws gaining political support.  Thus, rent-seeking 
behavior was an important part of the origins of the antitrust laws.
Daniel A. Farber & Brett H. McDonnell, Why (and How) Fairness Matters at the IP/Antitrust Interface, 
87 MINN. L. REV. 1817, 1835 (2003).
296 See James May, Antitrust in the Formative Era:  Political and Economic Theory in Constitutional and 
Antitrust Analysis, 1880-1918, 50 OHIO ST. L. J. 257, 348-61 (1989) (describing state judges’ attempts to 
reconcile desire for economic growth with firms’ anticompetitive behavior). 
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of the forty-eight states had constitutional or statutory prohibitions against trusts.297
Reminiscent of the market structure regulation built into earlier state corporation laws, 
many state antitrust statutes exempted favored groups like labor and agricultural 
associations.298
Similarly, the artisans and small entrepreneurs that were once protected from 
larger businesses through the structural limitations in corporate law now lost out to the 
integrated firms.  Local industrial labor relations became an important and politically 
charged issue.  Whether state officials favored firms or labor, liberalized corporate law 
could no longer influence firm size.  If workers were to be protected, they had to be 
protected in other more direct ways.  Toward the end of the nineteenth century, state 
legislatures addressed these issues directly through their labor laws.299  One common 
enactment, for example, mandated the frequency of employee wage payments.300
Related to these general labor statutes, legislatures responded to particular 
powerful professional and trade unions with protection in the form of occupational 
licensing systems.  The favored trades and professions basically defined their own 
licensing standards, enabling them to control the supply of sanctioned specialists.  
These arrangements flourished beginning in the late nineteenth century.301  From 
doctors to plumbers and barbers and blacksmiths, legislatures succumbed to organized 
pressure for economic protection.302
ii. Shareholder Protection:  Blue Sky Laws  
For local investors as well, legislatures devised new territorially-based 
regulation to offer some protection that corporate law could no longer offer.  As stock 
offerings became larger and more widespread, promoter fraud became common.  A 
particular problem for new investors was the practice of stock watering by promoters 
who had incorporated under some state’s lax corporation laws.  To water stock,303
promoters inflated the value of property they sold to the corporation in exchange for its 
stock, before selling more of the corporation’s shares to outside investors.  These 
297 JENKS & CLARK, supra note 217, at 216.
298 See id.
299 See Lawrence M. Friedman, Freedom of Contract and Occupational Licensing 1890-1910:  A Legal 
and Social Study, 53 CAL. L. REV. 487, 489-94 (1965).
300 See id. at 489.  Wisconsin was even willing to burden corporate shareholders with labor obligations.  
Since the 1850s, a Wisconsin statute imposed liability on shareholders for corporate debts for employee 
labor claims.  In 1878, it modified the statute to apply to shareholders of foreign corporations as well.  
Joncas v. Krueger, 61 Wis. 2d 529 (1974).
301 See MORTON KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE:  PUBLIC LIFE IN LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA
411 (2000).
302 See Friedman, supra note 299.
303
 Commentators offer various theories for the origin of the term “watered stock.”  Some suggest it 
originally described the practice of dairymen of watering down their milk in order to increase their 
profits.  Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEX. L. REV. 347, 356 
n. 37 (1991).  Others believe it originated with the practice of unscrupulous farmers who induced their 
cows to drink large amounts of water just before bringing them to market.  Their increased weight 
increased their selling price.  “The stock was literally watered.”  LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, SPECULATION 
NATION:  A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORATE CAPITALISM, Ch. 4 (draft Aug. 30, 2004).  In any event, 
farmers with cows seem to be the original culprits.
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investors effectively overpaid for their stock.  They paid 100-cent dollars in cash for 
their stock; the promoter paid far less.  As a result, outside investors were deceived as to 
the strength of the company’s capitalization and asset values.
State legislatures created blue sky laws to address this popular fraud.  Corporate 
law was no longer useful for this purpose because of the new dynamics of state 
competition.304 Beginning with Kansas in 1911, states established securities 
commissions to review the merits of offerings before they could be made to local 
investors.305  The Kansas statute required registration of securities and securities 
salesmen.  Only securities that received the blessing of the commission could be sold to 
the public, and the commission enjoyed a broad scope of review.  Grounds for 
prohibiting an offering included a finding that any of the issuer’s organizational 
documents or business plan contained any “unfair, unjust, inequitable or oppressive” 
provision, or that the issuer “does not intend to do a fair and honest business,” or “does 
not promise a fair return on the stocks, bonds or other securities.”306  Within two years 
of Kansas’ enactment, twenty-three other states had followed suit.  Almost all these 
later enactments were patterned after the Kansas model.307  Shareholder protection may 
not have been the sole motive for these enactments,308 but the statutes’ protections 
would naturally have relieved legislatures from attempting to regulate through their 
corporation laws, a strategy that would have required revision of the internal affairs 
doctrine.
D. Internal Affairs Warfare:  New York and New Jersey, 1897
Imitation of New Jersey was the dominant approach among states, but it was not 
the exclusive one.  From early on in the merger movement, New York recognized New 
Jersey’s threat to New York incorporations and taxation.309 In New York, special 
legislative committees were formed in 1888, 1891, and 1897 to study the trust problem 
and recommend legislation.310 The 1891 committee report recounted the egregious 
example of the reincorporation of the Sugar Trust to New Jersey immediately following 
the New York attorney general’s successful action to dissolve the trust in New York.311
304 See Cook, supra note 284, at 589; ALFRED F. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 18-19 (1976).
305
 Precursors included statutes regulating stock subscriptions in particular industries.  LOUIS LOSS & 
EDWARD M. COWETT, BLUE SKY LAW 3-5 (1958) (describing 1852 Massachusetts statute requiring paid-
in capital for railroad companies and state regulation of securities issuance by public utilities).
306 Id. at 8 & n.24.
307 See id. at 10.
308
 Macey & Miller, supra note 303 (describing political support of banks, bank regulators, and 
prospective borrowers, who saw securities investments as competition for depositor funds).
309
 As early as 1894, New Jersey’s chartermongering strategy enabled it to “run[] the state government 
very largely on the revenues derived from New York enterprises.”  COOK, supra note 207, at § 935.
310 See NEW YORK 1888 REPORT, supra note 221; NEW YORK 1891 REPORT, supra note 223; REPORT 
AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE AND ASSEMBLY, APPOINTED TO 
INVESTIGATE TRUSTS, N.Y. SEN. DOC. NO. 40 (1897) [hereinafter NEW YORK 1897 REPORT].
311
 Eight New York corporations were members of the trust.  Following the New York state attorney 
general’s successful action against these corporations, all the constituent corporations of the trust 
transferred their property to a newly formed New Jersey corporation.  NEW YORK 1891 REPORT, supra 
note 223, at 5, 10.
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The new New Jersey entity continued doing business in New York as before.312 To add 
insult to injury, the new corporation’s officers removed the books and records of the 
trust’s former constituent entities to New Jersey in likely anticipation of New York’s 
legislative investigation.  The officers refused to produce the books even under 
subpoena from the New York legislature.313 The 1891 report acknowledged New 
Jersey’s favorable environment for trusts, including its more favorable corporation laws
that allowed a corporation to hold stock in other corporations.314  The report noted the 
New Jersey incorporation of several companies “who transact their business in New 
York, chiefly if not entirely.”315
New York’s response, however, was mixed.  While the 1891 report 
recommended aggressive measures against the trusts,316 an 1892 corporate law revision 
permitted corporations to acquire the stock of other corporations, thereby enabling 
holding company structures.317 That same year, the governor of New York approved a 
special charter for the General Electric Company, with terms based on New Jersey’s 
general corporation act, explicitly to head off the company’s reincorporation in New 
Jersey.318 Earlier in 1890, New York had also eliminated its limits on authorized 
capital, also in response to the migration of New York firms to New Jersey for their 
corporate charters.319
Finally, in 1897, New York’s legislature took direct aim at New Jersey 
corporations, with an approach more nuanced than simply imposing structural 
requirements on foreign corporations.  Instead, New York sought to affect New Jersey 
corporations’ internal affairs by imposing “all requirements of the local law especially 
312 [W]e find the Sugar Refineries Company or trust in this State declared to be unlawful by the 
highest court of the State, and then we witness the bold spectacle of the same combination 
practically going to an adjoining State and there organizing a new company under a new name, 
but practically for the same purpose, . . . and then the new company establishes itself in the same 
offices in the city of New York, and goes on with its same business and practically the same 
combination.
Id. at 13.
313 Id. at 12.
314 There is cause to believe that the persons who organized the new sugar trust and incorporated the 
same under the laws of the State of New Jersey, did so to escape the rigors of our laws in several 
particulars:
1. To escape taxation under the laws of this State.
2. Under the laws of New Jersey the company could issue common and preferred 
stock, which could not be done in New York.
3. Under the laws of New Jersey the new company could hold and own the stock 
of other companies, domestic or foreign, without restriction.
Id. at 12-13.
315 Id. at 13.
316
 The report recommended, among other things, that foreign corporations doing business in New York 
be taxed in New York, and that trust corporations organized out-of-state be required to keep their books 
and records in-state.  Id. at 13-14. 
317 N.Y. LAWS 1892, p. 90; NEW YORK 1897 REPORT, supra note 310, at 6.    
318 HENN, supra note 151, at 18; Liggett v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 562 & n.41 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
319 Id. at 561 (citing N.Y. BUS. CORP. L., 1890, c. 567, § 12.).
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designed for the protection of creditors and shareholders,”320 in complete disregard of 
the internal affairs doctrine.  Its 1897 enactment subjected officers, directors, and 
stockholders of foreign corporations transacting business in New York to personal 
liability, under the same rules applicable to domestic corporations, for (i) unauthorized 
dividends, (ii) unauthorized and excessive indebtedness, (iii) unlawful loans to 
stockholders, (iv) false certificates, reports, or public notices, (v) illegal transfers of 
stock or property when the corporation is insolvent or insolvency is threatened, and 
(vi) failure to file an annual report.321
By the time of this enactment, it was clear that New Jersey incorporation was a 
popular device for large corporations doing business in New York but seeking to avoid 
New York regulation and taxation.322 The 1897 legislative committee report confirmed 
a general trend of migration to New Jersey incorporation by firms with no business in 
New Jersey but with substantial business in New York, in order “to relieve the 
corporation . . . of some duty or obligation which would have rested upon it had it been 
organized under the laws of this State.”323  As a consequence, “although for all practical 
purposes a corporation of this State, operating here, receiving the protection of our laws, 
and the opportunities of our markets,” such a corporation “is permitted by a mere fiction 
to escape duties and obligations imposed on corporations similarly situated but created 
in our own State.”324
The committee rejected the idea that New York should compete with New 
Jersey to “traffick” in “colorable charters.”325  Instead, it attempted to deter the foreign 
incorporation of New York businesses and to remedy any disadvantage to domestic 
corporations from New York’s more stringent corporate law rules.326 With its 1897 
320 NEW YORK 1897 REPORT, supra note 310, at 36.  
321 Laws 1897, c. 384, Sec. 4.  See also Historical Note, N.Y. STOCK CORP. L. § 114 (McKinney 1940).  
The “transacting business” requirement meant to target corporations with all or substantially all of their 
business in New York.  NEW YORK 1897 REPORT, supra note 310.  The same enactment required each 
foreign corporation doing business within the state to file an annual report detailing its capital stock, its 
debt, and its assets, and to keep its stock book in the state and available for inspection by stockholders 
and judgment creditors, as well as state officers.  Laws 1897, c. 384, Sec. 2, 3.
Personal liability of officers, directors, and shareholders to the corporation and its creditors falls 
squarely within the traditional understanding of internal affairs.  See supra note 20.  See also Erickson v. 
Nesmith, 86 Mass. 233 (1862) (finding no jurisdiction over suit by creditor of New Hampshire 
corporation against stockholders); Halsey v. McLean, 94 Mass. 438 (1866) (following Erickson as to 
creditor of New York corporation).  A few modern cases, however, have applied forum law to veil 
piercing cases.  See Johnson, supra note 22, at 273 & n.91.  Hansmann and Kraakman suggest tha t choice 
of law rules should distinguish the corporation’s tort creditors from its contract creditors for purposes of 
assigning personal liability to shareholders, with the internal affairs doctrine applicable only to contract 
creditors.  Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, A Procedural Focus on Unlimited Shareholder 
Liability, 106 HARV. L. REV. 446, 450-51 (1992).
322 NEW YORK 1897 REPORT, supra note 310, at 22; William T. Coleman, Corporate Dividends and the 
Conflict of Laws, 63 HARV. L. REV. 433, 447 (1950).
323 NEW YORK 1897 REPORT, supra note 310, at 22.  
324 Id. at 22.
325 Id.
326
 One particular high court decision caused some legislative anxiety regarding potential competitive 
disadvantages for New York corporations.  The Court of Appeals in Vanderpoel v. Gorman, 140 N.Y. 
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enactment, “New York attempted forcibly to domesticate foreign companies under 
penalty of practical withdrawal of the corporate shield of protection of stockholders and 
officers, imposing a contract liability on stockholders and directors.”327
New York’s special endowments help explain its unilateral gambit against New 
Jersey’s chartermongering strategy.  With New York being home to Wall Street and the 
center of corporate finance, the legislature would have been especially solicitous to the 
demands of commercial lenders and investment houses for protection from the financial 
shenanigans of wayward corporate managers of foreign corporations.  Special 
protections for local creditors and investors against illegal loans, unauthorized 
indebtedness, unauthorized dividends, and the like by foreign corporations is not 
surprising. With its own robust state economy, the New York legislature also enjoyed a 
luxury unavailable to other state legislatures:  it did not fear driving foreign 
corporations out of the jurisdiction.  Given its sheer size and large internal market—it 
was the most populous state at the end of the nineteenth century by a large margin328—
firms in many industries could not afford not to have a place of business in New York.  
Though the Commerce Clause protected out-of-state goods from discrimination, the 
costs of transportation and communication would have made it prohibitively expensive 
to try to supply the entire New York market from out-of-state.329
New York’s gambit was short-lived, however.  New Jersey swiftly retaliated. It 
had already passed a retaliatory reciprocity law in 1894 promising to impose, against 
the foreign corporations of any other state doing business in New Jersey, the same 
taxes, penalties, and other obligations imposed by that other state on New Jersey 
corporations.330 This time, in response to New York in 1897, the New Jersey legislature 
enacted a law barring actions in New Jersey to enforce any statutory personal liability 
imposed by any other state on stockholders, officers, or directors of any New Jersey 
563 (1894), held that New York’s prohibition on transfers and assignments by corporations in 
contemplation of insolvency did not apply to foreign corporations.  A New Jersey corporation’s 
assignment for the benefit of creditors—permissible under New Jersey’s corporation law—was therefore 
validated.  The New York legislature felt that this decision would disadvantage domestic corporations 
relative to their foreign competitors doing business in New York.  Irving Trust Co. v. Maryland Casualty 
Co., 83 F.2d 168, 170 (2d Cir. 1936). 
327
 Dill, supra note 260, at 285.
328
 New York’s population in 1900 was close to 7.3 million.  Pennsylvania was second, with a million 
fewer people, and Illinois was a distant third with only 4.8 million.  UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, 
STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS OF THE UNITED STATES 9 (2003).
329 See Carney, supra note 18, at 312-14 (noting that only states with large internal markets and large 
numbers of local corporations would attempt to regulate internal affairs of foreign corporations).
330
 Liggett v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 563 n.44 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (citing New Jersey Laws 1894, c. 
228, p. 347, § 3); 1 INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 232, at 1085 (Testimony of Mr. James 
B. Dill) (1900); Grandy, supra note 115, at 681.  See also Texas Co. v. Dickinson, 75 A. 803 (N.J. Super. 
1910) (holding that Texas corporation not entitled to certificate of authorization to do business in New 
Jersey for failure to pay $12,040 license fee calculated based on amount of fee Texas would impose on 
like New Jersey corporation); Babe Kaufman Music Corp. v. Mandia, 13 A.2d 790 (NJ. Ch. 1940) 
(precluding New York corporation from bringing suit in New Jersey on contract made in New Jersey 
prior to obtaining authorization to do business in New Jersey, on basis that New York law would impose 
same penalty on similarly situated New Jersey corporation doing business in New York).
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corporation for obligations of the corporation.331  The bill was drafted, introduced into 
the legislature, and signed into law by the governor all in short order—forty-eight hours 
from start to finish.332 New Jersey’s corporation trust companies veritably crowed to 
prospective charter applicants about the state’s responsiveness.  Two companies 
actively advertised this aggressive retaliation in an identical circular:
May we not refer to this as an instance of the watchful care which the N. 
J. Corporation Guarantee & Trust Co. (ditto the Corporation Trust Co. of N. J.) 
exercises over the corporations located with it when we say that this act, the 
importance of which cannot be overestimated, was drawn by counsel, was 
introduced at 8:30 P.M of March 29, and by 2:30 P.M. the following day was 
signed by the governor and became a law?333
According to Dill, that enactment essentially nullified any effect of the New York 
law.334  New York effected further liberalization of its corporation law in 1901.335
E. Institutional Inertia
State legislatures ultimately did not fight to preserve territorial corporate law, 
and they left undisturbed the then-existing internal affairs doctrine.  In the meantime, 
courts continued to conceive of corporations in territorial terms, echoing state 
sovereignty considerations from the eighteenth century.  Courts referenced the 
sovereign powers of the incorporating state in refusing jurisdiction over disputes 
involving the internal affairs of foreign corporations.  For example, an 1894 Minnesota 
Supreme Court decision noted:
The doctrine is well settled that courts will not exercise visitorial powers 
over foreign corporations, or interfere with the management of their internal 
affairs. Such matters must be settled by the courts of the state creating the 
corporation. This rule rests upon a broader and deeper foundation than the mere 
want of jurisdiction in the ordinary sense of that word. It involves the extent of 
the authority of the state (from which its courts derive all their powers) over 
foreign corporations.336
331 LAWS OF NEW JERSEY (1897), p 124.
332
 Dill, supra note 260, at 285.
333
 Steffens, supra note 239, at 50.
334
 Dill, supra note 260, at 285.  In one famous case, however, directors of a New Jersey corporation 
were held personally liable to their corporation for unlawful dividends under the New York statute.
German-American Coffee Co. v. Diehl, 216 N.Y. 57 (1915), reversing 167 App. Div. 928 (1st Dep’t 
1915).  The corporation subsequently recovered.  German-American Coffee Co. v. O’Neil, 102 Misc. 165 
(Sup. Ct. 1918). 
335 See Liggett v. Lee, 288 U.S. at 563 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (citing N.Y. Laws 1901, cc. 355, 520).
336
 Guilford v. W. Union Telegraph Co., 59 Minn. 332, 339-40 (Minn. 1894).  Despite this acknowledged 
limitation on the court’s jurisdiction, however, it proceeded to order the corporation’s issuance of 
replacement stock certificates to an in-state shareholder, finding that this would not interfere with internal 
management of corporate affairs.  See also Clark v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass’n, 14 App. D.C. 154 
(1899):
[A]cts [authorizing local business by foreign insurance companies] do not extend the jurisdiction 
of the courts of one State and authorize them to reach over their territorial limits into the 
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In 1910, a Pennsylvania court sustained a demurrer in an internal affairs dispute 
involving a New Jersey corporation, in part because the action would require “the aid of 
a chancellor of this state to inquire into the internal management of a foreign 
corporation, and to make a decree in derogation of the sovereign power of the state of 
New Jersey, which state alone may investigate charges of the character here 
presented.”337  Similarly, in 1910 a New Jersey court noted the affront to a sister state 
that would result from taking jurisdiction over an internal dispute of a foreign 
corporation.  Such a move would constitute “the usurpation by one state of the power of 
another over its own institutions.”338 In enunciating the jurisdictional rule, courts 
readily recognized states’ lack of power regarding such disputes.339
The existing tradition of deference to the law and courts of the firm’s state of 
incorporation was effortlessly followed, though the context and consequences had 
changed quite dramatically from the days of state territorial monopoly in which the 
internal affairs doctrine had originated.
VI. CONCLUSION
Here, I summarize the solution to the puzzle of the internal affairs doctrine.  I 
then explore the implications of my analysis, offering a few preliminary lessons that this 
history of the internal affairs doctrine may teach us regarding the promise and prospects 
of regulatory competition generally.  
The existence of the internal affairs doctrine seems puzzling when viewed as a 
snapshot—an equilibrium captured in a moment in time.  It becomes less puzzling, 
however, when viewed as part of a history, involving a series of separate but related 
jurisdiction of another State, and to bring into review and revision the corporate acts and internal 
affairs of the local corporations of the latter State. Such a power, if attempted to be exercised, 
would be futile and ridiculous. Indeed, neither the legislatures of the States, nor the Congress of 
the United States, could confer such power.
Id. at __.
Similarly, in 1897, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed dismissal of an action by 
shareholders of an electric utility company against the management for breach of fiduciary duty.  The 
shareholders were Pennsylvania residents, and the corporation’s major business was apparently the 
supply of electricity to the city of Philadelphia, but the company was incorporated in New Jersey.  
Madden v. Penn Electric Light Co., 37 A. 817 (Penn. 1897).  In affirming the dismissal, the court noted 
that plaintiffs’ prayer for relief would require “corporate management of a foreign corporation” by the 
Pennsylvania courts.  But the corporation was “a New Jersey corporation, created by another state, and 
subject to the corporation laws of that state.”  Id. at 818.  The Pennsylvania courts would not intervene 
even for a Pennsylvania resident “to protect him from the consequences of a voluntary membership in a 
foreign corporation.  By the very act of membership, he intrusted his money to the control of an 
organization owing its existence to, and governed by, the laws of another state.”  Id.
337
 Happersett v. Eaton, 38 Pa. C.C. 2 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1910).  The shareholder action involved accusations 
of unlawful dividends and unlawful asset transfers without shareholder consent.
338
 Jackson v. Hooper, 75 N.J. Eq. 592, 606 (1910).
339 See In re Fryeburg Water Co., 79 N.H. 123 (N.H. 1919) (finding that state public service commission 
lacked jurisdiction to approve stock issuance by foreign water company); Southern Sierras Power Co. v. 
R.R. Comm’n of Cal., 205 Cal. 479 (Cal. 1928) (holding railroad commission has no jurisdiction to issue 
permit to foreign electrical power company regarding issuance of stock).  Cf. Kimball v. St. Louis & S.F. 
Rwy Co., 157 Mass. 7 (Mass. 1892) (finding that while court had jurisdiction over suit by shareholder to 
enjoin foreign corporation from issuing certain bonds, it would be “misuse” of powers to adjudicate suit). 
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episodes.  The piecemeal development of the doctrine and then state charter competition 
illustrates how a market for regulation may emerge, despite the seeming downside for 
rent-seeking lawmakers.  In the face of court decisions espousing the internal affairs 
doctrine, legislators’ consistent inaction was rational, albeit for different reasons at 
different times.  The context for corporate law changed dramatically from the time of 
the doctrine’s first articulation to its later employ as a rule facilitating state competition.  
At each phase, legislators concerned with their own private interests had ample reason 
to accept the doctrine as articulated.
Courts’ application of the internal affairs doctrine could honor firms’ choice of 
corporate law only when firms had some choice about where to incorporate.  Firms had 
such a choice only after (a) incorporating states became willing to grant charters to 
firms without regard to any territorial tie, and (b) host states became willing to
recognize foreign corporations’ status and allow them to do business in-state—again 
without regard to whether they had economic ties to the incorporating state.  Only under 
these conditions could the internal affairs doctrine operate to facilitate competition.  But 
at the initial articulation of the doctrine, these conditions did not hold.  
Originally, the doctrine protected legislatures’ monopolies on corporate law.  
When the doctrine first emerged in the 1860s, serving to defend states’ sovereignty over 
their corporate creatures, state legislatures would have had no cause to complain.  The 
doctrine’s deference to the incorporating state regarding corporate internal affairs 
merely confirmed states’ existing monopolies.  With territorial corporate law, the 
doctrine precluded competition.  The doctrine thus cemented corporations’ dependence 
on the legislative grace of their home state legislatures.
Over time, however, the context for corporation law changed dramatically.  
Industrialization created economic conditions favoring large-scale firms in major 
industries.  New Jersey’s corporate law innovations during the great merger movement
responded to the legal needs of these large-scale firms, leading to the demise of 
territoriality in corporate law—the rending of territorial ties between firms and their 
incorporating states.  Tramp corporations emerged, sporting charters from states with 
which they enjoyed no substantive ties.  The great trusts re-formed themselves as New 
Jersey corporations.  States generally recognized the corporate status of these colossal
tramp corporations and encouraged their conduct of local business activity.  It would 
have been economically imprudent for most states, and politically disastrous for state 
legislators, to oppose their local presence or condition their entry.  Too many local 
interests depended on the continuing local economic activity of these foreign 
corporations at the turn of the twentieth century. Moreover, only collective action 
among state legislatures—a cartel, in effect—could preserve the rent-generating 
potential of state corporate law, and barriers to collective action were high.
Along with these strategic economic considerations, general liberalization of 
state corporation laws meant that imposition of local corporate law on foreign 
corporations would have offered little by way of added protection for local investors or 
producers. Legislators would therefore have had little to gain from such a strategy.  
Revisiting the internal affairs doctrine would have been an unattractive prospect for 
rational legislators.  
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Although conditions had changed—now firms could choose their incorporating 
state—the internal affairs doctrine and its notion of deference to the incorporating state
remained unchanged.  Originally a rule of deference to states’ territorial monopolies on 
corporate law, in its new context, the internal affairs doctrine became a rule respecting 
private choice and enabling competition.
This history of the internal affairs doctrine has lessons for regulatory 
competition generally.  Competition proposals abound in other areas of regulation.340
These proposals attempt in some measure to generalize the corporate charter 
competition model.  But the historical contingency behind the internal affairs doctrine 
and resulting charter competition casts doubt that this model may be easily replicated.  
The role of the internal affairs doctrine in facilitating charter competition was not 
planned, and it was not inevitable. For proposed competition in other areas, the path to 
facilitative choice of law—and the path of institutional evolution more generally—is 
unclear and has generally remained unspecified.341
Timing and sequencing matter.  The internal affairs doctrine actually preceded
strong-form charter competition, and the doctrine emerged in a wholly different context.  
Other important conditions were also in place before strong-form competition could
emerge.  Earlier Commerce Clause decisions had severely curtailed states’ ability to 
discriminate against out-of-state products.342  The resulting national product markets 
had two important impacts.  First, they enhanced firms’ geographical mobility.  A firm 
might locate operations to avoid a state’s unfavorable regulatory climate without losing 
access to that state’s product markets.  Second, national product markets begat dramatic 
industrial consolidation and the formation of massive interstate firms.  These enormous
firms played a key role in enabling competition.  While these firms needed New Jersey 
in the 1890s, New Jersey probably needed these great conglomerates as well.  There 
could have been no more effective ambassador for acceptance of New Jersey tramp 
corporations.  
340
 E.g., Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International 
Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903 (1998) (proposing that international issuers be 
allowed to choose their securities law); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to 
Securities Regulation 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998) (proposing that U.S. states be allowed to offer securities 
regulatory regimes to compete with federal securities law for issuers in U.S.); Roberta Romano, The Need 
for Competition in International Securities Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 387 (2001) 
(advocating issuer choice in international securities regulation); Robert K. Rasmussen, A New Approach 
to Transnational Insolvencies, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1 (1997) (arguing for private choice of insolvency 
law for transnational insolvency).  See also Howell E. Jackson, Centralization, Competition, and 
Privatization in Financial Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 649, 654 (2001) (noting emergence of 
jurisdictional competition arguments in international financial regulation).
341
 Frederick Tung, From Monopolists to Markets?: A Political Economy of Issuer Choice in 
International Securities Regulation, 2002 WISC. L. REV. 1363 (arguing that issuer choice proposals have 
overlooked critical choice of law issues); Frederick Tung, Lost in Translation: From U.S. Corporate 
Charter Competition to Issuer Choice in International Securities Regulation, 39 GA. L. REV. 525 (2005) 
(challenging use of U.S. corporate charter competition as model for issuer choice in international 
securities regulation).
342 See supra notes 120-124 and accompanying text.
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At the outset, there was significant legal uncertainty as to how the new tramp 
corporations would be treated in the states in which they conducted business.  Some 
courts and commentators deemed tramp incorporation to involve a dual fraud.  
To obtain a charter for the purpose of evading the laws of a foreign state, under 
cover of the rule of comity, would be a fraud upon the state granting the charter; 
and to attempt to act under such charter in the foreign state would be a fraud 
upon the latter.343
Some courts consequently refused to recognize the corporate status of these firms, 
treating them instead as partnerships and imposing liability on their promoters.344
Many a run-of-the-mill firm would likely have hesitated to test tramp
incorporation in this uncertain environment.  There was considerable risk in taking out a 
liberal charter from a state with no other connection to the business of the firm.  
Standard Oil, however, was no run-of-the-mill firm.  Nor were the other trusts that 
became the targets for state attorneys general in the 1880s.  The trusts thus played an 
important role in forcing—and winning—the issue.  Less powerful firms with less 
dramatic corporate law needs would not likely have taken up the challenge or so readily
won over recalcitrant host states.  
It was in this legal and economic environment that state legislatures modified 
their strategies for corporate law and corporate regulation to permit strong-form charter 
competition. These various preconditions were essential for such competition to 
emerge and for the internal affairs doctrine to assume its central role in enabling this 
competition.345
343
 2 VICTOR MORAWETZ, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 965(a) (2d ed. 1886). 
344 See Cleaton v. Emery, 49 Mo. App. 345 (1892); Taylor v. Branham, 35 Fla. 297 (1895).  See also 
COOK, supra note 207, v. 1 § 238 (citing other late-1800s authorities refusing recognition of pseudo-
foreign corporations and imposing liability on stockholders as partners).  Even in New York as late as 
1891, it was apparently still a plausible argument that New York citizens who incorporated in another 
state intending to carry on the corporate business solely in New York had engaged in a fraudulent 
incorporation not deserving of recognition.  While this argument was rejected by New York’s high court
in Demarest v. Flack, 128 N.Y. 205 (1891), it was not taken lightly.  Well into the twentieth century, 
courts distinguished true foreign corporations from pseudo-foreign corporations, treating the latter as a 
distinct category of problem.   See, e.g., Ernst v. Rutherford & Boiling Springs Gas Co., 56 N.Y.S. 403 
(1899); Babcock v. Farwell, 245 Ill. 14, 36 (1910); Corry v. Barre Granite & Quarry Co., 91 Vt. 413 
(1917); Cunliffe v. Consumers Ass’n of American, 280 Pa. 263 (1924); Williamson v. Missouri-Kansas 
Pipe Line Co., 56 F.2d 503 (7th Cir. 1932).  “The modern corporation, wandering from home very much 
like the ‘emancipated’ infant, raises a problem non-existent at the time the views of corporation law were 
first formulated.”  Comment, Corporations—Interference With the Internal Affairs of a Foreign 
Corporation, 31 MICH. L. REV. 682, 692 (1933).
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 This is not to say interjurisdictional pressures would not otherwise have affected the content of 
corporate law.  Such pressures affect the content of all regulation.  But the competition would likely not 
have taken the form of law-as-a-product competition.  The dearth of law-as-a-product competition in 
other regulatory areas suggests the uniqueness of internal affairs doctrine.
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This evolutionary tale of the internal affairs doctrine and modern charter 
competition refutes notions that the doctrine was inevitable or resulted from any 
underlying efficiency-enhancing rational design.346 As Stephen Jay Gould has noted:
A historical explanation does not rest on direct deduction from laws of nature, 
but on an unpredictable sequence of antecedent states, where any major change 
in any step of the sequence would have altered the final result. This final result 
is therefore dependent, or contingent, upon everything that came before—the 
inerasable and determining signature of history.347
The historical solution to the puzzle of the internal affairs doctrine casts doubt 
that fundamental institutional change—here, regulators’ voluntary surrender of their 
prescriptive authority—may be accomplished merely through casual prescription.  
Markets for law may not form spontaneously.  Existing institutional arrangements may 
matter, and they may or may not favor competition.  Prescriptions for competition may 
therefore be incomplete without careful consideration of existing institutional 
arrangements.  More generally, legal prescriptions may necessitate substantial 
institutional adjustments.  Besides identifying normatively attractive legal 
prescriptions—an important task in and of itself—scholars might do well to query the 
institutional basis for the status quo and marking—or at least suggesting—prospective
paths to institutional reform.  
Happily, in any event, my analysis may have something for everyone.  While the 
historical contingency of state charter competition may dampen enthusiasm for broad 
prescriptions for regulatory competition, race-to-the-top advocates believing charter 
competition to be efficient can be grateful for the confluence of small events that 
pushed U.S. corporate law down the efficient path.  Skeptics of regulatory competition, 
on the other hand, may also take some comfort.  Even if one believes that the corporate 
law race among U.S. states runs downward, it may be a race whose running is confined 
to its particular historical path.
346
 Functional explanations for the internal affairs doctrine have cause and consequence exactly 
backwards.  The doctrine was not designed to enable private choice and charter competition.  Instead, 
charter competition evolved around the pre-existing internal affairs doctrine.  But no one intended this at 
the doctrine’s origin.  The doctrine originally did not honor private choice but its opposite—states’ 
territorial monopolies.  Moreover, the doctrine may serve the ends of consistency and predictability in the 
modern context, as functional explanations have observed.  But at the doctrine’s origin, consistency and 
predictability were subsidiary concerns to—and byproducts of—courts’ concern for the sovereignty of 
the incorporating state.
347 STEPHEN JAY GOULD, WONDERFUL LIFE, THE BURGESS SHALE AND THE NATURE OF HISTORY ___ 
(1989).
